Eric Voegelin and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany at 75

Introduction[1]

The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany was adopted on May 23, 1949, about four years after the end of World War II.[2] Its official designation is not “Constitution”, but “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz). Prior to the Basic Law there were two attempts to create a democratic constitution in Germany, the Constitution of 1849, the

so called St. Paul’s Church Constitution (Paulskirchenverfassung), and the constitution of 1919, the Constitution of the Weimar Republic. For different reasons, both were doomed to failure.[3] The Basic Law of 1949 however turned out to be a success and is considered by most citizens to be the best constitution Germany has ever had (including various “leges fundamentales” (basic laws) of the Middle Ages and the modern age). The following pages contain an outline of the most important contents of the Basic Law, on the one hand because Germany celebrates currently the entry into force of the Basic Law 75 years ago, and on the other hand because Eric Voegelin was also familiar with the German constitution, occasionally referred to it, and was in Munich on its tenth and twentieth anniversaries.

Historical background

The Basic Law was drawn up in the years 1948-1949.  Right after the end of the Second World War Germany was divided into four occupation zones administered by the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. In the first months and years after the war political structures in the eleven Western Länder (= states) began to be established “from the bottom up”. This democratic development, the central geographical position of Germany in Europe, and the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union prompted the three Western Allies to make Germany an integral part of the Western hemisphere on the basis of a new constitution. The first step was a convention on the picturesque island in Lake Chiemsee in Upper Bavaria, which in just 14 days (Aug. 10.-23.1948) drafted central features of the later constitution. On this basis, a so-called Parliamentary Council elaborated the Basic Law from Sept. 1948 to May 1949 in Bonn (Germany’s seat of government from 1949-1999).[4]

The Herrenchiemsee draft contains a number of important guidelines for the future constitution, above all the guiding principle in Article 1 para. 1: “The state exists for the sake of man, not man for the sake of the state”. This central position of the human being was to be incorporated into the Basic Law and determines until today the entire state system. Article 1 para I Basic Law picks up on this idea and restates it in a different formulation. Other important provisions of the Herrenchiemsee draft regard the federal structure, the two-chamber parliament, the parliamentary form of government, the figurehead presidency, the eternal guarantee for human dignity, the lack of direct democratic elements on the federal level, and the protection of these principles against

enemies of the Republic. These characteristics are not only a response to national socialism, but reach far back into the 19th century: the Paulskirche Constitution of 1849 was not only intended to create the first nation state on German soil (which was founded in 1871), it also contained an impressive catalog of basic rights, especially in Articles 130-189, whose limitability was defined as follows: “No constitution or legislation of a single German state shall ever be able to abolish or restrict them.” Even though this constitution never came into force, many of its demands were incorporated into the Basic Law of 1949.[5]

The Weimar Constitution was just as modern and progressive as the Paulskirche Constitution. After the end of the First World War the main intention was to bring peace and order to the German state. The politicians of the various factions were convinced of the need to give the new polity a strong leadership. Thus, the Reich President was given the (fateful) right to dissolve the Reichstag and to appoint and dismiss the Reich Chancellor and, at his suggestion, the Reich Ministers. The catalog of basic rights in Articles 109-165 was evidently of great importance, because their main function consists in protecting its citizens from the state. These two elements, a strong, capable head of state and the catalog of basic rights, quickly lost their impact in the early 1930s. In the midst of political unrest (Hyperinflation 1923, Great Depression 1929, mass unemployment 1930ff.) the exceptional power of the Reich President helped the National Socialists to come to power, and less than a month after seizing power the new government succeeded in suspending the most important basic rights. The power of the state increased; the rights of the citizens decreased. The path to a totalitarian state was paved.

Even if the Basic Law of 1949 draws on the Paulskirche Constitution of 1849, it is also a reaction to the weaknesses of the Weimar Constitution which permitted its systematic abuse and final destruction in the few months after January 1933.

The basic structure and the “basic rights”

The table of contents of the Basic Law shows 14 chapters. It contains chapters on basic rights, the relationship between the Federal Government and the Länder, the Bundestag (Federal Parliament), the Bundesrat (Federal Council), the Federal President, the Federal Government, legislation, etc. At its core, the Basic Law consists of two separate elements: the basic rights on the one side and the state organization on the other. The basic rights rights are mainly laid down in Articles 1-19, the organization of the state in Articles 20-146. It was the intention of the founders of the constitution that basic rights should “dominate” the state. Whereas in most constitutions, basic rights are subordinate in terms of value and sequence to the organization of the state, in the Basic law they should take precedence over all state action. And just as basic rights were to form the basis for the whole state, the central position of human beings and their dignity were to form the foundation of basic rights. The three elements of 1. human dignity, 2. basic rights, and 3. state organization build on each other. The first sentence in Article 1 para. 1 Basic Law therefore reads: “Human dignity shall be inviolable.”[6] Human dignity should be the starting point, the middle point and the end point of all state action. Basically, the complete existence of the state and all concrete state actions are derived from its will to respect and protect human dignity. Accordingly, sentence 2 of Article 1 of the Basic Law reads: “To respect and protect it (= human dignity, HB) shall be the duty of all state authority.”

It is obvious that the German constitution does not limit human dignity to Germans or people living in Germany. Human dignity is innate, it is a universal and “pro-state” value; the state cannot bestow dignity, it can only recognize and protect it, and above all it cannot deprive anyone of it. According to the German understanding, it applies to all people all over the world from birth to death, it takes effect before birth (protection of the “nasciturus”, i.e. “prenatally”) and extend beyond death (“post mortem”). Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Basic Law (henceforth: BL) is worded accordingly: “The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and justice in the world.”

