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Living in the In-Between: Voegelin on the Human Tension Toward the Divine Ground

Eric Voegelin’s critique of twentieth-century ideologies is one of the most comprehensive attempts in political philosophy to explain ideology as the product of a spiritual disorder rather than of material conditions. The ground on which this critique rests, however, is contested. In The New Science of Politics, Voegelin defined the essence of modern movements as the “immanentization of the Christian eschaton” and characterized contemporary totalitarianism as the journey’s end of a Gnostic search for a “civil theology” (Voegelin, 1952, p. 163). This diagnosis leans heavily on a genealogical narrative connecting modern ideologies to ancient and medieval Gnostic currents. This is where the problem begins. After the publication of the Nag Hammadi texts it became clear that the ancient Gnostics sought not to transform the world but to reject it, which seriously shook the “Gnosticism thesis” (Corey, 2017, p. 19). Commentators following Bernard Yack have argued that it remains unclear whether the links Voegelin drew between modern ideologies and Isaiah, Prometheus, or Joachim represent an actual historical lineage or merely a resemblance, and that this ambiguity is too loose for a scientific explanation (Corey, 2017, p. 20). Cyril O’Regan has noted that Voegelin’s careless use of the attribute “Gnostic” risks turning the concept into an element of a “demonological discourse” (O’Regan, as cited in Katzenstein, 2011, p. 34). As Gebhardt reports, Voegelin himself conceded in 1976 that gnosis is only one component in the historical structure of modernity (Gebhardt, 2020, p. 41).
These criticisms raise an important question: If Voegelin’s critique of ideology rests on the Gnostic genealogy, does the weakening of the genealogy not invalidate the critique itself? The literature has offered two answers. The first relocates the critique onto theological ground. In that case, however, the critique loses its binding force for those who do not share Christian premises. Moreover, Voegelin’s theological readers have objected to him precisely at this point, arguing that he eliminates the possibility of knowledge about God independent of consciousness (Katzenstein, 2011, pp. 30–31). The second answer ties the critique to Voegelin’s philosophical anthropology, in particular to the concepts of the “open soul” and the “balance of consciousness.” Corey concedes that Voegelin’s genealogical claims are hard to defend historically, but argues that his account of the healthy soul and his analysis of the ways human beings attempt to escape the human condition retain permanent value (Corey, 2017, p. 23). This second answer points in the right direction. It is incomplete, however, because it does not systematically establish the link between anthropology and the critique of ideology. Following Kenneth Keulman, Corey reads the balance of consciousness through a two-sided scheme of derailment: either forgetting the world in the excitement of the divine pull or rejecting the divine altogether (Corey, 2017, p. 9). As will be shown below, this reading does not match Voegelin’s own definition and misses the most distinctive feature of his criterion.
The problem of this article is whether Voegelin’s critique of ideology has a foundation independent of the Gnostic genealogy and of theological premises. The article answers this question affirmatively and defends the following thesis: the actual foundation of Voegelin’s critique of ideology is not a narrative of historical descent but a structural criterion derived from the metaxy structure of consciousness. According to this criterion, ideology is the exclusion of man’s tension toward the divine ground. Voegelin formulated this criterion explicitly: the realities excluded in order to make the construction of an ideological system possible may vary widely, but the one item that always has to be excluded is the experience of man’s tension toward the divine ground of his existence (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 123). If the criterion is accepted in this form, Gnosticism ceases to be the foundation of ideology and becomes one of the historical instances of the criterion. The critique thereby acquires a ground unaffected by the weakness of the genealogical thesis.
To test this thesis, the article follows a method of conceptual-hermeneutic reconstruction consisting of four operations. The first is the delimitation of the corpus. The primary corpus is Voegelin’s Collected Works. The emphasis lies on the late texts in which his philosophy of consciousness matured: In Search of Order, The Ecumenic Age, Autobiographical Reflections, and the lectures collected in the volume The Drama of Humanity. To trace the development of the concepts, The New Science of Politics and the first three volumes of Order and History are also used. The second operation is the tracing of terms. Key terms such as metaxy, luminosity, hypostasis, balance of consciousness, second reality, and interdict on questioning were traced at the page level in the original English texts, and it was compared whether each term names the same structure or different structures in different texts. In this operation, Voegelin’s own texts were carefully distinguished from secondary texts such as editorial introductions and glossaries. For instance, the introduction to In Search of Order belongs to Ellis Sandoz, and the glossary in Autobiographical Reflections to Eugene Webb; statements in these texts have not been attributed to Voegelin. The third operation is systematic reconstruction. The argument dispersed across Voegelin’s texts has been reconstructed in four mutually conditioning steps: (1) the site of consciousness, (2) the rule by which the poles are known, (3) the norm of the tension, and (4) the criterion of ideology. The fourth operation is testing against the literature. Each step has been confronted with the strongest objection in the secondary literature: respectively, the theological objection (Katzenstein), the “two-sided balance” reading (Corey, Keulman), and the genealogical or Gnosticism objection (Yack, O’Regan, Corey).
