The Divinity of the Human Artifice

Since classical times, the meaning of art has been subject to learned discussions surrounding the difference between art and craft, reason and emotions, and art as a vehicle for ‘a truth’ to emerge. Does art invoke lower human impulses as Plato suggested? Or does art represent a human expression which transcends durability in natural processes? By conducting a dialogue between Plato’s theory of art, Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian dualism, and Hannah Arendt’s ideas on the permanence of the world and the work of art, this essay proposes a narrative which aims to bring about unity among these three philosophical ideas.  By comparing and contrasting aesthetic theories associated with these three authors, I will contend that the meaning of art is to be identified in its original τέλος (telos) to retain significance throughout the ages. Human beings seem to be driven by a desire to bypass the laws of nature by materializing ideas and concepts which circumnavigate natural processes to secure immortality in the form of tangible objects. This essay will firstly engage with Plato’s theory of art, highlighting differences between the role of the artisan and the artist, alongside the role of emotions in artistic expression. Secondly, it will introduce Nietzsche’s dualism as a revival to the role of emotions in artistry. Thirdly, it will consider Arendt’s theory as a way to challenge Plato’s views on art and craft and establish a connection between the role of the craftsman and the artist.  I will conclude that the idea of reification of the work of art suggests a surprising importance of the artist and its co-dependency to the physical world created by the craftsman. The reification of thoughts into objects suggests that the divinity of the human artifice and its capacity to materialize thought into forms represents a way to retain immortal ideas for a world inhabited by mortal beings.

With Plato’s theory of art, the quest for truth has highlighted a structural difference between the role of the artisan and the artist. Plato argued that the craftsman only makes things which possess utility and resemble “what is without being it.”^[1] The artist uses artistic representation to invoke lower human impulses identified with emotions. Craftsmen possess the capacity to create objects which derive from the realm of ideas. These objects are regarded as imitations of true forms. The artist creates representations based on the visible world created by the craftsman. In this argument, Plato suggested that both the craftsman and the artist are far removed from the quest for truth because neither of the two agents possess true understanding of their creations. The craftsman is seen as the Demiurge who, immersed in natural chaos, is able to produce order by making and manufacturing objects without truly representing their true forms. The function of these objects is actualized in the moment in which users fulfill their utility within the realm of ordinary experience. On the other hand, the role of the artist is not to make or manufacture, but it is to create imitations based on worldly objects created by the craftsman. These imitations are actualized through artistic expression embodied in dynamic forms. These forms are identified by Plato in colors, poetic coloring, music, meter, and rhythm. It is through a combination of forms and content that the artist is able to invoke an emotional response from the audience. This response is seen negatively by Plato since the artist, by invoking lower human impulses, acts upon the lower element of the mind in contrast with the higher element identified with reason. Therefore, while the craftsman operates in the realm of ordinary experience by creating objects with a utility which is actualized in their creation (like the chair you sit upon), the artist is seen as a deceiver who operates in the realm of ‘shadows’ by manipulating emotions through artistic forms. However, Plato’s contentions can be evaluated through the advancement of theories concerning aesthetics.  Hence, can emotions be re-evaluated in the context of artistic expression?

With Nietzsche, the dualism of reason and emotions and the role of both the craftsman and the artist have acquired a more positivistic yet realist approach when it comes to artistic expression. In ‘The Birth of Tragedy,’ Nietzsche ventures in defense of emotions identifying them as the means through which humans re-discover their union with nature. I propose that Nietzsche identifies in the craftsman, hence the Demiurge, the divinity of the Greek deity Apollo, who through the principium individuationis,^[2] tells us “of all the joy and wisdom of appearance, together with its beauty.”^[3] Moreover, the Platonic Demiurge identified in the craftsman acquires a more positivistic role since its expression is glorified through its capacity to manufacture objects which are embodied in physical appearance, like the bed we lay on. The capacity to manifest imitations through forms allows humans to create a physical environment that serves as a home for human beings and their physical needs. Without the Apollonian power, humans would not be able to manifest thoughts and would be unable to create worldly existence grounded in imitations of perfect Platonic forms. However, with the introduction of the Dionysian, Nietzsche aims to surpass the dualism of reason and emotions by a process of reconciliation. The nature of the Dionysian is proposed as a way to awaken emotions, in order to dissolve the principium individuationis “into complete self-forgetfulness.”^[4] With the Dionysian impulse, which is brought home to us most intimately perhaps by the analogy of drunkenness, humans are not only able to instill a unity with nature defined by Nietzsche as Primordial Unity through Bacchic choruses, but they also to create unity with other human beings. This unity occurs through the emotional experience human beings partake in aesthetic experiences. The union between the Apollonian and the Dionysian in artistic expression aims to reconnect the role of reason with emotions. It is through this unity that works of art start to be seen as soothing, rather than deceiving. However, if the Dionysian impulse can be seen as a significant aspect of artistic expression alongside its unification with the Apollonian, can also the role of the craftsman be reunited with the role of the artist? Or does this relationship reveal a co-dependency?

