The Concept of “Mentality” in Mircea Eliade’s Philosophy

In a previous article published in VOEGELINVIEW, “On The Philosophy of Mircea Eliade,” I showed that although deeply influenced by the Indian metaphysics he studied in his youth, Mircea Eliade wished to remain—and indeed remained—a thinker decisively indebted to Western thought. Nevertheless, the Indian world left profound traces in his theories, traces that can also be found in the understanding of history he developed in his studies dedicated to homo religiosus. In the present article, I will illustrate concretely, by presenting a particular case, the way in which the thought of the Indian metaphysical schools inspired Eliade.

History and Mentality

Frequently encountered in the writings of Mircea Eliade, the concept of “mentality”—made famous especially through the so-called French school The Annales—possesses formidable explanatory power. By revealing such influences, I wish to show that a philosophical reading applied to Eliade’s work is the only “total” reading of the work in question, a reading consistent with the desire repeatedly expressed by the Chicago professor himself. To begin with, I will present several significant passages in which the concept of mentality is used as an effective hermeneutical “key.”

In Asian Alchemy (1934), a study belonging to the context of the history-of-science research undertaken by the young Eliade, he attempted to demonstrate, by applying a new method, “that Chinese and Indian alchemy are not empirical sciences, are not proto-chemistries, but mystical, soteriological techniques.” This thesis, which sees alchemy as the projection of an attempt to transform the human condition, is one of Eliade’s most interesting ideas. Relevant for us is the explanation he gives for the coexistence of the two species of alchemy, one “mystical” and the other “naturalistic”:

“It may be that they correspond to diverse mental structures: the former mystical and transcendent, the latter secular and naturalistic.”

We therefore observe that the notion of “mental structure” is invoked in order to clarify the historical tribulations of ancient disciplines belonging to the—let us say—“applied” dimension of the history of religions. Probably, however, the most valuable mentions of the concept of mentality appear in Babylonian Cosmology and Alchemy (1937), a short but dense work on the history of science, in whose introduction we are warned that it “was conceived and written as a preliminary chapter of a more extensive work concerning the mental evolution of humanity.”

Once again, the concept of “mentality” is invoked. Here our attention is drawn, much more extensively, to the revolution that the method employed “is called upon to introduce into the understanding of human mental evolution,” a method that makes possible the unified interpretation of the entire history of humanity:

“Indeed, with every new fundamental discovery, man not only enlarges the sphere of empirical knowledge and refreshes his means of subsistence—but discovers a new cosmic level, experiences another order of reality. It is not the discovery of metals as such that produced the mental leap, but the ‘presence’ of metals, through which man comes into contact with realities previously unknown or insignificant. In other words, metallurgy—like agriculture, etc.—produces mental syntheses that radically modify the human condition by changing man’s image of the cosmos. These mental syntheses, surpassed or adulterated by subsequent discoveries, are the true factors of human psychic and spiritual evolution. And this is all the more important to emphasize because modern science has completely neglected the cosmological significance and experiential value of these discoveries. It is not merely a question of a new instrument in the struggle for existence, but of the revelation of another Cosmos, whose levels and rhythms had until then been inaccessible to man. This ‘revelation’ must be understood in the etymological sense of the word. A new cosmic level is ‘opened’ to man, into which he enters concretely and experimentally. Through the ‘presence’ of metals alongside man, for example, man discovers the magical means of establishing correspondence with the ‘metallic heavens’ or with the matrix of the earth in which ores have ‘grown.’ The mere intervention of metal in human experience radically modifies his structure by transforming his entire mental synthesis concerning the Cosmos.”

Synthesizing Eliade’s entire conception concerning the mental evolution of humanity, the fragment cited above reveals the unity of our author’s thought, who appears before us as a historian of mentalities. His incursions into the field of the history of sciences and religions during the Indian period (1929–1932) and immediately afterward were caused primarily by the necessity of illustrating the “mental evolution of humanity.” Only through Traité d’histoire des religions (1949) would Eliade definitively assume the role of historian of religions; until then, he described himself as a historian of mentalities. Fundamentally, the latter “specialty” was never abandoned; Histoire des croyances et des idées religieuses (1976–1983) may also be understood as a history of humanity’s mental dynamics.

