Contemplative Life as Mystical Life: On the Purpose of the Philosophy of Plotinus

A distinctive feature of many currents in Greek philosophy is the strong emphasis on contemplative life (βίος θεορητικός) – life that was praised by many thinkers and practiced in many ancient schools. We can discern several interpretations of the notion of contemplation (θεωρία): from the Aristotelian ideal of scientific pursuits, through the Pythagorean fusion of scientific and religious spirit, to the Platonic variant in which the rational-speculative element is subordinated to the mystical element. From the other hand, however diverse these interpretations may be, there is continuity between them. In fact, neither of these philosophies was purely “rational” or purely “mystical,” for the Greek genius was a synergy of both these aspirations, and this synergy can be discovered, in a greater or lesser degree, in each of the above-mentioned schools. Moreover, it can be argued that for all these schools the contemplative life was, at least to a small extent, linked with some form of mysticism. Yet, in Platonism contemplative horizons seem particularly lofty, and among the pagan Neoplatonic philosophers, perhaps no one elucidated this dimension more deeply than the famous author of the Enneads: Plotinus.

In classical Greek metaphysics, contemplation on its highest level is seen as an activity specific to both human beings and higher principles (such as the Demiurge or the Prime Mover), as well as a means by which man can bring himself closer to the state of divinity. Even Aristotle, writing about the first cause contemplating itself in the eternal act, mentions that such contemplation is the state of bliss achievable, albeit rarely, by humans (see Metaphysics 1072b). However, we find this concept far more pronounced in the Platonic tradition. Plato’s Demiurge calls the visible world into being by contemplating the reality of ideas (see Timaeus 28a–29a), and man, fleeing from the world of ceaseless change, experiences likeness to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ), becoming “righteous (δίκαιον) and holy and wise (μετὰ φρονήσεως)” (see Theaetetus 176a–b), which can be interpreted also as a contemplation, understood as the directing of spiritual sight towards the world of eternal archetypes. In turn, Plotinus in his treatise on the virtues writes, “Such a disposition in the Soul, become thus intellective (νοεῖ) and immune to passion, it would not be wrong to call Likeness to God (ὁμοίωσιν πρὸς θεόν)” (Enneads I, II, 3).

For Plato, the notion of “intellection” (νόησις) involves, as we read in the Politeia (also known as the Republic), two functions, called “science” (ἐπιστήμη) and “understanding” (διάνοια) (see Politeia 533d–534a). This “science” is not to be confused with science in modern sense, for, as we read in the same fragment, “intellection [is dealing] with essence” (νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν), which means that νόησις in its highest function is the direct intellectual apprehension of being. In turn, modern science is limited by its methodology to the purely empirical, or observational sphere, where individual beings are subjected to abstract laws, but at the same time any metaphysical notion of “essence” is discarded. Therefore, “science” in a Platonic context can even be seen as the opposite of science as it is understood today.

Plotinus draws from Plato his crucial intuitions regarding noetic knowledge and formulates one of the fundamental epistemological laws: in contemplation, the knowing subject identifies with the object of knowing. It can be argued that this law applies even at the level of discursive reasoning (διάνοια), but then it happens only indirectly, i.e. in the mind of the knower. Therefore, the difference between “ordinary knowledge” and “mystical knowledge” is the difference in degree of directedness, and contemplation in its higher sense is a “direct identification,” νόησις par excellence: true knowledge above “reasoning.”

Francis E. Peters defines νόησις in his lexicon Greek Philosophical Terms as the activity of νοῦς (i.e. intellect), noetic intuition, which is situated on the opposite end to both sense perception and discursive reasoning (see 1967, p. 121). Now, it’s important to bear in mind that in Plotinus’ philosophy there are two basic meanings of the term νοῦς: it is the Divine Intellect, second hypostasis of the spiritual world, but also the inner aspect of man, one of his own “hypostases.” As above, so below; the structure of the microcosm reflects the structure of the macrocosm. This is precisely the reason why the human νοῦς, through the contemplation of the divine νοῦς, can reach the state of “likeness to God.”

