What We Get Wrong About Nietzsche’s Nihilism
Friedrich Nietzsche’s name is often associated with the term “nihilism.” For many, Nietzsche provides a particularly acute articulation of the nihilistic perspective. For these interpreters, Nietzsche rips away the veils of meaning that may be presented by religion or philosophical ideals and asks us to embrace the meaninglessness of existence. A recent example of this tendency can be seen in James Tartaglia’s book, A Defence of Nihilism. The problem with this approach is that it fundamentally misrepresents Nietzsche’s insights into nihilism. For Nietzsche, nihilism is not a simple assertion about a state of affairs that is either true or not true. Instead, nihilism has a history and means different things throughout that history. Nietzsche calls for an overcoming of nihilism as a particular historical phenomenon. He felt nihilism needed to be overcome as it led to disastrous consequences for individuals and communities. For Nietzsche, the thought of eternal return affects the overcoming or “completion” of nihilism. In calling on humanity to embrace the final form of nihilism, he does so not in the hopes that we may affirm that existence is meaningless in the final analysis; rather, in this affirmation, Nietzsche asserts that nihilism will be completed and overcome as such. In embracing the eternal return of meaninglessness, we can posit a new meaning and foundation for humanity.
What is Nihilism?
“Nihilism” comes from the Latin term for nothing (nihil). We know this term from the famous philosophical dictum, first uttered in Greek cosmology, that nothing can come from nothing. This basic concept of materialist cosmology was translated into Latin by Lucretius (Lucretius, De rerum natura 1.150). As we shall see, for Nietzsche, in contrast to this materialist cosmology, something does come from the nothingness of nihilism. Throughout Western thinking, nihilism has developed as a concept by adding ethical, political, and epistemological dimensions to this original cosmological conception of nothingness.
What we might call the “ethical” dimension of nihilism is related to the notion of nihilism we highlighted above: the notion that existence has no meaning or that there are no bases or grounds for our values. Although most often associated with modern varieties of existential or postmodern philosophy, this position was posited in antiquity by figures such as the skeptic Empedocles. Shakespeare provides us with the most haunting articulation of this position, however, with the words he provides Macbeth:
Out, out, brief candle,
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury
Signifying nothing.
The dimension of nihilism that we might call “political nihilism” asserts that the destruction of all existing political, social, and religious order is a prerequisite for any future improvement in the realm of politics or society. This is the form of nihilism we find in nineteenth-century Russia, as articulated most clearly in the character Bazarov in Turgenev’s novel, Fathers and Children. What is notable about this form of nihilism is that there is still a foundation or firm footing to which the nihilist points. Bazarov believes firmly in the truths of modern science. The “nihil” of the term nihilist, in this case, points to that which will remain of existing structures after the revolutionary re-fashioning that is necessary: nothing. Bazarov makes this clear in his early exchange with a representative of the older generation, Pavel Petrovich:
“At the present time the most useful thing is negation – so we deny –
Everything?
Everything.
How can that be? Not only art, poetry – but also – terrible to say –
Everything,” repeated Bazarov with indescribable composure.
We might call “epistemological nihilism” that dimension of nihilism that posits an extreme skepticism concerning the possibility of knowledge and truth. This form of nihilism, again, has its ancient as well as its modern and postmodern proponents. Socrates famously asserted that he knew practically nothing (Plato, Apology 21d, 22d). While Socrates may have intended this position of being aware of one’s ignorance to be a mere starting point on the journey to knowledge, it was to form the basis of various forms of Academic Skepticism, which stated that any form of knowledge is fundamentally impossible. As Cicero later asserted concerning Socrates: “He himself thinks he knows one thing, that he knows nothing” (Cicero, Academica, I.16).
Nietzsche’s conception of nihilism includes all three dimensions above that nihilism results in a lack of meaning, involves absolute destruction, and means there is no foundation for knowledge. What is distinctive about Nietzsche’s approach to nihilism is that he adds a novel, historical dimension. “What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no answer” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 2). Nihilism is a process of devaluing the highest values; it takes place over time and has a history. Nihilism is the historical mode of unfolding values. The highest values reveal themselves only in their withdrawal, as the highest values; they reveal themselves in devaluing themselves.
For Nietzsche, the values that have shaped the bulk of the Western tradition, the otherworldly values of Platonism and Christianity, unfolded as a form of nihilism. These otherworldly values arose as a devaluing of the hitherto highest values, the noble values of asserting one’s strength in this world. The modern world has rejected Platonism and Christianity. The modern world has recognized that those otherworldly values lack substance. However, in this rejection of the values of Platonism and Christianity, the modern world has not moved beyond nihilism; rather, the modern world has ushered in another historical mode of nihilism. For Nietzsche, the modern form of nihilism is its culminating or final stage. This is a critical stage in the history of the West, and it presents itself in the form of a crisis.