Nor is the concept of mentality absent from The Myth of Reintegration (1942), an essay in which the author proposed “a longer analysis of the theme of divine ‘bi-unity’ and the ‘totalization’ of divine attributes.” The following explanation is offered for the modifications and alterations of the legends of Saint Sisoe, occurring according to the “law of the degradation of the fantastic:”

“When the uncultivated masses, who received and amplified the legends of the Saint battling the She-Devil, forgot the primordial meaning and metaphysical significance of this conflict—they modified it in accordance with their own mental and spiritual capacity.”

Likewise, in Commentaries on the Legend of Master Manole (1943), the degradation and forgetting of the original meaning are attributed to mental modifications:

“The aesthetic and economic value of pearls became detached much later, when the primordial metaphysical meaning began to be forgotten, due to certain revolutions that took place in the mental life of European society.”

We should note that the “law of the degradation of the fantastic,” one of Eliade’s most valuable contributions to the philosophy of culture, is associated with mental modifications within a cause-and-effect relationship. In the following fragment as well, Eliade appears before us as a theorist and historian of mentalities:

“(…) the history of humanity’s mental life, far from being an evolution, is traversed by a rhythm of degradation and death of fundamental intuitions; and this slow decomposition of mental syntheses in no way inferior to those that followed can be reconstructed in its most important stages.”

In Traité d’histoire des religions we encounter once again the concept under discussion, in a passage with which we conclude this series of examples:

“For the moment, let us consider each document—rite, myth, cosmogony, or divinity—as a hierophany; in other words, let us attempt to consider it as a manifestation of the sacred in the mental universe of those who received it.”

Observing that interpreters concerned with the meaning of Eliade’s work “attempt to discover it solely through exegesis of his work as a philosopher of religion,” Sergiu Al-George approached it “from the perspective of Indian thought,” inaugurating one of the most important interpretive directions. After first showing that “what Mircea Eliade discovered in Indian culture was the phenomenon of Yoga and that from this he understood the entire ensemble,” the erudite Indologist systematically demonstrated that the most important concepts used by Eliade in his hermeneutic endeavor correspond to concepts from Hindu metaphysics.

We should not understand this as meaning that we are dealing with a European who became Indianized. Objectively, Sergiu Al-George described the “reaction against India” that marked Eliade, although he “formed himself as a philosopher of culture in the Indian world, which conditioned an optic—as R. Pettazzoni and J. Masui among others observed—an Oriental perspective within his own field of research.” Even if he never abandoned the Western Weltanschauung, in his thought “India would continue to mark its presence not so much in the object as in the essence of his theoretical approach.” Aligning myself with Sergiu Al-George within the same exegetical orientation, I shall highlight the Indian philosophical counterpart existing in Yoga-darśana to the concept of mentality.

“Mental Structures” in Yoga-darśana

The most precise definition of Yoga metaphysics is offered by Patañjali:

“Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff” (Yoga-sutra, I, 2).

To understand this, a brief exposition of the doctrine within whose context it finds its meaning is necessary. Yoga-darśana postulates the existence of two atemporal principles: Puruṣa (Sanskrit: पुरुष—the Self, Spirit) and Prakṛti (Sanskrit: प्रकृति—the Nature). Human suffering, a major theme of Hindu culture, begins with the act of so-called “metaphysical ignorance” (avidya), an ignorance consisting in “taking the non-eternal, impure, painful and non-Self as eternal, pure, pleasant, Self” (Yoga-sutra, II, 5).