In the case of Divine Intellect, identity of the knowing subject with the object of knowing is an ontological necessity. Here is what Plotinus writes:

As an active force, the first activity (πρώτη ἐνέργεια), it must be, also itself, the noblest intellection (νόησις), intellection possessing real being since it is entirely true; and such an intellection, primal and primally existent, can be no other than the primal principle of Intellection: for that primal principle is no potentiality and cannot be an agent distinct from its act and thus, once more, possessing its essential being as a mere potentiality. As an act (ἐνεργεία) – and one whose very being is an act – it must be undistinguishably identical with its act: but Being (τὸ ὂν) and the Intellectual object (τὸ νοητόν) are also identical with that act; therefore the Intellectual-Principle, its exercise of intellection and the object of intellection all are identical (ἓν ἅμα πάντα ἔσται, νοῦς, νόησις, τὸ νοητόν). (Enneads V, III, 5)

In the case of human beings, it is not an ontological necessity but a potential goal of voluntary, ascetic effort. Plotinus teaches us that human consciousness must be purified from all worldly content, stripped from all images and sounds. In a word, it must resemble “matter” in the Greek sense: a space open to being filled – and firmly waiting to be filled – with rays of noetic light:

The Soul itself must exist as Seeing – with the Intellectual-Principle as the object of its vision – it is undetermined (ἀόριστον) before it sees but is naturally apt to see: in other words, Soul is Matter to [its determinant] the Intellectual-Principle (ὕλην οὖν πρὸς νοῦν). (Enneads III, IX, 5; or III, IX, 3B in 1917–1930 edition)

If there is to be perception of what is thus present, we must turn the perceptive faculty inward and hold it to attention there. Hoping to hear a desired voice, we let all others pass and are alert for the coming at last of that most welcome of sounds: so here, we must let the hearings of sense go by, save for sheer necessity, and keep the soul’s perception bright and quick to the sounds from above. (Enneads V, I, 12)

Here we touch, perhaps, on the main thread that unites the whole Neoplatonic metaphysical edifice: the idea of “procession and return.” “In the beginning” (in the ontological, not temporal sense) the multiplicity of creation emerged from the original unity, so this movement, after reaching its limit, must be reversed, and the unity of cause and effect must be restored. In this light, the contemplative life can be seen as the conscious beginning of “return.” In our everyday lives we are constantly dispersed in a plethora of impressions and cognitions, so this plurality, although it is to some extent unified, must be transcended in favour of higher unity. The two quotations above showed us how it should be done. “Emptying” of the soul allows to move from the psychic level of reality to the noetic one. Here the Divine Intellect can communicate itself to our intellect, and therefore here the true θεωρία can begin:

In the advancing stages of Contemplation (θεωρία) rising from that in Nature, to that in the Soul and thence again to that in the Intellectual-Principle itself – the object contemplated (τῶν θεωριῶν) becomes progressively a more and more intimate possession of the Contemplating Beings (τοῖς θεωροῦσι), more and more one thing with them; and in the advanced Soul the objects of knowledge, well on the way towards the Intellectual-Principle, are close to identity with their container. Hence we may conclude that, in the Intellectual-Principle Itself, there is complete identity of Knower and Known, and this not by way of domiciliation, as in the case of even the highest soul, but by Essence, by the fact that, there, no distinction exists between Being and Knowing (τῷ ταὐτὸν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν εἶναι) . . . (Enneads III, VIII, 8)

Plotinus’ philosophy is therefore an example of the most subtle, deeply mystical interpretation of βίος θεορητικός, which is also sui generis βίος πρακτικός. Contemplative life finds its realization outside of discourse, in consistent overcoming of the limitations imposed by the senses, and in achieving ever deeper degrees of insight into the noetic reality, which results in “likeness to God” and a state of union with the Divine Intellect.