God is Dead and the Crisis of Nihilism
In a sense, Nietzsche’s entire efforts as a thinker are a response to the history of nihilism and what he saw as its critical culminating stage in the modern era. Early in his career, Nietzsche diagnosed the problem of nihilism under the banner of the teachings of “sovereign becoming”:
If, by contrast, the doctrines of the sovereign becoming, of the fluidity of all ideas, types, and styles, of the lack of all cardinal differences between man and animal (doctrines which I consider true but deadly) are still foisted on the people for another generation with the frenzy of instruction which is now customary, then it should take no one by surprise if people destroy themselves in egotistical trifles and misery, through ossification and self-absorption, initially falling apart and ceasing to be a people. Then, in place of this condition, perhaps systems of individual egotism, alliances for the systematic larcenous exploitation of those non-members of the alliance, and similar creations of utilitarian nastiness will step forward onto the future scene (Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” § 9).
These doctrines of “sovereign becoming” are “true but deadly”; they are deadly to the individual and peoples. We cannot avoid these deadly truths by creating some new myth or by turning a blind eye to what has been exposed as true. Therefore, we must turn these deadly truths into life-giving truths. In other words, we must come to see the modern crisis of nihilism as having a “Janus-face,” akin to Martin Heidegger’s notion that the modern “essence of technology” has a Janus-face: revealing, on the one hand, the withdrawal of Being; on the other hand, the modern “essence of technology” opens a “saving power” for beings in that a new, non-metaphysical way of Being could be founded (Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”). Nietzsche later famously summarized this insight into the crisis of modern nihilism with the words, “God is dead.”
“Whither is God?” he cried. “I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I! All of us are his murderers! But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? And backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder?” …. At last, he threw his lantern to the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. “I have come too early,” he said then; “my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering—it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars—and yet they have done it themselves!” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, § 125)
In this haunting pronouncement by Nietzsche’s madman, we learn three critical pieces of information concerning Nietzsche’s view of the current crisis of nihilism: (1) that it is man who killed God, or that it is man who has created the current crisis of nihilism; (2) that the death of God leaves man and the earth (beings as a whole) without direction or a center of gravity; and (3) that humanity is not ready to hear the words of one who would expose them to this lack of center. Like Zarathustra in his attempt to go to the people in Part I of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the madman’s claims that we are in a crisis and that we need some new heading are not heard. Humanity covers over this emptiness and lack of direction with ungrounded remnants of past values (as safeguarded by “the good and the just”), or we pursue “egotism” and “utilitarian” advancement of means as ends in themselves.
The History of Nihilism
To understand humanity’s refusal to face the abyss of the death of God and to understand how to overcome the crisis it poses, we need to understand the history of nihilism, according to Nietzsche. By reading Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil, we can see that he isolates three stages to the grand history of nihilism.
The first stage of nihilism, for Nietzsche, is the nihilism of the weak, who are preyed upon by the strong. The weak are slaves within an original system of noble values, wherein strength and the ability to overcome others are valued most highly. The weak are overcome by the strong, who make the lives of the weak miserable. The weak thereby deem that life is suffering and of no value. Life is worthless, is nothing! The weak despair of this life and undertake the “slave revolt in morality.” This revolt posits that weakness rather than strength is a virtue. Ultimately, this form of nihilism leads to the creation of “priestly values” as well as hinterwelt (“afterworlds”) – where true value can be located. This is a teaching based on the spirit of revenge. The response to this first nihilism leads to otherworldly philosophy (most powerfully in Platonism) and otherworldly religion (most powerfully in Christianity). This otherworldly value system also manifests itself as a “will to truth” and the extensive scientific inquiry into beings in order to discover the real being (the “thing in itself”) that lies behind its physical manifestations. This will to truth ultimately leads to the second stage of nihilism.
The second stage of nihilism arises in the modern age. After two millennia of the will to truth, founded by this kind of Platonism and Platonism for the people, and scientific inquiry into the foundations of all beings, humanity concludes that there are no foundations: there is no philosophic “thing in itself” behind material phenomena, no self or soul behind material phenomena of oneself, no eternal grounds beyond this world to anchor its meaning. In other words, God is dead, and we have killed him. The death of God is the death of the Christian God, but also of the Platonic Ideas, broadly speaking, of any philosophic “hinterwelt” (world behind things) to anchor beings. With the renting of the veil produced by priests and philosophers in response to the first nihilism, once again, Life has no value; it is nothing! This finds expression in the words of the Soothsayer in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: “All is empty, all is the same, all has been.”
The third stage of nihilism is the hypothetical future stage, wherein nihilism is overcome. He calls it “completed nihilism.” Assuming that humanity can face the abyss of the death of God and overcome the rule of the good and the just, as inheritors of the will to truth that has deepened humanity, we will not be able to conceal or conveniently forget this deadly truth. Redemption from the crisis of nihilism will not take the form of an atavism. The way out is the way through! Therefore, for Nietzsche, the way out of the crisis means affirming its consequences. For Nietzsche, the highest formula for affirmation is the affirmation of the eternal return. Affirming the abyss, the nothing thus means affirming its eternal return.