From this “zero moment,” a strange relationship arises between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The motive and origin of this relationship are problems that the Samkhya and Yoga metaphysical systems consider insoluble at the current stage of human knowledge. Nevertheless, it is possible to describe it in the symbolic language proper to the Indian tradition, as we learn from Mircea Eliade, who cites Patañjali:

“(…) just as a flower is reflected in a crystal, intelligence (buddhi) reflects Puruṣa.”

Ignorance consists in attributing to the crystal the properties of the flower. This is the “illusory relation” (upadhi) caused by a “sympathetic correspondence” (yogyata) between the knower (drastr) and the mind (citta), the latter being the instrumental aspect of Nature. Liberation occurs when the “mental modifications” (citta-vrtti) are suppressed (nirodhah), a fact which permits self-knowledge of the Self (Puruṣa) and the removal of the illusory connection between it and Nature (Prakṛti). Relying on the traditional exegesis of the Yoga-sutra, the Romanian commentator Gheorghe Jurj specifies that the mind (citta) is “a medium transformed by the activation of its various functions (manas, ahamkara, buddhi) and structures (vrtti). (…) Citta does not know; knowledge always belongs to the Knower (drastr).” The Knower is one of the names given to Puruṣa, indicating a particular aspect of Spirit.

As we have seen, Mircea Eliade often speaks in his writings about the “evolution of mentalities” or “revolutions of mentality,” formulations reminiscent of the “mental modifications” (citta-vrtti) known and analyzed in Yoga-darsana. The most conclusive proof concerning the similarity between Eliade’s concept of mentality (mental structure) and the Hindu concept of citta-vrtti was found in a fragment from his notes written and transcribed in India:

“The second verse of Patañjali’s manual thus defines the aim and meaning of Yoga: ‘Yoga cittavrtti nirodha.’ Nirodha does not mean ‘destruction’ or ‘disappearance,’ but ‘blocking,’ ‘isolation,’ ‘fixation.’ Thus Patañjali’s definition may be translated: Yoga is the activity through which the blocking [or fixing] of psychic states is obtained. A series of clarifications is indispensable in order fully to illuminate the meaning and implications of this passage. First of all, one must not confuse the expression ‘psychic states’ or ‘psychic experiences’ with the ‘soul.’ The latter is an autonomous principle, not involved in any mental experience and which Yoga seeks to ‘realize,’ that is, to possess consciously and globally, and not merely to glimpse or imply. This qualitative difference between the mental and the spiritual, which the Yoga-sutra continually emphasizes and discusses, is common to all Hindu philosophies (with the exception of Buddhism) and stands out historically in post-Vedic literature. It is a crucial point in understanding Indian doctrines.

The fixing of mental states, in other words the suppression of psychic experience, the suppression of mental dynamism—is likewise a general Indian motif. (…) This absolute, impossible to attain through psycho-sensory experience, is the spirit, Puruṣa of the Yoga-sutra. It is present in every human being, but awareness of its presence is obscured. Yoga, through the blocking, fixing, and neutralization of mental experiences, affirms the possibility of concretely attaining (this does not mean sensorially, but effectively and immediately) the autonomy and self-consciousness of the soul. This state is above every hierarchy. It is the goal.”

After, in the first part of his analysis, translating citta-vrtti as “psychic states,” in the second part Eliade equates the same syntagm with “mental states” or “mental dynamism.” It is thus evident that the transposition (translation) performed by our author transferred citta-vrtti from the vocabulary of Indian metaphysics into the Eliadean vocabulary under the form of the concept of “mentality.”

The historical-religious studies carried out by Mircea Eliade thus acquire philosophical meanings with well-defined origins. The attempt to reconstruct, in its major stages, the “mental life of humanity” may reveal modifications of mentality situated between painful historical conditionings on the one hand and the hierophanic manifestations of the meta-historical “sacred” on the other. We can already discern the outline of a philosophy of history doubled by a theology, which, being in close correlation with one another, represent the theoretical support of the morphology of religions practiced by the Chicago professor.

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