A look at the history of the concept of human dignity reveals that the term has been in use for centuries. A religious justification can be found at the beginning of the Old Testament, when it is said that God created man in his image: “So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them.” (Genesis I, 27) The thesis of man as “imago Dei” determines the thinking in Christianity over the centuries. A different understanding can be found in the Roman philosopher and politician Cicero, who explains the term “dignitas” in De officiis (44 BC) by referring to the external and accidental social position on the one hand, but also by emphasizing the unchangeable inner quality of man on the other:

“It is part of any study of dutiful action to always bear in mind how much the nature of man surpasses that of cattle and other animals; the latter feel nothing but pleasure, and they throw themselves on this with all their strength, but the spirit of man grows through learning and thinking, he is always exploring something, acting or being guided by the pleasure of singing and listening. … From this we see that bodily pleasure is not worthy enough of man’s exalted position and must be spurned and rejected, … if we want to consider how superior a position and dignity lies in our nature, then we will realize how shameful it is to let ourselves drift into pleasure-seeking and to live in a pampered and soft way, and how honorable, on the other hand, to live sparingly, abstinently, strictly and soberly.” (1. book, 105-106)

Thomas Aquinas in the High Middle Ages justified the dignity of man through his likeness to God and coined the remarkable sentence that “man is the goal of all creation” (Summa contra gentiles, 1259-64, 3. book, ch. 22).[7] In the Italian Renaissance, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola emphasized in his work De hominis dignitate (1486) that the dignity of man is based on his ability to shape life as “plastes et fictor”. Man creates his own profile, which can lead him to the highest forms of life, but also to a relegation to an animal existence. In this ability consists his dignity. Immanuel Kant, who filled the concept of human dignity with new content at the end of the 18th century, represents for many the high point in the theoretical justification of human dignity. In his treatise on Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)[8] he states:

“In the realm of purpose, everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can also be replaced by something else as an equivalent; what, on the other hand, is elevated above all prices, with no equivalent, has a dignity.”

The Kantian view is that human dignity is an innate worth or status that we don’t earn and cannot forfeit, which we have by virtue of our rational autonomy. In order to explain the term dignity in Kant’s thought, it is helpful to turn to the second formulation of the so called categorical imperative, the “humanity formula”. In Kant’s (a bit outmoded) words it sounds like this: “Act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, at all times also as an end, and not only as a means.” Kant was, of course, aware that people are usually means to the realization of a wide variety of purposes, he himself being as professor at the University of Königsberg also a “means to an end”, but he saw and emphasized that people are far more than just rationally serving a purpose: they are ends in themselves, have the gift of autonomy beyond all purposes and take part, beyond the “mundus sensibilis” in a higher order, the “mundus intelligibilis”.  As ends in themselves, human beings are not allowed to be instrumentalized in existential situations.

The definition of the concept of human dignity in the Basic Law aims precisely in the direction of Kant’s definition: the concept of human dignity characterizes man as a spiritual and moral being who, in freedom and self-awareness, is able to determine himself and influence his environment. Above all, human beings must not be subjected to treatment that degrades them to mere objects. The best-known interpretation of the term “human dignity” in the BL stems from the constitutional law professor Günter Dürig, who developed the so-called “object formula”, which was formulated in 1957 and is still groundbreaking for the concept today. According to this, the dignity of a person is violated “if the concrete person is degraded to an object, to a mere means, to a justifiable quantity”.[9] Obviously, the so-called object formula is linked to Kant’s prohibition of instrumentalization, and the Federal Constitutional Court has indeed referred to the object formula in various decisions.

This brief look at individual stages of the concept of human dignity should not obscure the fact that the discovery and formulation of human dignity in various contexts did not go hand in hand with its practical and political impact. Only the experiences of the great state crimes of the 20th century, in particular those of Italian Fascism, German National Socialism and Soviet Communism, marked the transition from philosophical-theological validity to a legally and politically binding text on human dignity. The pre-constitutional discussion on human dignity only prepared the legal texts on human dignity; it was only after the experiences of inhuman terror in the first half of the 20th century that the concept of human dignity found expression in the Charter of the United Nations (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the German Basic Law (1949) and subsequently in other important documents. Beautiful is the following characterization of the development of human dignity:

“Human dignity can be compared to a runner who started last but then overtook all the other runners. Human dignity, which was the last to enter the public consciousness and become enshrined in law, has now moved ahead of all human rights. It has become the highest commandment of morality as well as many constitutions and international agreements. Violations of human dignity such as torture, slavery, forced labor and humiliation have been globally outlawed, even if they have not yet completely disappeared.”[10]

The Basic Law gives human dignity precisely this prominent first place among or before human rights. Art. 1 para. 3 BL states accordingly: “The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law.” This sentence expresses that the basic rights are subordinate to human dignity in Art. 1 para. 1 BL and follow it, and mentions their primary importance: They bind the three powers of the state: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. Human dignity is the highest value which pervades and dominates all state action. To bring the concept of human dignity to life, here are two examples. The first example: Does a life sentence contradict human dignity? According to the Federal Constitutional Court (henceforth: FCC), it is not contrary to human dignity if the prisoner has a realistic chance of being released on parole after 15 years. Without the chance of release, life imprisonment would be similar to slavery and forced labor, which violate human dignity. This means that every criminal in Germany has the chance to be released on parole after 15 years in prison. The second example: Can planes with for instance 300 passengers and hijacked by terrorists be shot down if it is certain that they want to attack a packed soccer stadium and kill all the for example 80.000 spectators?[11]

In January 2005 the so-called Aviation Security Act came into force; it allowed the aircraft to be shot down as a last resort in order to save the lives of the visitors to the soccer stadium. In February 2006, the FCC ruled that such a shoot-down was incompatible with human dignity and other values enshrined in the constitution. From the ruling:

“Such treatment disregards those affected as subjects with dignity and inalienable rights. By using their killing as a means to save others, they are reified and at the same time deprived of their rights; by unilaterally disposing of their lives by the state, the aircraft passengers, who are themselves in need of protection as victims, are denied the value that is due to human beings for their own sake.”[12]

It is obvious that this decision has caused great controversy in the scientific community and among the public; it is also obvious that the judgment is based on Kant’s reasoning and above all on his so-called self-purpose of the “humanity formula” (even if the judgment does not mention Kant’s name). However, it is not clear what verdict would actually be reached if the plane was shot down despite violating the Aviation Security Act, which has since been adapted to the verdict: murder in 300 cases, or acquittal for saving 80,000 lives? We don’t know and hopefully we will never have to decide.[13]

Article 2 BL enshrines freedom in the constitution, Article 3 equality. Is it a coincidence that freedom and equality follow human dignity as the enumerated first values? The demands of the French Revolution for “liberté” and “egalité” (or the first two values in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: liberty and equality) come to mind. Article 2 standardizes the general right to freedom in the following wording:

“Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.”