The sections of the article follow these four steps. The first section shows that consciousness is not a closed subject but an event of participation occurring in the metaxy, and discusses why the model of the modern subject cannot grasp this structure. The second section sets out the polar structure of the metaxy and the rule that the poles can be known only within the tension; this rule is tested against the theological objection. The third section reconstructs the “balance of consciousness” as the norm of living rightly in the tension and shows why the two-sided reading in the literature is incomplete. The fourth section formulates the structural criterion of ideology and tests it against the Gnosticism objection. The conclusion discusses the findings produced by the analysis, the conceptual framework these findings constitute, and the gap they fill.
Consciousness Is in the Metaxy: From the Closed Subject to Participatory Consciousness
The first condition for placing Voegelin’s critique of ideology on a structural foundation is to locate his conception of consciousness correctly. The problem is this: if consciousness is a closed subject that looks at the world from outside and directs itself toward objects, then the “tension toward the divine ground” remains either a subjective feeling or an unverifiable metaphysical claim. In that case, the exclusion of the tension cannot serve as an objective criterion of ideology either. Voegelin’s theological critics object precisely at this point. As Katzenstein reports, these readers think that what is missing in Voegelin is the longing to get outside one’s “subjective” consciousness in order to ascertain whether its content accords with an “objective” state of affairs as determined by reason and supernatural revelation (Katzenstein, 2011, pp. 30–31). Behind this objection lies the implicit assumption that consciousness is modeled on the subject-object scheme. As Katzenstein rightly observes, this is exactly what Voegelin was intent on undermining (Katzenstein, 2011, p. 31). The first problem to be solved, therefore, is what Voegelin puts in place of the subject-object model.
Voegelin’s objection to this model takes shape through Edmund Husserl’s Krisis. According to Voegelin, Husserl’s model of consciousness rests on the sense perception of objects in the external world. However sophisticated the analysis of this model may be, it seemed absurd to him to claim that there is nothing to consciousness but the consciousness of objects of the external world (Voegelin, 1989/2011, pp. 96–97). Voegelin demonstrates the inadequacy of this model through his own experiences. In his anamnetic experiments recalling his childhood, he notes that experiences such as standing on the border of the known world and looking into a mysterious horizon of infinity, or the time concentrations in which a thousand years pass like a single day, have very little to do with objects of sense perception. They are experiences of participation in various areas of reality (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 97). Voegelin later connects this critique to the critique of ideology, describing the absolutization of the model of object perception as the “more or less hidden trick” in the construction of the systems of the nineteenth century (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 123). This connection shows at first hand that the theory of consciousness is not a preliminary to the critique of ideology but its ground.
Voegelin also explains why the subject-object dichotomy is inadequate. The dichotomy is modeled on the cognitive relation between man and things in the external world. It therefore does not apply to an experience in which reality arrives at its own truth in man (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 245). The approach that takes object perception as the model of all knowledge conceives of man as an observer located in the landscape of being and taking stock of what he sees. For Voegelin, however, man is not a “self-contained spectator” but an actor playing a part in the drama of being, committed to play it without knowing what it is (Voegelin, 1956/2001, p. 39). There is no vantage point outside existence from which its meaning can be viewed, because participation is existence itself (Voegelin, 1956/2001, p. 39). The “getting outside consciousness” demanded by the theological objection is therefore, within Voegelin’s framework, not merely a mistaken demand but an impossible one. If such a vantage point existed, man would be a spectator of existence rather than a participant in it.
The positive counterpart of this negative finding is the structure Voegelin calls the “paradox of consciousness.” On the one hand, consciousness is located in human beings in their bodily existence and intends reality as an object. Its bodily location lends reality a metaphorical touch of externality and “thingness.” Voegelin calls this structure of consciousness its intentionality, and the corresponding structure of reality its thingness (Voegelin, 1987/1999, p. 29). On the other hand, bodily located consciousness is also real and is part of the reality it intends. In this second sense, reality is not an object of consciousness but the something in which consciousness occurs as an event of participation between partners in the community of being (Voegelin, 1987/1999, p. 29). Reality moves from the position of an object to that of a subject, and consciousness becomes an event occurring in this subject as reality becomes luminous for its truth. Voegelin calls this second structure luminosity (Voegelin, 1987/1999, pp. 29–30; 2004c, pp. 354–355). The two structures cannot be separated. In intentionality the subject is man; in luminosity it is reality itself; human consciousness always contains both (Voegelin, 2004b, p. 392). To the two structures of consciousness correspond two modes of reality: thing-reality and the It-reality that comprehends all the partners in being (Voegelin, 1987/1999, p. 30). When reality is identified only with the object side, it is overlooked that the knowing subject also belongs to this reality (Voegelin, 2004b, pp. 391–392).