To better comprehend the dichotomy of the artist and the craftsman, Plato suggested that the craftsman manufacture objects; they are actualized by their true function. The telos of these exchangeable objects is actualized within their tangible usage by human beings. The artist is responsible for the creation of lower representations which are identified as being copies of what the craftsman makes, having been inspired by the realm of ideas. Hannah Arendt’s theory regarding the permanence of the world and the work of art supposes that the relationship between the craftsman and the artist reveal a co-dependency. Arendt argued that:

Among the things that give the human artifice the stability without which it could never be a reliable home for men are a number of objects which are strictly without any utility whatsoever and which, moreover, because they are unique, are not exchangeable and therefore defy equalization through a common denominator such as money.^[5]

Furthermore, the telos of works of art does not have to be identified within its utility. It does not possess one. Art appears rather detached by its association with ‘use objects’ not for the emotions they invoke, as argued by Plato, but because “works of art are the most intensely worldly of all tangible things.”^[6] On the one hand, the craftsman, inspired by the Platonic god, makes tangible objects which fulfill their telos in the moment in which these objects are actualized by the human agent in their utility. The artist produces works of art where “their durability is almost untouched by the corroding effect of natural processes, since they are not subject to the use of living creature.”^[7] Therefore, the permanence of works of art appears to be of a higher order in comparison with the objects which the craftsman makes.

While these considerations question Plato’s views on artistry, they also propose that the significance of works of art should be identified in their capacity to convey meanings through physical forms. The human agent connected with the production of ‘use objects’ aims to bypass natural processes which are associated with decay and durability. The capacity to transcend natural processes, Arendt proposes, is to be identified not in the immortality of the soul or of life, but in something immortal achieved my mortal hands, where art embodies objects that are tangibly present, to shine and to be seen, to sound and to be heard, to speak and to be read. Through the power of thought which ignites the human agent, feelings enter the world via works of art as representation of immortal ideas in tangible forms. I contend that these feelings can be associated with Nietzsche’s Dionysian powers, intensifying the sensorial experience of works of art through the multiplicity of forms. The power of thought, inspired by the Apollonian principium individuationis, allows the existence of tangible objects to reflect mere appearances of perfect ideas. The union of these dichotomies allows us to hypothesize that the power of immortal ideas enclosed within a variety of forms such as sculpture, paintings, poetry, and written works embraces the role of content over the forms through which these are expressed. Therefore, tangible objects might serve as a vehicle for the transfiguration of thought into feelings, feelings into content, and content into forms. This consideration finds agreement with Susan Sontag’s idea that in aesthetic criticism, “the best criticism, and it is uncommon, is of this sort that dissolves considerations of content into those of form.”^[8]

Plato’s theory of art suggests not only to regard the activity of representation by the craftsman and the artist as deceiving, but also how art appeals and represents the lower, less rational part of our nature. With Plato, the artist is accused of producing a similarly bad state of affairs in the mind of the individual, by encouraging the unreasoning part of it. Nietzsche sees emotions in a more positivistic lens. With the union between the nature of the Apollonian, which allows for the appreciation of forms and their contemplation, and the nature of the Dionysian, identified with the capacity to awaken emotions, “not only is the union between man and man reaffirmed, but Nature which has become estranged, hostile or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her prodigal son, man.”^[9] With Arendt’s ideas, aesthetic criticism should begin to recognize the role of the human artifice as capable of transcending utility in the creation of objects. This creation embraces the capacity of man as a mortal being to create works of art which possess a transcendental capacity to retain content through time. Meanings embedded into works of art, suggest that the role of the artist is crucial for the memory and recollection of ideas. These ideas are neither a driving biological force which springs forth from the human artifice, nor a tool which aims to produce objects with utility. They are driving forces which aspire to transcend worldly existence aiming to bypass the permanence of the world via works of art. Is man regarded as the Platonic Demiurge which confines immortal ideas into objects in order to transcend temporal existence? If so, what is the meaning of the human need to transcend worldly existence through ideas? Are we so afraid of death that we aim to leave behind objects with no physical utility which allow for the memory and recollection of ideas which transcend natural processes? These remains critical questions in the context of aesthetic criticism and the role of the human artifice in the creation of works of art.

NOTES:

[1] Plato, The Republic, (Penguin Classics, 1955) 362

[2] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, (Dover, New York: 1995) 3, 5, 6.

[3] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 3

[4] Ibid.

[5] Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (University of Chicago Press, 1958) 167

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays. (Pinguin Modern Classics, 2009), 13.

[9] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 4.

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