The first part of the sentence grants every person in Germany the most extensive degree of freedom possible for all people. However, in this sentence the word “personality” is followed by three limits to this freedom, the so-called “barrier triad”, namely “the rights of others”, who all have the same rights to freedom, “the constitutional order”, i.e. the sum of the rules laid down in the constitution, and finally the “moral law”, i.e. the customs, traditions and conventions in use in Germany. (The so-called “moral law” is evidently also a core concept in Kant’s ethics; the term used by Kant and in Art. 2 BL is “Sittengesetz”).

Article 3 BL contains the general basic right to equality. Paragraph 1 reads: “All persons shall be equal before the law.” This general principle of equality is the basic norm for the entire legal system. Human dignity and freedom and all other rights shall be enjoyed equally by all human beings without distinction. Of interest is the wording in Art. 3 para. 2 BL, which states: “Men and women shall have equal rights”. Although Art. 3 para. 1 BL already emphasized that all people are equal before the law, the equal rights of men and women are highlighted here again. The background: The Parliamentary Council that drafted the Basic Law from Sept. 1948-May 1949 consisted of 65 members: 60 men, 4 women and one chairman (= man). These four women fought long and relentlessly for this sentence, which was by no means a matter of course at the time, quite the opposite! The women’s faction was ultimately victorious and made the sentence that emphasized the equal rights of men and women a firm part of the BL. After reunification, the constitution underwent a reform, which resulted, among other things, in the following addition to Art. 3 para. 2: “The state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist.” It is conspicuous that the constitution now demands the actual implementation of equal rights for both sexes, it is evident that sentence two is thus formulated much more sharply than sentence 1, and it is easy to recognize that women are now mentioned first (and not second as in 1949).

Equality before the law means that people must be treated equally according to the law, i.e. not according to sympathy, appearance, religion, or other factors. The principle of equality not only permits, it even requires unequal treatment if this is objectively necessary. The following principle applies: essentially equal things must not be arbitrarily treated unequally and essentially unequal things must not be arbitrarily treated equally; a general prohibition of arbitrariness applies. Indiscriminate equality can even mean a blatant violation of this principle. Here is an example: A poll tax consisting of a fixed amount of money levied on every inhabitant of the country would mean that a single mother with five children would have to pay six times as much as a bachelor; an obvious great injustice. The result: equal things are to be treated equally, but unequal things are to be treated unequally.

The following basic rights list a large number of values that can be understood as more detailed provisions and “concretizations” of human dignity and, above all, of Article 2, the universal right to freedom. For example, Art. 4 BL guarantees freedom of belief and conscience, Art. 5 (under the heading “freedom of expression”) guarantees the seven (!) freedoms of expression, freedom of information, freedom of the press, freedom of reporting by radio and film and freedom of art and science. Article 6 BL protects marriage and the family, and Article 7 the school system, which is entirely under the supervision of the state, Article 8 the freedom of assembly, and Article 9 the freedom of association.

Since a detailed description of the individual basic rights would go beyond the scope of this overview, an important feature of the basic rights in Articles 1-19 BL will be discussed in conclusion: basic rights can in principle be amended. Constitutions are documents that are subject to the passage of time and must therefore be amended and adapted from time to time. This applies also to basic rights as part of the constitution. However, since the main purpose of basic rights is to protect citizens (and not only to organize the state organism), their amendment and restriction is limited. On the one hand, the basic rights themselves provide for the possibility of a restriction by a corresponding law as shown with regard to Art. 2 para. 1 BL (“barrier triad”); on the other hand, Art. 19 para. 2 BL regulates the limits of the limitation for all basic rights: “In no case may the essence of a basic right be affected.” The BL allows the basic rights to be changed, but not their essence. We speak of the so-called “essentiality theory” (Wesentlichkeitstheorie), which absolutely prohibits any change of the innermost core of Art. 2-18 (Art. 1 and 19 are except, because Art. 1 contains the guarantee of human dignity, the only provision that may not be amended in any way or under any circumstances; and Article 19 contains provisions restricting basic rights in general).

Principles of the State Organization

The basic rights section in Art. 1-19 is followed by the state organization section in Art. 20-146 BL. The most important provisions are contained in Art. 20 BL. Paragraph 1 contains the following wording: “The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.” This sentence contains 4 of the 5 basic principles of the state structure that define the structure and tasks of the state. These principles are: republic, democracy, welfare state and federal state. The fifth principle, the rule of law, can be found in Art. 20 para. 2 and 3 BL.

The term “republic” requires Germany to reject any form of monarchy. Republic means “non-monarchy”. There is an absolute ban on monarchy at federal and state level. The head of state must be electable and dismissible. Any form of hereditary or elective monarchy is excluded. The term “democracy” means rule by the people. The people are ultimately the holders of state power, but transfer this state power to elected representatives in regular elections. A democracy is structured from the bottom up, from the basis to the top and not vice versa. Hans Kelsen has characterized the essence of democracy in this way:

“The idea of democracy is a form of state or society in which the will of the community … is generated by those subject to it: by the people. Democracy means identity of leader and led, of subject and object of rule, means rule of the people over the people.”[14]

On the one hand, democracy is a protest against the will of others, to which one’s own will must bow, i.e. against the agony of heteronomy, but on the other hand, people need a binding order that gives them stability. Political stability is best granted if people are subject to an order, they themselves set up and steer; as a result, people in democracies follow their own will, not the will of others. Art. 20 Abs. 2 BL answers the question of how democracy is exercised in Germany: “All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies.” The constitution speaks indiscriminately of elections and votes. It is important to know that the term “elections” refers to personnel decisions and the term “votes” to substantive decisions. Citizens elect members of the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) every four years; votes, on the other hand, only take place in one single case, namely the reorganization of the federal territory. The number of federal states, currently 16, can be reduced (or increased) by plebiscite. Citizens cannot make any other substantive decisions at federal level. This reflects the profound mistrust of the founders of the constitution in the German citizens after the experiences of National Socialism which clearly manifested the seductiveness of people. (At state level, however, there are far more and stronger plebiscitary elements).