This analysis leads Voegelin directly to the concept of metaxy, and the first finding of the article emerges here. When consciousness is experienced as an event of participatory illumination, it must be located not in one of the partners but in the reality that comprehends them. In Voegelin’s words, if the spatial metaphor be permitted, the luminosity of consciousness is located somewhere “between” human consciousness in bodily existence and reality intended in its mode of thingness. Since contemporary philosophy has no accepted term for this structure, Voegelin chooses to denote the between-status of consciousness with the term metaxy, which Plato developed in his analysis of the same structure (Voegelin, 1987/1999, p. 30). This passage shows that for Voegelin the metaxy is neither a general metaphor of existence nor a rung in a cosmological hierarchy. It is the technical name for the structure of the luminosity of consciousness. Voegelin reaches the same result through William James’s concept of “pure experience,” noting that the insight that experience occurs neither in the subject nor in the world of objects but “in-between” was worked out on a much vaster scale in Plato’s concept of the metaxy (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 98). In a passage quoted by Ellis Sandoz in his introduction to In Search of Order, Voegelin states that although the psyche is rooted by its body in the external world, the psyche itself exists in the metaxy, in the tension toward the divine ground of being. For this reason, terms such as “immanent” and “transcendent,” “external” and “internal,” do not describe objects; they are exegetic language indices arising from the event in which the metaxy becomes luminous (Voegelin, as cited in Sandoz, 1999, pp. 24–25).
This finding provides the following solution to the problem posed at the beginning of the section: the “tension toward the divine ground” is neither a subjective feeling nor an unverifiable metaphysical proposition. It is the structure of consciousness itself. The distinction between subjective consciousness and objective reality presupposed by the theological objection is, within Voegelin’s framework, the absolutization of only one of the two structures of consciousness, namely intentionality. As Katzenstein notes, for Voegelin the experience of a divine Beyond is as much a human experience in the metaxy as is the experience of an immanent realm of beings, the “world”; there is no transcendence without immanence, and vice versa (Katzenstein, 2011, p. 31). The first step of the argument is thus complete: the site of consciousness is the metaxy. The second step addresses the internal structure of this site, that is, the problem of how the poles of the tension can be known.
The Polar Structure of the Metaxy and the Prohibition of Hypostasis
Once it is accepted that consciousness is in the metaxy, a new problem arises: how can the poles of this tension, man and the divine ground, be known? This question is the second and sharper form of the theological objection. As Katzenstein shows, according to some theological readers Voegelin’s approach reduces what can be known about God, even if only analogically or negatively, to symbols expressing the “luminosity” of consciousness in the metaxy (Katzenstein, 2011, pp. 30–31). On this reading, Voegelin ends up either in an agnosticism that reduces the divine to experience or in a subjectivism that turns divine truth into a function of human consciousness. Katzenstein notes that this objection begs the question, but he also concedes that it has a point: Voegelin’s interpretation of Christ and the Trinity leaves open whether it remains true to the narrative universe of the New Testament (Katzenstein, 2011, pp. 31–32). The problem this section must solve is the following: is what Voegelin says about the poles an agnosticism, or is it a rule concerning the mode in which the divine is known?
The answer to this question must be sought in the Platonic origin of the concept, because Voegelin inherits the metaxy not merely as a term but together with a method of analysis. In the Philebus (16c–17a), Plato symbolizes the mystery of being as existence between the poles of the One (hen) and the Unlimited (apeiron). Between the two poles arise the number and form of things. This area of form and number is the In-Between (metaxy) of the One and the Unlimited and is the domain of human knowledge (Voegelin, 1974/2000, pp. 243–244). The point Voegelin particularly stresses is that Plato also lays down a methodological rule for this in-between area. The method that remains aware of the in-between status of things is called “dialectics”; the improper hypostasis of in-between things into the One or the Unlimited is the characteristic defect of the method called “eristics” (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 244). The warning against hypostasis, then, is not an interpretation Voegelin adds to Plato from outside but a rule that comes with the very emergence of the symbol metaxy. In the Symposium, the metaxy appears as the symbol of man’s erotic tension. The spiritual man (daimonios aner) who is in search of truth is between knowledge and ignorance (metaxy sophias kai amathias); the whole realm of the spiritual is halfway between god and man (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 245). For Voegelin, this myth is not a piece of information but an event in the metaxy in which man has “converse” with the divine ground that is common to all men (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 246). Plato is also aware that this discovery constitutes a historical threshold. He calls the philosopher who moves in the realm of the spirit a daimonios aner, preserves for the man who lives in the older form of the myth the thnetos, the mortal of the epics, and calls the man who has become familiar with the new insight but resists it an amathes, an ignorant man (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 247). This threefold distinction will become important later, because the Platonic counterpart of ideological closure is not ignorance but resistance to what is known.