It must be remembered that the Divine Intellect is not pure unity, but a noetic one-many, the “world of ideas” or “world of forms.” Hence, it would be wrong to think that contemplation of the Intellect is like plunging into something abstract. On the contrary, the second divine hypostasis, as the world of eternal archetypes, comprises all possible qualities – images, sounds, fragrances, tastes and so on – which flow “as one quality englobing and safeguarding all qualities” (see Enneads VI, VII, 12). Moreover, even though such contemplative acts are called “intellections” (νοήσεις), they are incomparably more intense than the ordinary “perceptions” (αἰσθήσεις) with which we are familiar – so much so that Plotinus calls the latter “dimmer intellections” and the former “vivid perceptions” (see Enneads VI, VII, 7). We see therefore that contemplation from the Neoplatonic perspective, contrary to appearances, is not an escape from life as such, but rather the realization of the best possible life, filled with the most beautiful landscapes and celestial melodies. Yet, it is also the most philosophical experience possible, since the direct contact with the Divine Intellect is a fulfillment of Platonic “dialectic,” the goal of which is “perfect intellection” (see Enneads I, III, 5). Plotinus clearly states that dialectic, once settled down in the intellectual cosmos, still discerns ideas, essences and first kinds, but its dynamics here are paradoxically also a state of rest: “it is no longer busy about many things: it has arrived at Unity and it contemplates” (see Enneads I, III, 4).

In short, the Divine Intellect is “God with attributes” (Saguna Brahman), as the sages of India would say. According to Plotinus (and the whole Platonic tradition) there is something still higher: the absolute Unity, the primordial One that transcends Intellect and Being, and hence also contemplation – “God without attributes” (Nirguna Brahman). Here the mystic finds himself on the threshold of Beyond-Being, before the leap for which his prior contemplative life was but a preparation.

In the light of the above considerations, we can now see what role does discursive reasoning, this “lesser contemplation” play in Plotinus’ philosophy. For Plotinus, the entire Enneads are a kind of tool, an encouragement and an impulse to move from “thinking” to “seeing”:

in our writing and telling we are but urging towards it [the One – P.Ł.]: out of discussion we call to vision: to those desiring to see, we point the path; our teaching (δίδαξις) is of the road and the travelling; the seeing must be the very act (ἔργον) of one that has made this choice. (Enneads VI, IX, 4)

Things here are signs; they show therefore to the wiser teachers how the supreme God is known; the instructed priest (σοφὸς δὲ ἱερεὺς) reading the sign (αἴνιγμα) may enter the holy place and make real the vision of the inaccessible. (Enneads VI, IX, 11)

Finally, Plotinus not only “points the path,” but also gives an interesting answer as to why we should make an effort of ascending beyond our everyday, empirical reality via contemplation. In short, this reality is not our true home, but rather a place of exile. According to the philosopher, our real homeland is the intelligible cosmos, which we abandoned when descending into the body:

Before we had our becoming Here we existed There, men other than now, some of us gods (θεοί): we were pure souls (ψυχαὶ καθαραὶ), Intelligence inbound with the entire of reality, members of the Intellectual, not fenced off, not cut away, integral to that All. (Enneads VI, IV, 14)

Here, Plotinus’ account echoes Plato’s mythologizing teaching from Phaedrus on the fall of the soul (see 246d – 248c), but the author of Enneads slightly differs from his master regarding the cause of “losing wings.” In Plato, the soul (“winged chariot”) falls because it cannot reach the “place above heaven” (ὑπερουράνιος τόπος) in the entourage of gods, being pulled down by its lower part (“evil horse”) and colliding with other souls (“chariots”), while in Plotinus, the fall was triggered by “self-will” or “audacity” (τόλμα), “the primal differentiation (πρώτη ἑτερότης) with the desire for self ownership” (see Enneads V, V, 1). Consequently, as Plotinus writes elsewhere, the soul took on “other man” (ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος) (see Enneads VI, IV, 14), falling victim to “pleasures, desires, fears” (ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων) (see Enneads VI, IV, 15).

At the end of the day, the message of Plotinus is nothing but optimistic. The very ability to lead a contemplative life directed at the divine testifies that the soul is determined by its inner dynamics of “procession and return.” Therefore, we can close these considerations by quoting the words of Dominic O’Meara (in his Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads), with which any Neoplatonist of old would heartily agree: “We exist as movement towards the One. Our very nature is a motion of ‘assimilation to god’” (1995, p. 103).

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