Germany describes itself a social welfare state. The word “social” is only used briefly in two places in the constitution, which is due to the economically disastrous situation immediately after WW II. In 1948-49, no one in the Parliamentary Council knew whether the promise of a welfare state would ever be fulfilled. The situation was dreadful and depressing. After the economic situation had already improved in the early 1950s, the establishment of a welfare state was tackled. Germany was experiencing a tremendous economic upswing, which was called “economic miracle” because of its scope and impact. Therefore, the welfare state soon started to play a major role in the country’s self-image. The welfare state provides protection for the economically weak and obliges the state to grant the poor a dignified existence and an appropriate share in the general prosperity. The official name of Germany’s economic system is “Social Market Economy” because it represents the attempt to combine the principle of competition on the market with the principle of social welfare. One specific feature of the welfare state is the so-called “minimum subsistence level”, which is tax-free for everyone. For example, if someone has a gross annual income of 50,000 or 100,000 euros, he or she can deduct 11,608 euros from this amount (in 2024). The result is the taxable income. (Of course, there are many other expenses that can be deducted to arrive at the final taxable income).

As a result of years of good economic development, the welfare state was greatly expanded. A few years ago, the welfare state ratio exceeded 30 % of gross domestic product (over 1 trillion (= 1000 billion) out of a gross domestic product of around 3.5 trillion (= 3500 billion)), and the costs of welfare state measures are rising significantly year after year.

For some years now, the level of unemployment benefit has dominated political discussions. In 2023, an unemployed person received a so-called citizen’s allowance (Bürgergeld) of 502 euros and adequate housing after the first year of unemployment (during the 1. year the support is more generous); in 2024, the amount was increased to 563 euros (an increase of more than 10 % (12,15 %)!). For an unemployed family of four, the expenses quickly amounted to 2,500 euros or more (because the apartment and ancillary costs are also taken over), so that the costs for the welfare state represent a veritable challenge for the Federal Republic; in addition, the gap between the citizen’s allowance and the wage in the low-wage sector is sometimes so small that work is no longer worthwhile. People say: “It doesn’t pay off!” If some people receive 3,000 euros net for a low-paid job and others receive 2,500 euros without a job, where is the incentive to look for a stressful 40-hour job (a week)? In fact, Germany is currently struggling with a high labor shortage.

Another element in Art. 20 para. 1 BL is the federal state. State power is divided between the federal government and 16 federal states. Both levels have the character of a state, each with its own legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Although the individual federal states came into being before the Federal Republic was founded and created the federal government in the first place, over the decades the balance has shifted increasingly in favor of the federal government and in disfavor of the federal states. The federal government has usurped numerous powers. Although many laws are so-called federal laws and the federal states are only responsible for their implementation, the federal states are involved in federal legislation and often have a great deal of room for interpretation and discretion when implementing federal laws.

The fifth characteristic of Germany’s political and legal order is the rule of law (Rechtsstaat). The fundamental concern of every constitutional state is that the state is bound by the law and thus the contrary of an “arbitrary state” (Willkürstaat). The central elements of the constitutional state are the separation of powers, the fact that these state powers are bound by law, the guarantee of legal certainty and the protection of citizens through basic rights. All these characteristics are granted in the BL. The features of the republic, the democracy, the welfare state, the federal state are all concentrated in the short sentence in Art. 20 para. 1 of the Basic Law (“The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.”) The rule of law respectively the constitutional state is not mentioned therein. Art. 20 para. 2 and 3 BL, however, mention the separation of powers as a central element of the constitutional state. Constitutional theory therefore sees the rule of law also anchored in Art. 20 para. 2 and 3 BL. The obvious question is: Why is it important to have the five principles of state structure mentioned in the provision of Art. 20 BL? The answer is that Article 20 BL enjoys a privileged status among the Articles of the Basic Law. Every constitution contains provisions on legislation, i.e. the procedure by which simple legal regulations are created and enter into force. However, a constitution must also contain provisions on amending the constitution itself. The most important provision in the German constitution is Art. 79, especially Art. 79 para. 3 BL. This provision stipulates:

“Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, of the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.”

This sentence carries enormous weight; it stipulates that three characteristics are absolutely resistant to change in the event of amendments to the constitution. These features are 1. the division of the Federation into Länder, 2. the participation of these Länder in the legislative power of the Federation, and 3. the provisions of Article 1 and 20 (not: “up to” 20). The first characteristic is a rejection of the unitary state that manages and controls all regions from a single power center. No statement is made about the number of countries which can be altered, only federalism as such is to be protected. The second feature is the participation of these federal states in federal legislation. The idea is simple: if the federal states already exist as independent states, they should also be involved in the legislation that affects them. The federal states should be more than mere recipients of orders. Finally, the third characteristic requires the retention and protection of the provisions in Articles 1 and 20, i.e. human dignity on the one hand and the five aforementioned structural principles of the state (republic, democracy, welfare state, federal state, rule of law respectively constitutional state) on the other. However the constitution is amended, these three characteristics cannot be changed, i.e. by any majority and under any circumstances. They are beyond any change and are therefore called the “perpetuity guarantee” of the constitution.[15] An interesting question was discussed in this context: if unfavorable political developments bring a radical left-wing or radical right-wing majority to power, could they not use their absolute majority to abolish Art. 79 para. 3 BL and thus override human dignity in Art. 1 and abolish the 5 structural principles in Art. 20 BL? The answer of the Federal Constitutional Court, which once had to deal with this question, is a clear no. Article 79 para 3 BL contains the logical requirement that it cannot itself be abolished. As long as the Federal Republic and the Basic Law exist, these three characteristics determine the German state. The only way to eliminate them would be to dissolve the German state and establish a completely different state. Such a demand is not seriously being made by any party, and if it were ever made, it is hardly conceivable that it would ever be realized. The sensitivity of the German population is extraordinarily high precisely because of particular historical experiences. Since the founding of the Basic Law, the Federal Republic has over the last decades rather proved to be an “anchor of stability” (also in comparison to GB, France or Italy) which can be attributed precisely to the constitution and the mentality of its citizens.