In his late philosophy of consciousness, Voegelin turns this Platonic analysis into an explicit rule. The tension extends at one end toward what Plato and Aristotle call the “ground” and at the other toward “man.” Between the two poles there is a movement and countermovement, and Plato and Aristotle call the area of this movement the psyche (Voegelin, 2004c, p. 363). The rule is this: the poles are not known as givens independent of the tension; the tension and the poles belong together. One therefore cannot hypostatize the ground into a god about whom we know something short of the tension, nor man into an immanent entity short of the tension. When the linguistic terms used to describe the tension are hypostatized into entities that can be explored independently of it, the luminous reality of the psyche is lost and one falls into empty speculation (Voegelin, 2004c, p. 363). Voegelin defines this error as “hypostasis”: the fallacious assumption that the poles of the participatory experience are self-contained entities that form a mysterious contact on the occasion of an experience (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 99). In In Search of Order the same rule is applied to the tension itself. If the tension between time and eternity is transformed into an autonomous object, the participatory tension is hypostatized to the neglect of the participants at its poles (Voegelin, 1987/1999, p. 42).
The most important feature of this rule is its symmetry, and the article’s second finding follows from it. The prohibition of hypostasis applies not only to the divine pole but also to the human pole. The theologian who turns the ground into an object known outside the tension and the anthropologist who turns man into an immanent entity outside the tension commit the same error (Voegelin, 2004c, p. 363). Voegelin also shows the concrete consequences of this symmetry. If God is thought of as something that exists like an object in space and time, the necessity arises of proving his existence. If, however, God is not assumed to be such an object in the first place, the problem of proof does not arise, because the divine is already present in consciousness (Voegelin, 1980/2004, p. 255). For the same reason, Voegelin characterizes the divine ground as a “non-existent reality,” that is, a reality that does not exist in the mode in which an object exists in the spatio-temporal world (Voegelin, 1980/2004, p. 255). When the mutuality between human will and divine will is split into two separate entities, insoluble problems arise as well, as in the debate over Pelagianism (Voegelin, 1980/2004, p. 294). Corey draws attention to the same point: only when God is understood in reified terms is it possible to pronounce him dead, as Nietzsche did (Corey, 2017, p. 8).
This symmetry gives the following answer to the theological objection with which the section began: what Voegelin says about the divine pole is not an agnosticism but a rule concerning the mode in which the divine is known. This is evident in his interpretation of the symbol epekeina. In the Republic, Plato says that the Good provides objects with their existence and essence but is itself beyond (epekeina) essence (Voegelin, 1957/2000b, p. 167). For Voegelin, this “beyond” is not a spatial preposition. Because the divine Beyond is not one of the being things, it is present in all of them as their formative force. The Beyond is not a thing beyond the things but the experienced presence (Parousia) of the formative It-reality in all things (Voegelin, 1987/1999, p. 44). The divine is not unknowable because it cannot be known as an object; on the contrary, it is experienced as presence in all things. Aristotle’s concept of metalepsis completes this mutuality: in the search, the human participates in the divine Nous and the divine in the human Nous (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 250). As Katzenstein notes, to the degree that theological discourse ascribes determinate properties to, or withholds them from, a transcendent being named “God,” it partakes in objectifying thought and must therefore be read against itself; what Voegelin was groping for in his later reflections is precisely such a “metaxological language” (Katzenstein, 2011, pp. 31–32).
This solution does not mean that the theological objection disappears entirely. As Katzenstein points out, the extent to which Voegelin’s interpretation of the Trinity and Christology remains true to the Gospel narrative is a separate matter of debate (Katzenstein, 2011, p. 32). What is decisive for the problem of this article, however, is the following: the prohibition of hypostasis is not bound to any particular theology; it applies equally to theological and to ideological dogmatism. Therefore, to the extent that Voegelin’s critique of ideology rests on this prohibition, it does not depend on Christian premises. The second step of the argument is thus complete: the poles can be known only within the tension, and the hypostatization of either pole is a structural error. The third step takes up the question of what it means to live rightly within this tension.
