John Locke and the Uncivilized Society
John Locke and the Uncivilized Society. Scott Robinson, Lexington Press, 2021
Many commentators have sounded the alarm over the level of political polarization among the American populace over the last several years. Americans’ distrust of their political counterparts is arguably at an all-time high. We have seemingly moved past the point of merely disagreeing into the much more dangerous territory of impugning the motives of our opponents. Resistance has also moved beyond elections and into the streets, sometimes ending in violence. While some have attempted to place blame on particular groups or individuals: Donald Trump, Barack Obama, social justice warriors, white supremacists, atheists, and religious fundamentalists (to name a few), others have turned to broader explanations such as wealth inequality, the media, the educational system, and technology. What they tend to share in common is a reductionist worldview, informed by ideological assumptions, which obscures the root of the problem. In order to better understand our “uncivilized society,” Scott Robinson turns to the work, and interpretations, of John Locke. While acknowledging the legitimacy of Locke’s influence on the American Revolution, Robinson makes a multi-faceted argument regarding Locke’s re-emergence in scholarship during the middle of the 20th century and his subsequent influence on contemporary American society.
Robinson’s provocative thesis is “the uncivilized Lockean society emerges because it is a product of a political theory designed to encourage resistance and to discourage robust philosophical reasoning.”[1] Locke’s theory arguably creates, and supports, selfish citizens who pursue their material interests with little regard for the good of the whole. Moreover, Locke cloaked his theory in language designed to hide its revolutionary and partisan motivations. Drawing from Voegelin’s concept of pneumopathology, Robinson calls Locke’s project a “subtle ideological construction.”
Robinson spends the first several chapters framing the argument. The first chapter includes a variety of contemporary examples of incivility in American politics, with an emphasis on cases involving “resistance against political actors whose actions have been consented to.”[2]Unlike the Declaration of Independence, which included empirically grounded grievances against the King, the modern resistance movements (such as Black Lives Matter and the Malheur Occupation) often resort to abstract charges against democratically elected officials. Divorcing social justice from political justice invites force over persuasion, and disputes get settled through violence in the streets instead of the ballot box. The second chapter outlines the interpretative battles in Lockean scholarship, with the author staking a claim in the critical camp, along with contemporary scholars Hazony and Deneen. Robinson argues the derailments in liberalism are not due primarily to a misapplication of Locke’s work, but are rather the expected outcome of substituting an ideologically motivated political theory in place of a philosophically robust one.
Chapter three outlines the philosophical framework the author uses to diagnose the problems inherent in Locke’s work, namely Eric Voegelin’s concept of pneumopathology (a sickness of the spirit). Voegelin did not mince words in his criticism of Locke in a letter to fellow critic Leo Strauss, calling Locke a nonphilosopher and political ideologue and noting the Second Treatise was founded on a “psychology of desire.”[3]Voegelin’s definition of philosophy is instructive: the love of being through love of divine being as the source of its order. In Locke, much like Hobbes, Voegelin is suggesting amor sui and dominion over being as the motivating principles. Robinson agrees with Voegelin that Strauss’s analysis of Locke’s concealment (which he attributed to political reasons) does not go deep enough. After acknowledging fundamental agreement with Voegelin, the author shies away from fully embracing the term Voegelin developed, pneumopathology, in favor of subtle ideological construction. Although it accurately describes what Locke is doing, it does not tell us why he is doing it. In explaining his preference for the term, the author states, “subtle ideological constructor suggests the activity of philosophical denial, where the term pneumopathology suggests an actual psychological condition.”[4] However, philosophical denial, using Voegelin’s definition, does indeed represent a spiritual sickness. And Voegelin is careful to point out someone like Locke is not suffering from a mental condition, but a spiritual one. Modern psychology (in spite of the literal meaning of the term) refrains from discussions of spiritual substance and does not seem to recognize the existence of anything resembling a soul. Voegelin suggests the philosopher is a physician for the soul, which points to someone like Robinson, not a psychologist in a clinical setting, as the proper diagnostician of a spiritual malady. Perhaps the shift is more about the audience than the substance, something the author suggests in passing.
Terminological quibbles aside, Robinson convincingly demonstrates Locke knowingly engaged in an ideologically motivated endeavor and carefully concealed it. He spends two chapters on the main components of Locke’s system: his speculative view of history and abstract definition of rebellion. Regarding the former, Robinson suggests Locke’s historical speculation is built to support his preference for a life of a material convenience. In other words, Locke presents an all too convenient theory of history that seems to necessarily lead to a civil society marked by material comfort. While Locke does not completely abstract from history, he selectively chooses facts that support his theory and imaginatively constructs conclusions in the absence of historical records. For instance, the historical records available to Locke only concern “events that occurred after the initial discovery of civil society,” leaving the historical state of nature and historical state of war to imaginative speculation.[5] While Locke’s speculation is reasonable, Robinson points to an equally plausible alternative offered by Rousseau, which leads to significantly different conclusions about civil society.