Institutional pillars for implementing the state principles

In order to fill the theoretical principles of the republic, the democracy, the welfare state, the federal state and the rule of law with life, concrete institutions are needed. The most important institutions are the Bundestag (Federal Parliament), the Bundesrat (Federal Council), the Bundespräsident (Federal President), the Bundesregierung (Federal Government) and the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court). Of course, the political parties also play a prominent role in the political process.

The Bundestag (Federal Parliament) has three main tasks: It has a central legislative function, an electoral function and a control function. Federal laws such as the Civil Code, the Criminal Code, the Social Code and the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act (currently an important topic due to high immigration) are passed by the Bundestag. The Federal Government, the Federal Council and members of the Federal Parliament have the “right of initiative”, i.e. to initiate legislation, but it is always the Federal Parliament that decides whether a bill actually becomes law (according to the required majority). The Bundestag is elected every four years by citizens over the age of 18 on the basis of the following five electoral principles: elections must be general, direct, free, equal and secret. The Bundestag has an important electoral function because it is where the Federal Chancellor, the Federal President and the highest federal judges are elected. The election of the Federal Chancellor is therefore carried out by the citizens electing members of Parliament from different parties, and the majority of the members of parliament from one party elect the Chancellor. There is no direct election of the Federal chancellor. Once the Chancellor has been elected, he chooses his ministers, who are appointed by the Federal President. Finally, the Bundestag has an important control function in that it can set up committees of inquiry or have the financial distribution reviewed. According to the Federal election law, the Bundestag should have 598 deputies, but due to a special feature of this electoral law it currently has 736 deputies. (Work is currently underway to reduce it to its original size, accompanied by protests from those parties and politicians who will lose their seats in parliament as a result of the change.)

The Bundesrat (Federal Council) is the “parliament of the state governments” that enables the federal states to represent their interests vis-à-vis the federal government. Its main tasks are also legislation, the election of individual high representatives and control. The Bundesrat participates in federal legislation, as already highlighted in detail in Art. 79 para. 3 BL, it is involved in the election of the Federal President and the judges of the Federal Constitutional Court, and it exercises control rights with regard to the Federal President and the distribution of finances (together with the Bundestag). Depending on the size of the individual federal states, each state has between 3-6 votes in the Bundesrat.

The Bundespräsident (Federal President) is the head of state. In contrast to the Reich President of the Weimar Republic, to whom the Constitution of the Weimar Republic granted considerable influence over the material leadership of the state (in particular the right to dissolve the Reichstag, to appoint and dismiss the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Ministers), the Federal President is above all a “dependent” head of state: His functions are largely of a formal nature. One of the most important tasks of the President is to represent the Federal Republic under international law, which is expressed in the reception of state visits, the conclusion of state treaties and the reception of envoys. In the area of legislative power, his right to draw up and promulgate laws is particularly noteworthy. Because the Federal President must sign laws originating from the Bundestag, the question regularly arises as to whether he can prevent a law (which he dislikes) by not signing it and how far his right of scrutiny extends. (And this misuse actually happened.) The Federal President also exercises the right of pardon.

The Bundesregierung (Federal Government) is along with the Federal President of the central branch of executive power. The task of the government is to steer and direct the policies of the state. In a parliamentary system of government, the government can only fulfill this task if it has the confidence of parliament. The government is dependent on the confidence of parliament; it can only enact a law if the majority of its members support the government’s work. The Federal Government consists of the federal chancellor and the current 16 federal ministers (in 2024). The federal government is organized on the basis of three principles: The Federal Chancellor determines the policy guidelines and is responsible for them (“chancellor principle”); within these guidelines, the federal ministers manage their areas of responsibility independently and on their own authority (“departmental principle”). The Federal Government decides collectively on differences of opinion between the federal ministers (“collegial principle”). Currently the federal government, in office since December 8, 2021, consists of three parties, the SPD (Social Democrats), the Greens, and the FDP (Liberals (in the classical sense of the word and therefore not to be confused with “Liberals” in the US)). The SPD and the Greens have a great deal in common in terms of expanding government spending and extending the welfare state, while the FDP pursues a classic liberal policy of strengthening individual rights and the free market economy. As the FDP holds the Ministry of Finance and can therefore effectively control government spending, the FDP currently carries a great deal of weight in federal politics. Citizens hear about the tensions and power struggles in the federal government almost every evening on the news.

The Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) is the last of the five major institutions of the BL. It has a special position because it is firstly a constitutional body and secondly the highest judicial body. It is independent and autonomous alongside the other constitutional bodies (such as the Bundestag, Bundesrat, Federal President and Federal Government). The decisions of the FCC are binding on the constitutional bodies of the federal and state governments as well as all courts and authorities. The FCC stands in the tradition of modern constitutional jurisdiction, which begins with the 1803 decision of the American Supreme Court in “Marbury v. Madison”. At that time, a law was declared unconstitutional for the first time. In Germany, something similar was provided for in the Paulskirche constitution of 1849, but the constitution never entered into force. Although there was a State Court in the Weimar Republic, it was only responsible for proceedings between the Reich and the Länder. A general extension of the State Court to the review of laws by the constitution sparked heated debate. The most famous statement was formulated in Carl Schmitt’s 1929 essay on The Guardian of the Constitution (Der Hüter der Verfassung), which emphasized that judges did not have the competence and authority to review laws, they should only apply them. As there was an obvious process of constitutional destruction under the rule of National Socialism, it was quickly agreed in Herrenchiemsee and in the Parliamentary Council that a strong constitutional court was needed to safeguard the free state. The FCC was founded in 1951 and is, to this day, a strong companion and pioneer of politics and public law in Germany. Compared to the constitution of the Weimar Republic, the FCC now has not just one competence, but five. It decides in the case of federal-state disputes (disputes between the federal government and a state), in the case of an abstract review of a norm (examination of the compatibility of a norm with the constitution independently of a specific legal dispute) and in a specific review of a norm (examination of the compatibility of a norm with the constitution in connection with a specific legal dispute), in the case of a dispute between organs (dispute between supreme federal organs like Bundestag, Bundesrat, Federal President, Federal government) and in the case of a constitutional complaint.