Existing Within the Metaxy: Tension, Nous, and the Balance of Consciousness
The prohibition of hypostasis states what must not be done. Without a positive criterion of living rightly in the tension, however, ideological derailment cannot be diagnosed. Voegelin calls this positive criterion the “balance of consciousness.” The dominant reading of this concept in the literature is a two-sided scheme based on Keulman’s work. As Corey summarizes it, balance means preserving the genuine experience of the metaxy against two dangers: (a) becoming so excited by the experience of a divine pull that one forgets that one is still human and that the world remains unchanged, or (b) becoming so frustrated with the evasiveness of divinity that one rejects it altogether. Imbalance therefore takes two forms: disregarding the world in favor of a divine transfiguration, or disregarding the divine in favor of humanism, materialism, or atheism (Keulman, 1990, as cited in Corey, 2017, p. 9). Corey illustrates these two forms with the figures of Isaiah and Prometheus (Corey, 2017, p. 10). The problem of this section is whether the two-sided scheme matches Voegelin’s own definition of balance and, if not, what the scheme overlooks.
To answer this question, the structure of the tension itself must first be determined. For Voegelin, the tension is not a static position but a two-directional movement. On the human side there is the search for the ground (zetesis); on the divine side, the attraction (kinesis) that moves man to search (Voegelin, 2004b, p. 384; 2004a, p. 214). The “desire to know” in the first sentence of Aristotle’s Metaphysics is, for Voegelin, the desire to ask questions about the ground; being moved toward asking such questions is the kinesis from the divine side (Voegelin, 1980/2004, p. 251). The search presupposes an attraction. Without the attraction from the ground there would be no desire to know (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 250). Voegelin also connects this mutuality with Plato’s myth of the puppets in the Laws. The god pulls man by the golden cord of reason and by other cords; man can follow the golden cord or follow the other cords and be a fool (Voegelin, 1980/2004, p. 329). The pull of the golden cord is gentle and needs the support of man in order to become effective (Voegelin, 1957/2000b, p. 286). Searching and being drawn (helkein) are mutual. Splitting this mutuality into two separate entities such as free will and divine will is an instance of the error of hypostasis shown in the second section (Voegelin, 1980/2004, p. 294).
This structure of the tension also determines the meaning of reason in Voegelin and requires a direct reckoning with the modern conception of reason. For Voegelin, reason (nous) in its first and most important meaning is the consciousness of existing from a ground of existence. When reason is emptied of this content, it becomes an instrument for handling world-immanent things. Since man still remains man, the missing content must be filled with other contents. Voegelin attributes the profound irrationality of the modern period to this (Voegelin, 2004a, p. 214). Corey likewise notes that the reduction to instrumental reason is one of the basic predicaments of modernity, and that on this point Voegelin shares a common critique with Oakeshott and Arendt (Corey, 2017, p. 7). Voegelin’s contribution, however, is not merely to rescue reason from instrumentality but to identify it with the tension itself: the consciousness of being caused by the divine ground and of being in search of it is reason as such (Voegelin, 1980/2004, p. 329). In The New Science of Politics, Voegelin identifies the site of this structure as the psyche and defines it as the “sensorium of transcendence” (Voegelin, 1952, p. 75). Reason, in this sense, is not a fixed faculty that man possesses but openness toward the divine ground itself. The openness toward reality at large depends on the openness of the psyche toward the divine ground (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 301).
The goal of the tension is determined within this framework as well. The event Plato calls periagoge (turning around) is the condition for completing man’s education toward the understanding of reality (Voegelin, 1957/2000b, p. 169). The opposite of turning toward is turning away (apostrophe). The Stoics diagnosed the turning away from the ground as a disease of the mind, and turning toward and turning away became the fundamental categories of order and disorder in human existence (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 125). The highest form of the turning is what Aristotle calls immortalizing (athanatizein). The nurture of the human nous, the divinest part of the soul, through the quest of the ground is the action of immortalizing (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 301). For Voegelin, however, man can immortalize only when he accepts the burden of mortality. The balance between Nous and Apeiron becomes the balance of immortality and mortality in the life of reason (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 302).
This analysis makes it possible to show why the two-sided scheme of balance is inadequate. Voegelin does not define balance as a general middle way between “the divine” and “the world.” His definition is more precise. The philosopher faces a recognizably structured process that is recognizably moving beyond its structure. The structure is lasting enough to persist through the millennia of known history, yet it is dynamically alive with theophanic events that point toward an ultimate transfiguration of reality (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 291). Balance must be preserved between the experienced lastingness and the theophanic events in such a manner that the paradox becomes intelligible as the very structure of existence. Voegelin calls this task the “postulate of balance” (Voegelin, 1974/2000, pp. 291–292). The typology of derailment that follows from this definition has not two terms but three. In the first, existence in the lasting cosmos becomes an untruth to be overcome by the truth of transfigured reality, as in apocalyptic movements. In the second, the truth of transfigured reality becomes a projection, an illusion thrown up by human beings, as in various psychologies of the nineteenth century. In the third, the two experiences cancel each other out, and the paradox degenerates into a void of existence without meaning, as in a Sartrian existentialism (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 291).
