Morality and Intuitions of Metaphysical Truths

No matter which class I am teaching, for quite some time the first reading assigned has been an article on Goedel’s Theorem. The reason is to emphasize that any attempt to make an axiomatic system of any moderate complexity consistent and complete (able to determine whether any statement within the system is either true or false) will fail. This is because, at least when it comes to mathematics, Goedelian propositions will be generated by the system that are true, can be seen to be true, but are not provable. Goedel’s stand-in for all such propositions is the statement “this statement is not provable within this axiomatic system.” If this statement is true, then it is not provable. If it were to be false, and was provable, then it would again be proved that it is not provable, since you would have just proved a statement that says it is unprovable! I add to this that the axioms upon which axiomatic systems are based are by definition, not provable, their truth being self-evident. So, axiomatic systems contain unprovable truths coming and going.

When teaching ethics, after covering Gödel, the first thing I do is to point out our intuitive understanding of the truth and validity of reciprocity/justice/fairness. If someone were to give you a cup of your favorite coffee at the appropriate time and you were to punch them in the face, barring some convoluted back story, this would be grossly unjust. The truth of reciprocity is captured by phrases like “one good turn deserves another” and “do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” In practice, no normal person doubts the truth of that notion.

Fairness and reciprocity are axiomatically true. Their truth is self-evident. If anyone claims to doubt their truth, this person is almost certainly a liar and a hypocrite, at least on this topic. When this hypothetical person approaches another in a spirit of friendliness and politeness, only to be greeted with unbridled rudeness and hostility, he is likely to feel offended or at least to question the mental stability of the other person.

Ludwig Wittgenstein had some sensible things to say on topics like these.  He spends a few pages of his aphoristic writings wondering what it would mean to be mistaken that one was speaking or writing in English. There is not really a standard of certainty that goes beyond knowing such a thing. Part of his point is to throw a monkey wrench into the useless, theoretical musings of his analytic philosophy contemporaries.

So-called “modern” philosophy gets traced back to the writings of René Descartes and his quest for certainty. Descartes sought a theoretical proof of the existence of the “outside” world. Later philosophers like Martin Heidegger pointed out that this quest is misguided. We always already find ourselves in the world and being in the world sets the context for any theoretical musings.

For this reason, shortly after assigning Goedel’s Theorem, and sometimes The Halting Problem – which addresses the same issues – my students read a summary of The Master and His Emissary by Iain McGilchrist. This puts forward the thesis that there are two modes of consciousness going on simultaneously that are normally seamlessly blended together. One is a broad focused, low resolution, intuitive awareness of context, and the other is narrowly-focused high resolution mode that selects individual items out of this context. Evolutionary, this permitted animals to be broadly aware of their environments in case of predators, while also being focused enough to find food. In most people these functions are associated with the left and right hemispheres of the brain with plenty of communication between them. After a stroke or brain injury a hemisphere can stop working or be impaired and characteristic problems emerge as a result.

The right hemisphere (RH) is associated with humor, intuition, metaphor, context, problem-solving, spirituality, being realistic, creativity, and mystery. It is in many ways the experiencing self. The left hemisphere, (LH) being more narrowly focused, is more verbal, logical, clear cut, optimistic, robotic (skillful but relatively mindless activities and memorized knowledge). Ideally, the RH provides the experiential material for the LH to ponder and review which in turn can modify how something is experienced.

Beauty is experienced, though it cannot be defined. The LH can analyze a beautiful experienced object without being able to explain why it is beautiful, though it can point at aspects of a thing that makes it admirable. Likewise, our experience of the rightness of reciprocity defies logical analysis. With regard to Descartes, it is not possible to prove the existence of the world theoretically, or beauty, or justice. They are not theoretical constructs. They are givens that can be partially analyzed. It is hubristic and mistaken to ask for theoretical proofs of such things. They are closer in nature to axioms whose truth are self-evident. Here we are in the world. Now what?

Sometimes, LH style thinking can get out of hand and try to bootstrap itself without the aid of the RH intuitive, experiential self. In the case of moral theories like utilitarianism and Kant’s deontology, these theories attempt to shoulder out our intuitive moral understandings about love and reciprocity and to supplant them with the products of rationalism. In other words, they falsely claim to be consistent and complete systems for moral decision making.

Recently, in conversation, a utilitarian admitted that he was a moral nihilist and the category of moral innocence did not exist for him. This negates the fundamental moral assertion that murder is prohibited, and in particular, harming the innocent is wrong. Harming the innocent violates justice/fairness/reciprocity. Once I realized that my interlocutor had abandoned this most basic of moral insights, as utilitarians do, I could see that LH theorizing had, apparently irretrievably perverted his moral insight; a moral insight that normally a two year old is perfectly capable of having. Here I am thinking of a two year old who complains that his ice cream is smaller than his siblings and exclaims “that’s not fair!”

Wittgenstein, with his musings about what it would mean to be wrong that one was speaking English, points out that no theoretical anything can be as certain. To be wrong about a thing like that would mean giving up any level of assurance about anything at all. The idea that as per Descartes, having rejected as veridical his most basic sense-perceptions, that he will be able to theoretically resurrect them is ridiculous. He has to invoke God in the process and God’s existence, by His very nature, is not amenable to proof or certainty, hence every moderately decent religion’s insistence on the importance of faith and doubt.