Locke continues his ideological construction through a redefinition of rebellion. Setting aside the traditional understanding of resistance against tyranny as rebellion, Locke recasts it as an act taken by those in authority who abuse their power. The tyrants become the true rebels. Locke’s theory condemns rebellion while justifying resistance. Importantly, Locke’s resistance is couched in individualistic terms, unlike the traditional approach which was based in a communal orientation. Locke’s man is ready to resist for self-interested, materialistic reasons. Robinson links Locke’s resistance theory to the modern form of political revolution, which reflects a change in social attitudes and values fundamental to the established order. This fundamental alteration of society can be found within Locke’s theory itself, as he is not advocating a restoration of principles, but is creating a new society for his new man. As Robinson explains:
“Locke’s new definition of rebellion was coined by a man who knew that neither his society nor the thrust of Western political philosophy was actually grounded simply on personal preservation or material convenience. It is a definition that therefore suggests returning to tradition, but one that changes the tradition in the same stroke. Locke’s arguments did not restore the English precepts of ordered liberty under representative monarchy, they founded new individualistic precepts. Locke knew his arguments facilitated a subtle dissolution and new founding of English liberty.”[6]
Having outlined the core tenets of Locke’s ideological construction, Robinson spends the next two chapters discussing how Locke prohibits questions that might expose the shaky premises grounding the theory. Locke’s solution to the problem of money, and the accompanying acquisitiveness that flows from it, appears to be reason and religion. These restraints will conceivably prevent men from selfishly pursuing material interests at the expense of the common good. Unfortunately, Locke’s conceptions of reason and religion are woefully inadequate to serve this purpose. Robinson points out how in spite of being featured in Locke’s early writings, noetic reasoning fades to the background by the time of the Second Treatise. The practical result is an assumed good of material comfort that individuals rationally and selfishly pursue. Noesis allows us to reason about first and final principles and to make determinations about which ends to pursue. However, if one has a political objective in mind, as Robinson suggests Locke did, it is counterproductive to encourage people to use the faculty of noesis. Locke’s premises might be undermined by such an inquiry and subsequently, the political goals he has in mind will be less likely to come to fruition. Moreover, an unreflective acceptance of even a laudable good (such as freedom) can lead to suboptimal outcomes, as individuals will not be taught to consider other goods, or to weigh the outcomes for the community.
Locke’s attenuated version of reason is central to his understanding of religion. Instead of appealing to the noetic and pneumatic experiences of a soul responding to a divine ground of being, Locke links faith directly to the physical senses. Appeals to material convenience and self-preservation are the best way to induce men to religion.[7] In other words, the dogmatic application of Christianity is necessary not because of its inherent truth, but because it ostensibly aids in the creation and perpetuation of material comfort and self-preservation. The nurturing of the soul, for the sake of the soul, or the pursuit of truth, for the sake of truth, is missing from Locke’s account of reason and religion. This also feeds directly into Locke’s proposals for education, which the author criticizes on the same reductionist grounds.
The final chapters of the book deal with contemporary examples of problems related to Locke’s theory, including a provocative chapter on positive toleration and Islamic terrorism. The author points to an odd, but explicable, dynamic in America where toleration is extended to those who wish to harm us, while fellow citizens are regarded as enemies. As Robinson explains, “the Lockean society is one that acts with incivility towards itself, though its acts are authorized through consent, while acting with great civility toward foreigners who are demonstrating an imminent threat that fundamentally would have violated the American process for providing consent to government.”[8] A follow up volume could be written on this sentence alone, as numerous examples seem to confirm Robinson’s incisive, but disturbing, thesis.
Fortunately, the book does not end on a completely hopeless note. Robinson is not ready to suggest discarding liberalism, noting its positive impact on many societies over the past four hundred years. However, it is failing and in need of a significant reorientation. Robinson suggests Algernon Sidney, with his emphasis on virtue and the good of the community, would be an upgrade to Locke in teaching and defending liberal principles. Within the education system, the author specifically mentions classical philosophy and history as two subjects that need to be emphasized. Of course, this presupposes a change in what a Lockean society views as the purpose of education: preparation for a good career (to increase our material comfort). Religion can teach us to value more than our selfish, corporeal desires, but as the author notes, the relationship with liberalism has been rocky. While there is not an easy solution to the problems outlined, the book itself serves as an example of what can be achieved through thoughtful contemplation. Robinson has written an incisive, provocative, and learned volume that not only forces us to reconsider our relationship to Locke and liberalism, but more importantly, offers an alternative path towards a more civilized society.
Notes
[1] p.16
[2] p.8
[3] pp.40-41
[4] p.44
[5] p.84
[6] p.109
[7] p.156
[8] p.202
Related Posts