The article’s third finding is this third derailment. The two-sided scheme captures the first and second derailments in the figures of Isaiah and Prometheus. Voegelin himself gives the example of Isaiah: the prophet tried to turn the leap in being into a leap out of the laws of mundane existence. Voegelin calls this “metastatic faith” and stresses that the constitution of being cannot be affected by human fancies (Voegelin, 1956/2001, pp. 505–506). The two-sided scheme, however, cannot see the third derailment, in which the paradox cancels itself and turns into meaninglessness. This derailment neither absolutizes the divine nor openly rejects it; it replaces the tension with a meaningless void. The difference is important because, as the fourth section will show, Voegelin thinks that ideological second realities are constructed precisely to fill such a void. Because the two-sided scheme conceives of imbalance as a swing between two extremes, it cannot grasp the setting in which ideology emerges, namely the void created by the loss of tension. The three-term typology, by contrast, can explain ideology not only as a swing toward one extreme but also as a response to the void. The third step of the argument is thus complete: the norm of the tension is the preservation of the paradox between lasting structure and theophanic events, and one can derail from this norm in three directions.
The Violation of the Metaxy: The Closure of the Soul and the Structural Criterion of Ideology
The three preceding steps determined the site of consciousness, the rule by which the poles are known, and the norm of the tension. The problem of this section is whether a distinguishing criterion of ideology can be derived from these structural elements. The problem is directly related to the genealogical objection in the literature. As Corey summarizes, three criticisms have been directed at Voegelin’s Gnosticism thesis. The first is that the ancient Gnostics sought not to transform the world but to reject it; following Franz, Corey therefore recommends making a “clean break” with the term. The second is the ambiguity as to whether the links Voegelin draws represent an actual historical lineage or merely a resemblance. The third is that Voegelin failed to make adequate distinctions between different ideologies, such as Nazism and Liberalism (Corey, 2017, pp. 19–22). Rossbach and O’Regan likewise argue that the criteria Voegelin used to identify a Gnostic drift are too vague for a disciplined inquiry (Katzenstein, 2011, pp. 33–34). If Voegelin’s concept of ideology is tied to this genealogy, these criticisms shake the concept itself. This section shows that Voegelin’s texts contain a criterion independent of the genealogy and derived from the three steps above.
First, what is the experiential source of the escape from the tension according to Voegelin? In The New Science of Politics, Voegelin answers this question not genealogically but structurally. The fallacy of immanentizing the eschaton looks rather elemental; yet seven centuries of intellectual history cannot be explained by stupidity and dishonesty. A drive must be assumed in the souls of these thinkers that blinded them to the fallacy (Voegelin, 1952, p. 121). The fallacious constructions gave the thinkers a certainty they would otherwise not have had. Certainties are in demand for the purpose of overcoming uncertainties with their accompaniment of anxiety. For Voegelin, uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity, and the life of the soul in openness toward God may prove too heavy a burden for men who lust for massively possessive experience (Voegelin, 1952, p. 122). This explanation needs no genealogy. The source of the escape is not the influence of a particular historical current but the uncertainty inherent in the structure of the metaxy itself. Voegelin names this condition with the term “pneumopathology,” taken from Schelling: what is sick is not the soul in the psychological sense but the spirit (Voegelin, 1999, pp. 101–102). This sickness is not a deficiency of intelligence. Following Robert Musil’s distinction, Voegelin characterizes it as “intelligent stupidity,” a disturbance in the equilibrium of the spirit and a revolt against the spirit (Voegelin, 1999, p. 101).
Second, how does the escape from the tension violate the polar structure of the metaxy? The symmetrical rule of hypostasis shown in the second section returns here as two vectors of violation. The first vector is the absolutization of the human pole. Voegelin calls it the “egophanic revolt”: the epiphany of the ego eclipses the epiphany of God in the structure of Classic and Christian consciousness (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 94). The egophanic thinker constructs history as an imaginary process culminating in his own self-realization, and in order to create this imaginary history the reality of the metaxy must be made to disappear (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 327). The second vector is the immanentization of the divine pole: the expectation of a transcendent fulfillment is drawn into history (Voegelin, 1952, p. 163). In its most extreme form, this is a state of perfection to be achieved through a revolutionary transfiguration of the nature of man, as in Marxism (Voegelin, 1952, p. 121). Voegelin defines the common result of the two vectors in terms of the metaxy and distinguishes ancient and modern movements not by descent but by their attitude toward the metaxy. The early movements attempted to escape from the metaxy by splitting divine reality, whereas the modern movements attempt to abolish the metaxy by transforming the Beyond into this world (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 302). This distinction answers the first point of the genealogical objection. The ancient Gnostics’ rejection of the world and the modern ideologues’ attempt to transform it are not a contradiction; they are two different forms of violating the metaxy.