In the spirit of Wittgenstein, what moral theory or principle, can possibly be more certain than one’s intuitive understanding of the fairness, justice, and rightness of reciprocity? If that were wrong, and if similarly one could be wrong about what language one was speaking, then all bets are off and we might as well all go home and watch TV, assuming it exists.

The appropriate response to G. E. Moore’s pointless musings about whether his hand exists, is to attempt to stab it as it sits on the table before him, and see whether he moves it out of the way. No LH theory is going to be more certain than the existence of his hand. His hand is in no need of proof and justification; certainly not by something epistemologically inferior to his senses.

A recent episode of Radiolab called Tit for Tat was about the prisoner’s dilemma. Two prisoners in separate rooms are given the choice of saying nothing or ratting out his fellow prisoner. If both say nothing, they get six months. If one rats the other out, he goes free and the other prisoner gets ten years. If both rat each out, then they each get five years. They are unable to communicate and do not know each other beyond attempting to participate in a thwarted bank robbery. Logic seems to dictate that they each rat each other out in case the other “defects” as it is called in the game.

Computer programmers then take this scenario and run it over and over. Multiple iterations change the logic of the situation. They experiment with different strategies. Always cooperate, always rat, mostly cooperate, mostly rat, mostly cooperate and then unexpectedly defect, etc. The winning strategy turns out to be tit for tat. If you cooperate, next time I cooperate. If you defect, next time I defect. In other words, reciprocity, fairness, and justice. The programs employing tit for tat, over time, take over this imaginary world and come to dominate. Actually, it is tit for tat with a ten percent dose of generosity that is the best. Every now and then when the other person defects you do not respond by defecting. This generosity has to be gratuitous and unexpected or the other person will take advantage of this strategy and use it against you. Over time, this strategy generates more and more cooperation and fewer and fewer defections.

For some people, this has morally nihilistic implications. Tit for tat with a dose of Jesus’ turn the other check is simply the best strategy for survival and world domination, if world domination means relatively peaceful, harmonious co-existence. Our moral intuitions are simply evolution’s way of getting us to promote our own survival. Biology über alles.

The other possibility is that reciprocity/fairness is simply true. A little bit of the heavenly perfect as described by Jesus’ parables is even better. Complete submission to ill-treatment might not be in the best interests of one’s persecutor since it is likely to encourage and prolong his behavior. A moderate but firm insistence that the ill-treatment should stop, rather than simply retaliation, is often going to be best.

If it is true that tit for tat and some supererogatory forbearance tends to produce a pleasant outcome, then this suggests a rather attractive tendency of the structure of reality. In many instances, being good and moral will actually have good consequences for you and for others. However, it does not work the other way. The hypothetical, or conditional, in logic “if p, then q” is not reversible. The fact that if you are good, often good things will happen, does not mean that if something has good consequences, you are being a good and moral person. Utilitarianism is an example of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Being moral often has utility, but producing utility does not make you moral.

Boethius in The Consolation of Philosophy points out that someone only finds out what kind of person he really is when being a good person conflicts with his (earthly) interests. Do you still do the right thing when you will not be applauded, congratulated, met with approval, keep your job, spouse, friends, and family, and in Boethius’ case being beaten to death in one’s prison cell? Too often, I do not; and so it goes with most people perhaps. I am thinking of my silence when my college administration sends out mass communications to the faculty; these emails usually being absolutely morally monstrous. My business ethics students asked me once why I say nothing and my pathetic reply is that I do not feel like losing my job and being scapegoated by the entire academic community. Many others will agree with me, but remain silent out of fear of also becoming the victim of scapegoating and similarly losing their jobs or chances of future promotion.

In the Gorgias, Polus asks Socrates whether he would rather be an evil tyrant sadistically torturing and killing his victim and his victim’s family, or to be the victim. Socrates replies he would prefer to be neither, but if he had to choose, he would choose to be the victim who is at least morally innocent.

A utilitarian commented that he would be unable to choose since the net utility would remain the same and utility is the only proper way to judge the morality of an action. When I pointed out that one is a moral monster while the other is innocent he replied that the notion of innocence had no meaning in his moral worldview. In this, he was being consistent with his philosophy. Utilitarianism jettisons any care for justice in favor of the useful and in the process abandons the one moral insight that no human being has to be taught – that people should strive to be fair. The fact that many animals perceive the truth of this is the basis for my claim that it is not primarily learned – though it can be culturally reinforced or compromised.

In hearing a living human being declare that innocence is not a moral category, I felt like I was watching a massive, man-made ugly urban landscape occupying the left side of his head, extending far above and around him, fatally deranging the poor man. And an individual morally outclassed by your average two year old.

Were this man to ever father a child, God forbid, imagine his future two year old saying “but I didn’t do it!” and him replying “Moral innocence WHACK! is not WHACK! a moral category WHACK! that I recognize. WHACK!

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