The most interesting competence of the FCC is the constitutional complaint. Art. 93 Abs. 1 no 4a BL stipulates:

“The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on constitutional complaints, which may be filed by any person alleging that one of his basic rights or one of his rights under paragraph 4 of Article 20 or under Article 33, 38, 101, 103, or 104 has been infringed by public authority.”

The constitutional complaint is the most important of the five procedures. It serves to protect the basic individual rights of citizens. In the event that someone’s basic rights are directly violated by a measure of public authority at federal, state or local level, he or she has the right to appeal to the FCC themselves (a right that does not exist in the case of a dispute between organs or in the case of abstract or concrete judicial review). Constitutional complaints account for around 95% of all proceedings before the FCC each year; since 1951, a total of more than 245,000 constitutional complaints have been lodged with the FCC. Although only around 2-3% of constitutional complaints are successful, the FCC is today regarded as a genuine “citizens’ court” thanks to the constitutional complaint.[16]

At the end of the overview of the most important institutions enshrined in the constitution, we will take a brief look at the political parties. Not only are they explicitly mentioned in the BL, but they have also found a prominent place in the constitution. As they are anchored in Art. 21 and thus directly behind the prominent Art. 20 BL, which is referred to as the “Constitution in short form”, the Parliamentary Council has assigned them a special position. The Constitution defines their task in Art. 21 para. 1 and 2 in the following words:

“Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds”. AND: “Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order, or do endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality.”

The political parties are the link between the state on the one hand and society on the other. They are a kind of transmission belt that mediates “from bottom to top” and “from top to bottom”. Any citizen can set up a political party and fight in the political competition for approval, provided the party complies with the basic democratic order. The demand not to jeopardize the so-called “free democratic basic order” is, however, of the utmost importance. The parties should promote democracy through diversity and pluralism and not put it at risk. Since the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany, the following sentence has been applied: “No freedom for the enemies of freedom!” The Weimar Constitution was characterized by freedom of values and value relativism; legal positivism had left its mark. This freedom of values is decisively rejected by the Basic Law. The Basic Law is committed to a system of values that is reflected in the guarantee of human dignity and in the basic rights. The Basic Law embodies a system of values that all political parties (and all people living in Germany) are obliged to observe. But if a party disregards or opposes this basic democratic order, then the Federal Constitutional Court has the right to ban this party as unconstitutional. Two parties have been banned in the history of the Federal Republic: in 1952, one year after its founding, the Federal Constitutional Court banned the “Socialist Reich Party” as a successor organization to the NSDAP, and in 1956 the Federal Constitutional Court declared the “Communist Party of Germany” unconstitutional. (A ban procedure for the right-wing party “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) is currently being discussed, but the application for a ban seems to promise little success.) Democracies also have to cope with strongly opposing positions.

The Basic law as “provisional arrangement”

Germany’s constitution is called the Basic Law and not the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Why is that? The reason is of a historical nature: unlike laws and ordinances, constitutions claim to be long-term regulations. In a sense, a constitution is “for eternity”. The historical circumstances a few years after the war and above all the Soviet Union’s refusal to participate in a state based on democracy and a market economy prompted the fathers and mothers of the constitution to call it the Basic Law. It was intended to be a provisional arrangement. But as the saying goes: “Nothing lasts as long as a provisional arrangement.” And so it is with the Basic Law. It was drawn up on 23 May 1949 and has been in force ever since. The original Preamble of 1949 stresses that not all Germans were allowed to participate in the process of constitution making and therefore “the entire German People remains obliged to fulfill the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination.” 40 years later, after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, work began on the reunification of West and East Germany.

Two options were available at the time: dissolution of the Basic Law and replacement by a completely new constitution, or accession of the former German Democratic Republic to the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Due to the (political and economic) success of the Federal Republic, the second option was chosen: on October 3, 1990, the former East Germany ceased to exist on the Day of German Unity by handing over its territories to West Germany. I remember a sentence I read in a newspaper at the time: “When I woke up on October 3, my wardrobe was still in my room, but my room was in another country.” What sounds rather funny and amusing here was a huge problem for many people in the former German Democratic Republic: the entire political, economic, legal and social system in East Germany had to be taken over from one day to the next by a previously foreign country they didn’t know and never visited. The differences in mentality were also enormous (after “only” 40 years of separation) and have not been completely overcome even today. The merging and growing together of the two German states is still a challenge today. The financial burden of the “reconstruction of East Germany” is considerable, too. It is estimated that at least 2 trillion euros (= 2000 billion) were paid in transfer payments (from West to East) in the first 30 years; it is also assumed that at least 100 billion euros are still being added every year.

In connection with the finances, a brief reference to current politics should also be made: The debt level of the Federal Republic in 2022 amounted to 2.57 trillion euros.[17] More than 10 years earlier, the debt was approaching the 2 trillion euro mark; the Maastricht criteria could no longer be met. Specifically, the target of limiting government debt to a maximum of 60% of gross domestic product was missed. Politicians “surprisingly” reacted to this news and introduced the instrument of the so-called “debt brake”. The debt brake stipulated (even in the constitution, Art. 115 para. 2 BL!) that the Federal Republic must limit its new public debt to a maximum of 0.35% of gross domestic product (GDP). Exceptions are made for natural disasters or economic crises. And, another surprise, the debt brake worked: between 2012 and 2019, Germany reduced its debt and repaid several billion euros each year. The 2020 – 2022 coronavirus crisis and subsequent high inflation overrode the debt brake. In the current government, the FDP is fighting fiercely against the SPD and Greens for compliance with the debt brake. The result of this battle is still pending.