Third, what is put in place of the tension once it has been excluded? Voegelin calls these constructions “second realities,” a term he takes from the Austrian novelists Robert Musil and Heimito von Doderer. A second reality is the image of reality created by human beings when they exist in a state of alienation, in opposition to the reality of experience (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 122). For Voegelin, one cannot live in a vacuum. The void that arises when the tension toward the beyond is lost must be filled; if not with the real reality, then with second realities (Voegelin, 2004c, pp. 380–381). This observation is directly connected with the third derailment identified in the third section: second realities are responses to the void created when the tension is cancelled in meaninglessness. The principal characteristic of this alienation is what Doderer called the “refusal to apperceive” (Apperzeptionsverweigerung), which Voegelin regards as the central concept for understanding ideological aberrations (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 122). Plato’s amathes, the man who resists what he knows, is the classical counterpart of this concept (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 247).
Fourth and decisively, how is the criterion formulated? The historically most interesting form of the refusal to apperceive is the formal interdict on questioning demanded by Comte and Marx. Anyone who raises the question of the divine ground of reality will be informed by Comte that he should not ask idle questions (questions oiseuses), and by Marx that he should shut up and become a “socialist man”: “Don’t think, don’t ask me” (Denke nicht, frage mich nicht) (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 123). From this observation Voegelin derives an explicit diagnostic criterion: the purpose of the diagnosis is to determine which part of reality has been excluded in order to make the construction of a fake system possible. The realities excluded can vary widely, but the one item that always has to be excluded is the experience of man’s tension toward the divine ground of his existence (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 123). This criterion is the direct result of the three steps above. According to the first step, the tension is the structure of consciousness; the exclusion of the tension is therefore not a choice of perspective but a mutilation of the structure of consciousness. According to the second step, the exclusion of the tension is possible only through the hypostatization of a pole. According to the third step, this exclusion takes place in one of the three directions of derailment from balance.
This criterion also answers the second and third points of the genealogical objection. The criterion does not ask from which current an ideology historically derives; it asks only what it excludes. Yack’s and Corey’s criticism concerning genealogical ambiguity therefore does not affect it. Corey himself argues that the links Voegelin draws from Plato to Joachim should be read not as a chain of descent but as types of response to the human condition that can arise independently at different times according to the principle of the “equivalence of symbols” (Corey, 2017, p. 21). The criterion proposed in this article supplies the systematic foundation that Corey’s typological reading lacks: what the types have in common is the exclusion of the tension. The 1976 revision reported by Gebhardt is consistent with this reading as well. If gnosis is only one component in the historical structure of modernity (Gebhardt, 2020, p. 41), then what defines ideology must be not gnosis but the structural violation of which gnosis is one instance. The objection of Rossbach and O’Regan regarding the vagueness of the criterion can be met only in part. The criterion determines precisely what is excluded, but it does not measure the intensity with which, or the political consequences with which, different ideologies carry out this exclusion. The lack of differentiation stressed by Franz and Corey (Corey, 2017, pp. 21–22) marks the limit of this criterion.
The positive counterpart of this criterion is the event Voegelin calls the “opening of the soul.” Through the opening of the soul, the philosopher discovers his own psyche as the instrument for experiencing transcendence and at the same time discovers the divinity in its radically nonhuman transcendence (Voegelin, 1952, p. 67). The closure of the soul in modern gnosticism can repress the truth of the soul, but it cannot remove the soul and its transcendence from the structure of reality (Voegelin, 1952, p. 165). The philosophical basis of resistance lies in Heraclitus’s distinction between the common world and private worlds. Those who are awake have a world one and common, whereas those who are asleep each turn aside into their private worlds (Voegelin, 1957/2000a, p. 304). In dream existence, the experience of participation in a universal order, in the common (xynon), is lost (Voegelin, 1957/2000b, p. 131). Voegelin’s methodologically first rule is to go back to the experiences that engender symbols (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 121). For him, nobody is obliged to participate in the crisis of his time (Voegelin, 1980/2000, p. 249). The fourth step of the argument is thus complete: the distinguishing criterion of ideology is the exclusion of man’s tension toward the divine ground. This criterion is independent of genealogy, but it does not measure differences of degree among ideologies.