The eternal return is an “abysmal thought.” Like the crisis of nihilism itself, the eternal return has a Janus-face. That is, the affirmation of the eternal return of all that is small and meaningless in existence has both a terrifying and a liberating aspect. It is terrifying in that meaninglessness is eternal. This terrifying aspect causes nausea, represented in Thus Spoke Zarathustra by a black snake in the throat of the title character. The thought of the eternal return of nihilism, however, is also liberating. In nihilism, “all is permitted.” This means that beings are liberated to arise as they are outside of an externally imposed standard of platonic Christian ideals or modern human technological mastery. It is this liberating aspect of the eternal return that is given voice by Zarathustra’s animals (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part III, “On the Vision and the Riddle”; “The Convalescent”).
The notion that human-willed activity is of no value leads to a paralysis of action and thought. The way out of this paralysis is the way through nihilism. It is by means of completing nihilism, taking it to its ultimate conclusions, and embracing its consequences that we will be liberated of the crushing and paralyzing effects of nihilism. For Nietzsche, the way through nihilism is the affirmation of the eternal return, the affirmation of the eternity of the small and meaningless in existence.
What is to be done?
Assuming Nietzsche is correct and that our hope through the crisis of modern nihilism lies in the affirmation of the eternal return as the completion of nihilism, what is to be done? What is to be done to advance the Nietzschean agenda? What is the upshot of Nietzsche’s teaching regarding how it changes how we think and act in our world today? Or, who are the real Nietzscheans? Who is advancing his teaching and preparing humanity for redemption from the crisis of nihilism? Of the serious thinkers who have attempted to think in the shadow of Nietzsche, three basic approaches exist.
For post-modern thinkers such as Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, we must prepare the way by facing “sovereign becoming” or “pure becoming.” We need to do this by accelerating the blurred lines between man and animal and all other conceptual distinctions that no longer hold. These former boundaries are “deconstructed,” and the resulting fluidity of concepts is affirmed. Today, this deconstruction of all forms of identity arises in “gender-bending” and other political affirmations of alternative identities. For the postmodernists, in this affirmation of “difference,” we will enter and embrace a “post-al” age: post-modern, post-metaphysical, and post-human.
A rather different approach to the crisis of nihilism is offered by Leo Strauss. For Strauss, we must continue Nietzsche’s work of exposing the veiled communication of the history of philosophy since the veils used by past philosophers (e.g., Plato’s invention of the “Good”) are no longer tenable or believed. Undertaking this esoteric reading of the history of philosophy will respond to the political consequences of nihilism by showing that there are alternatives to the relativism of the modern age known by classical philosophers. These classical alternatives can help to support the principles of modern liberal republicanism by anchoring them in natural, universal truths. In this way, the way out is not the way through but the way back.
Another approach to the crisis of nihilism can be seen in the thought of Martin Heidegger. For Heidegger, we must see the modern age of nihilism and technology as a product of Nietzsche’s teaching. Nietzsche’s doctrine is the last chapter of metaphysics as nihilism and the withdrawal of Being. Therefore, we must go where his thinking fell short and provide a true embracing of nihilism (the Nothing) that allows for a new founding and arising of beings in their Being. Ultimately, this is not a willed activity of man; it is the product of a fateful dispensation: “Only a god can save us.”
Regarding faithfulness to Nietzsche’s teaching, the postmodernists hold to it the most closely. They agree with Nietzsche that the way out of nihilism is the way through. We are now in a position to judge this Nietzschean-postmodern teaching, given that the 21st century has largely been shaped by that point of departure. If we look at the world around us, I think it is plain to see that the Nietzschean-postmodern teaching, rather than providing for overcoming nihilism, has led us down the rabbit hole of nihilism even further. In the wake of their deconstruction of all fixed values, we are left in a world where people do not feel they can define what a “woman” is. To borrow from Zarathustra, “You are no bridge to the overman.” The only serious alternatives, it would seem, are between the Straussian return to classical political rationalism and the Heideggerian poetic and prophetic preparation of the ground for the arrival of new gods. Although Strauss and Heidegger call into question the conclusions presented by Nietzsche, they are the only ones to provide thoughtful responses to the crisis of nihilism as articulated by Nietzsche. In a way, the tension between the Straussian return to classical rationalism and the Heideggerian preparation of the ground for the arrival of new gods is akin to the tension between the two pillars of the Western tradition: Athens and Jerusalem. It is the tension between the way of unaided human reason represented by Athens and the way of resignation before the Divine mystery represented by Jerusalem. For this reason, rather than decide between the Straussian and Heideggerian alternatives, the better approach, it seems, is to let them exist side by side in tension. Perhaps the way out of the crisis of nihilism is returning to and re-experiencing this fundamental tension between Athens and Jerusalem that has grounded the West throughout its history.
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