And why is the German constitution also today still called “Basic Law” instead of Constitution? Reunification has taken place, so that the Basic Law could have been renamed the “Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany”. The reason was the realization that the Basic Law has been a truly successful constitution that has brought the Federal Republic considerable success, and since the most important provisions should continue to apply after reunification, the name Basic Law should also be retained. In 1992-93 there was a “major” constitutional reform that made minor changes to the Basic Law, but these did not change the basic tenor (I have referred to Art. 3 para. 2 sentence 2 BL.). One certainly accurate comment on the constitutional reform is: “The result: an almost unchanged new edition of the Basic Law; in 1992/93 the Basic Law was virtually placed under monument protection.”[18]

Voegelin’s reference to the Basic Law

At the end of this overview of some of the provisions of the Basic Law, we will take a brief look at Eric Voegelin and his view of the German constitution. Volume 34 of the Collected Works of Eric Voegelin contains a Cumulative Index, which also deals with the terms Constitutio, Constitution, Constitutional government, Constitutional Law, Constitutional order, Constitution of soul and Constitutions: amendment of. There are a few references to Germany, such as Carl Schmitt, Weimar Constitution, Immanuel Kant, and Hans Kelsen (Kelsen was Austrian, but held a chair at the University of Cologne from 1930 to 1933). Most of the references, however, are aimed at an intellectual-historical context, which is expressed, for example, in keywords such as Constitution of Athens, Politeia, Aristotle on Constitutional order, United States Constitution, Austrian Constitution, Mill on Constitutions, etc. References to the Federal Republic of Germany and the basic law are extremely rare. The most important reference to the Basic Law are in the lectures on “Hitler and the Germans”, which Voegelin gave in 1964 at the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich.[19] Even his 1957 lectures on “The Nature of Law” at Louisiana State University contain no references to the German constitution. Voegelin concentrates there on the philosophical foundations of the concept of law with numerous references to Aristotle, and occasionally to Plato.

Voegelin’s comments on the German constitution are entitled “Descent into the Legal Abyss”. The title suggests a critical reckoning, which in fact follows. In his explanations, Voegelin refers to the “Rechtsstaat” (rule of law) as derived from Art. 20 BL, but also addresses the concept of human dignity in Art. 1 BL. According to Voegelin, the concept of Rechtsstaat is an empty concept; it says nothing about the content that the state and the law are supposed to protect. The concept of the Rechtsstaat is typically German; nobody except Germans know that they live in a Rechtsstaat. Voegelin’s conclusion: „We are floating in the second reality of word exhilaration, with words like Rechtsstaat, where one talks in circles without knowing exactly what is meant.”[20] The German term “Rechtsstaat” is translated into English as “rule of law”, and there is no question that the term enjoys the highest esteem in political science and jurisprudence despite its apparent lack of content or “emptiness”. On the one hand, the rule of law is the opposite of an arbitrary state because the government is bound by the law; on the other hand, it is precisely the separation of powers, the binding of state powers to previously agreed norms and the existence of basic or human rights that ensure the freedom of citizens. I would say that Voegelin’s critique is little convincing.

Voegelin’s attempt to create a contradiction between paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 20 BL is equally unconvincing. Article 20 para. 2 sentence 1 BL standardizes: „All state authority emanates from the people.” Art. 20 para. 3 BL, on the other hand, emphasizes: “Legislation is subject to the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary are bound by law and justice”. Can be derived from these two sentences, “that the layers of constitutional norms as such are isolated, and legislation is now subject to the constitutional norms, on the model of the simple hierarchy of legal propositions, which is subject to the constitutional order”?[21]

A third of Voegelin’s arguments relates to basic rights and here to the guarantee of human dignity. He quotes the three paragraphs of Article 1 BL and then states:

“If we interpret in the manner of legal positivism, then you could say that the real legal material begins with article 2, where the fundamental rights are enumerated. But this article 1 is revealing, precisely because the foundation for fundamental rights is formulated there: Fundamental rights have the purpose of protecting the dignity of man, at least against attacks from the state. But what is this dignity of man? That is not said. So all that is visible of the dignity of man is what can be protected by the fundamental rights. And that is only a very dubious part of it.”

This criticism by Voegelin sounds the most convincing, although no one has to or should interpret a constitution from the point of view of legal positivism. The Basic Law was expressly developed in contrast to the legal positivism of the Weimar Constitution. The preamble of the Basic Law begins with the words: “Conscious of their responsibility before God and man …”, and Art. 20 para. 3 BL also points beyond simple legal positivism with the following formulation: “The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice”. The term “law” refers to a legal proposition as the result of a formal legislative process, the term “justice” however points to the level of natural law beyond pure parliamentary propositions. In addition to this remark, Voegelin is certainly right in claiming that the concept of human dignity is difficult to define. To this day, no kind of definition exists. What does exist, however, is the (aforementioned) “object formula”, which prohibits making people the object of state action. The formula was developed as early as 1957 and one could ask why Voegelin did not know or mention this formula, which was already much discussed in the late 1950s and early 1960s? Voegelin held his lectures in 1964. Concrete examples to illustrate this concept already existed at that time.

In his introduction to “Hitler and the Germans”, the editor Brendan Purcell comments on Voegelin’s remarks with the words that “the discussion of the law may appear somewhat abstruse at times”, which the reader can certainly confirm. Purcell goes on to write: “His criticism of the Rechtsstaat is that … it obscured or eclipsed the first reality of common sense and of ethics, making it easy for jurists and citizens to obey the law, no matter what its content.” Voegelin was of the firm conviction that “experiences of order, whether philosophical or revelational, alone provide the matrix within which the law is formulated and toward which it must primarily be responsible.”[22] It is from this point of view that his criticism of the German constitution can best be understood and comprehended.

Conclusion

The Basic Law will be 75 years old on 23.05.2024. The development of the Basic Law begins with the (ultimately failed) Paulskirche Constitution of 1849, which in turn receives important inspiration from the American Constitution of 1787,[23] and then leads via the stages of the Reich Constitution of 1871 and the Weimar Constitution of 1919 to the Constitution currently in force. The vast majority of Germans celebrate this constitution because it has made political stability, legal security and economic prosperity possible. With the guarantee of human dignity and the list of basic rights in Articles 1-19 BL, the comprehensive protection of citizens from the state has been realized. The basic rights are above any positive legislation, they draw on the intellectual history of past centuries and condense the results into a few pages. The historian Golo Mann comments: “Nothing is missing here that Anglo-Saxon, French or German philosophy has developed in two hundred years.”[24] The principles in Art. 20 BL, the state organs mentioned, and the Federal Constitutional Court serve to protect and develop citizens.