Conclusion
This article began with the question of whether Voegelin’s critique of ideology has a foundation independent of the Gnostic genealogy and of theological premises. The analysis has answered this question affirmatively. The significance of this answer, however, lies not in a summary of the article but in the new data the analysis has produced. These data can be gathered under four points.
The first finding is that for Voegelin the metaxy is not a metaphor of existence but the technical name for the luminosity structure of consciousness. In the literature, the metaxy is mostly treated as a general symbol describing man’s “in-between” position. Voegelin, however, explicitly chose the term to denote the fact that the luminosity of consciousness is located neither in bodily consciousness nor in the intended object but between them (Voegelin, 1987/1999, p. 30). This finding explains why the demand to “get outside consciousness,” on which the theological objection rests, cannot be met. A vantage point outside consciousness would mean the abolition of the metaxy itself.
The second finding is that the prohibition of hypostasis is symmetrical. Since the poles can be known only within the tension, the theologian who objectifies the divine ground and the ideologue who turns man into an immanent entity commit the same structural error (Voegelin, 2004c, p. 363). This symmetry gives conceptual grounding to the link that Katzenstein perceives between Voegelin’s critique of “dogmatization” and his critique of ideology (Katzenstein, 2011, p. 32). Theological dogmatism and ideology are not two separate defects but violations of the same rule with respect to the two poles. Voegelin’s critique of ideology is therefore not a defense of a theology. By the same criterion, it also contains a critique of theology.
The third finding is that the balance of consciousness is not two-sided, as assumed in the literature, but a three-term structure. The reading extending from Keulman to Corey conceives of imbalance as two extremes between being carried away by the divine and rejecting the divine (Corey, 2017, p. 9). Voegelin’s own definition, by contrast, determines balance as the preservation of the paradox between lasting structure and theophanic events and counts a third derailment: the self-cancellation of the paradox into a meaningless void (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 291). This third derailment is indispensable for explaining the setting in which ideology emerges, because Voegelin thinks that second realities are constructed precisely to fill the void created by the loss of tension (Voegelin, 2004c, pp. 380–381). Whereas the two-sided scheme sees ideology only as a swing toward one extreme, the three-term structure also explains it as a response to the void.
The fourth finding is that Voegelin’s concept of ideology rests on a structural criterion: ideology is the exclusion of man’s tension toward the divine ground (Voegelin, 1989/2011, p. 123). This criterion asks not where an ideology historically derives from but what it excludes. It is therefore unaffected by the genealogical criticisms directed at the Gnosticism thesis. Gnosticism ceases to be the foundation of ideology and becomes one of the historical instances of this criterion. The difference between ancient and modern Gnostic movements is explained not by descent but by the difference between escaping from the metaxy and abolishing it (Voegelin, 1974/2000, p. 302).
Together, these four findings constitute a conceptual framework that remains implicit in Voegelin’s dispersed texts. This framework can be called a “metaxy-centered model of structural diagnosis” and consists of four mutually conditioning elements: the site of consciousness (the metaxy), the rule by which the poles are known (the symmetrical prohibition of hypostasis), the norm of the tension (three-term balance), and the criterion of ideology (the exclusion of the tension). The function of this model is to ground the link between Voegelin’s philosophical anthropology and his critique of ideology not in a genealogical narrative or in a general image such as the “open soul,” but in an argument that can be traced step by step.
The gap the article fills thus becomes clear. The literature either defends Voegelin’s critique of ideology together with the Gnostic genealogy or abandons it together with the genealogy. Commentators who, like Corey, ground the critique in anthropology have not systematically established the link between anthropology and the criterion of ideology, and they have reduced balance to a two-sided scheme. This article has shown, by reconstructing it step by step from Voegelin’s own texts, that the critique has a foundation independent of the genealogy and not dependent on theological premises. Voegelin’s critique of ideology thereby comes to offer a debatable criterion also for readers who do not share Christian premises and do not accept the Gnosticism thesis.
This criterion also has a limit. It determines whether a system of thought is ideological, but it does not measure differences of degree among ideologies or differences in their political consequences. The criticism that Franz and Corey direct at Voegelin, that he failed to distinguish adequately between movements such as Nazism and Liberalism (Corey, 2017, pp. 21–22), retains its validity within this framework as well. The development of secondary criteria capable of distinguishing different intensities and institutional forms of the exclusion of the tension is a problem this article leaves open for future research.

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Melike Çelebi Özcan is a researcher, educator, and translator. She completed her PhD in Philosophy and Religious Studies at Dokuz Eylül University in İzmir, Türkiye. Her doctoral dissertation examined the relationship between Human Being and Absolute Being in Eric Voegelin’s philosophical anthropology. She has published book chapters, papers in conference proceedings, and journal articles in the fields of political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and modern philosophy.

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