NOTES:

[1] The following remarks concentrate on the constitution as a legal document, but are occasionally interspersed with excursions into real historical events, intellectual history and current political processes.

[2] The war ended with the unconditional surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945, and work on the Basic Law was completed on May 8, 1949.

[3] Between the Constitution of 1849 and the Constitution of 1919, there was of course the Reich Constitution of 1871, which formed the basis for the German Reich (Empire, 1871-1918). The Reich Constitution of 1871 had neither a fundamental rights section nor clear democratic elements. Elmar Hucko beautifully characterizes the various breaks in German history between 1848 and 1949 as follows: “The 1848 Revolution had come from below, 1871 presented a case of a revolution from above and in 1918 a revolution had been unleashed from above and below at the same time. The Bonn Basic Law was ultimately a product of Germany’s liberation by the Allies and hence of a “revolution from the outside”. Elmar M. Hucko (ed.): The Democratic Tradition. Four German Constitutions, Leamington Spa et al.: Berg, 1987, p. 67.

[4] The former capital Berlin was rejected as seat of government because it was located in the middle of the Soviet occupation zone, and the German government also wanted to maintain its fundamental ties to the West by choosing Bonn, which was located in the Western part of the country, near the French border.

[5] The Paulskirche constitution finally failed after the Prussian King Frederick William IV refused the imperial crown offered to him on April 28, 1849. He did so because he saw himself as a king by the grace of God. In other words, he justified his rule by God. He therefore considered it an insult to receive an imperial crown from ordinary citizens and revolutionaries. His argument was: “The smell of revolution clings to the crown.”

[6] Quotations from the Basic Law follow the official translation of the “Press and Information Office of the Federal Government”. Translation by Christian Tomuschat (Berlin) and David P. Curry (Chicago), Bönen: Publishing house, 1998.

[7] The Latin original: „Homo … est finis totius generationis”.

[8] Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, USA: A&D Books, 2014.

[9] Günter Dürig, in: Theodor Maunz/Günter Dürig: Grundgesetz 1957, Art. 1 para 1, no. 28, 34. [Basic Law].

[10] Pfordten, Dietmar von der: Menschenwürde, 2. ed., Munich: C.H. Beck, 2023, p. 7. [Human dignity]

[11] The figures mentioned here have been chosen purely at random by the author of these lines and are merely intended to illustrate the dramatic nature of the situation.

[12] Decision of the FCC, vol. 115, pp. 118 ff.

[13] It is obvious that a decision on the basis of utilitarianism which argues in favor of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” respectively here in this context “the least suffering of the least number” would look very differently. And many people intuitively would prefer this point of view.

[14] Hans Kelsen: Demokratie. Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 2. ed., Tübingen: J.C. B. Mohr, 1929, p. 14. [Democracy. The nature and value of democracy]

[15] The so-called “perpetuity guarantee” in Art. 79 para. 3 BL has an important historical origin: After the National Socialists seized power on January 30, 1933, the German Reichstag was set on fire on the night of February 27. Hitler issued a “Reichstag Fire Decree” on January 28, which suspended the most important basic rights of the Weimar Constitution. Communists who had caused the fire should no longer to be protected by the state. (The extent to which communists caused or were involved in the fire is still disputed today, and the suspension of human rights soon affected not only communists but all citizens of the state.) One month after the “Reichstag Fire Decree”, on March 24, the Reichstag passed the so-called “Enabling Act”, which allowed (“enabled”) the government to pass laws without the involvement of parliament. Parliament was thus excluded from political decisions. These two legal acts (Febr. and March 1933) sealed de facto the end of the Weimar Republic. In order to understand Art. 79 para. 3 BL, it is important to note that the so-called Gleichschaltung (equalization) of the federal states had also already begun in March 1933. The governments of the Länder, which were often not ruled by National Socialists, were replaced by National Socialist governments. Primarily the first two provisions of Art. 79 para. 3 BL respond to these events.

[16] Das Bundesverfassungegericht – Gericht und Verfassungsorgan [The Federal Constitutional Court – Court and Constitutional body], online: https://www.bmj.de/DE/rechtsstaat_kompakt/rechtssprechung/bundesverfassungsgericht/bundesverfassungsgericht_node.html (retrieved on May 20, 2024).

[17] https://www.bundesbank.de/de/presse/pressenotizen/deutsche-staatsschulden-907124 [German Federal Bank] (retrieved on May 22, 2024).

[18] Heribert Prantl: Glanz und Elend der Grundrechte. Zwölf Sterne für das Grundgesetz, München: Droemer Publishing house, 2014, p. 60. [The splendor and misery of basic rights. Twelve stars for the Basic Law]

[19] Eric Voegelin: The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 34, ed. by Ellis Sandoz, Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2006, pp. 257-58. 

[20] Eric Voegelin, Hitler and the Germans, in: The Collected Works, vol. 31, ed. by. Detlev Clemens and Brendan Purcell, Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1999, p. 215.   

[21] Eric Voegelin, Hitler and the Germans, in: The Collected Works, vol. 31, op. cit., 217.  

[22] Brendan Purcell: Editors‘ Introductions, in: Eric Voegelin: The Collected Works, vol. 31, op. cit., 31-32.    

[23] See the book of Kurt Rabl, Christoph Stoll and Manfred Vasold: From the U.S. Constitution to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, completely bilingual account of the historical development and the role of the U.S. Constitution, Gräfelfing: Moser Publishing house, 1988.

[24] Golo Mann: Deutsche Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, 16. ed., Frankfurt am Main: Büchergilde Gutenberg, 1982, p. 988. [German history of the 19th and 20th centuries]. (Golo Mann was a son of Thomas Mann and a prominent historian.)

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