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After the Cold War: U.S.-Ukrainian Relations (1991-2000)

Introduction

This article is to examine the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine at the end of the Cold War. During this period, the U.S. was concerned with a single issue in its relationship with Ukraine – denuclearization – and initially framed this relationship from a Russian-centric perspective. As a result, the U.S. achieved minimal results. Once it was able to abandon its Russian-centric perspective and present denuclearization along with other issues that concerned Ukraine, such as meaningful recognition of its independence, protection of its territorial integrity, and financial assistance, the U.S. was able to achieve its foreign policy objective.

This article contains five sections: 1) the strategic importance of Ukraine to U.S. and European policy-makers; 2) a brief Cold War history of the Ukraine; 3) the initial relationship between the U.S. and the Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991-1993); 4) the subsequent nature of this relationship between the two countries after agreement on denuclearization (1994-2000); and 5) a postscript of the relationship since 9/11 and lessons learned such the end of the Cold War.

Strategic Importance

The newly independent Ukrainian state ushered in a new period of renewed interest in the country.1 Prominent politicians, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Madeleine Albright, and Strobe Talbott, have spoken about Ukraine’s strategic geopolitical importance. For example, Brzezinski observed: “It cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”2 Strobe added: “. . . the fate of Ukraine is the key to stability in Central Europe – that if Ukraine could develop as an independent, sovereign nation, secure in its current borders, with normal, peaceful relations with its neighbors, then the entire region would have a better chance for peace and prosperity.”3

Finally, Secretary of State Albright noted that: “Today, the United States and Ukraine are building a shared vision: a Europe at peace, fully integrated, and fully free. An independent, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine is a critical part of that vision. A democratic Ukraine will be an example to its neighbors and a leader throughout the region. A prosperous Ukraine will be a major world market and a strong contributor to the global economy. A peaceful Ukraine will be a vigorous partner in European and international affairs. The United States is committed to working with Ukraine to help achieve these goals in the months and years ahead.”4

Specifically, Ukraine’s geographical location, natural resources, and potential for scientific, industrial, and agricultural trade made it a strategic country for U.S. foreign policy. Although it took a period of adjustment in the U.S. foreign policy establishment to recognize Ukraine’s unique and independent geopolitical importance, U.S. policy-makers ultimately concluded that treating Ukraine as an equal partner on the world stage would further both U.S. and Ukrainian national interests.

Interesting, this late acknowledgement of Ukraine’s key geopolitical role in the region was identified by several great powers in the past. For example, during World War I, the Austrian government sent on November 20, 1914 a message to its allies, which declared “the goal of Austrian politics in the war will be to wrest the Ukrainian people from Moscow and to establish an independent Ukraine. This will not only weaken Russia once and for all, but also weaken its influence on the Black Sea basin.”5 From the Russian perspective, its goal was to incorporate “Russia Galicia” into its empire by annihilating the Ukrainian national movement. The Russian governor of Galicia, Count Georgii Bobrinsky, declared that “Eastern Galicia and the Lemko territories have long been an integral part of Russia . . . I will introduce there the Russian language, law, and custom.”6

Ukraine also became one of the centers of the struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union during World War II. Hitler believed the Ukraine, with its natural resources in the Donbas and Northern Caucasus, would be able to supply Germany sufficient supplies of oil, coal, and grain. In a letter dated June 21, 1941 to Mussolini, Hitler wrote “Above all else, I hope that as a result of our success we will be able to secure a general supply base in Ukraine for a prolonged period. Ukraine will become for us a supplier of those resources that we will need in the future.”7 This strategy was also perceived by the Soviet Union, as Marshal Georgii Zukhov wrote: “Stalin was convinced that in a war with the Soviet Union Hitler’s forces would first try to take control of the Ukraine with the Donbas in order to deprive our country of its most important economic regions and to seize Ukrainian grain, Donetsk coal, and then the oil of the Caucasus.”8

Holding 5 % of the world’s mineral resources with large deposits of coal, iron, ore, manganese, titanium, aluminum, and nickel ore, as well as large reserves of oil and natural gas, makes the Ukraine an attractive region for further industrial development. It also possesses some of the finest black arable soils in the world that makes it suitable for farming and agricultural development and trade.9 Finally, the Ukraine’s possession of the Black Sea not only creates a huge potential for trade and economic ties with countries of the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and Middle East, but it also provides a strategic starting point for naval operations in the region.10

In spite of these advantages in natural resources and geopolitical position, Ukraine has two unique vulnerabilities: its wide, open expanse of land and its population’s multi-ethnic composition. Because of its lack of any geographical barriers, Ukraine is vulnerable to military threat from both the east and the west.11 Not surprisingly, one of the strategic priorities for the Ukraine, if not the strategic priority, following the end of the Cold War was the unconditional maintenance of its territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders. Securing bilateral and reciprocal agreements to protect its territorial integrity became one of the key objectives for Ukrainian foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The second vulnerability of the Ukraine is its population with its regional variation and multiethnic composition. Analysts often divide the Ukraine into 1) the Crimea, with its primarily ethnic Russian population (67 %), 2) western Ukraine with separate fragments of which in the past belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and which are marked by a high level of national awareness and the adherence by a large population to the Greek-Catholic faith; and 3) the south-east portion of the country, which is dominated by a Russophone Orthodox population.12 On the basis of this regional differentiation, it is possible to use Samuel Huntington’s “civilizational divide” that would appear to run down the middle of the country, separating the eastern Orthodox part of the Ukraine from its western Catholic part and could be a fault-line for civilizational conflict.13 As a multi-civilizational state with a large number of ethnic distinctions, Ukraine is constantly confronted with the threats of separatism and nationalism that seek to disrupt social, economic, and political stability.14

Because of its geopolitical position, natural resources, and scientific, industrial, and agricultural potential, Ukraine has played and continues to play a critical role in Central and Eastern Europe. Although it is confronted with the problems of a multi-ethnic population and a lack of geographical barriers against external threats, Ukraine also has the resources to overcome these obstacles to establish a democracy with a market-oriented economic system. However, the geopolitical importance of the Ukraine was not recognized immediately by the U.S. foreign policy establishment because of a Russian-centric policy. It was only after a period of time, when the Ukraine became recognized as an independent rather than Russian-affiliated one, did U.S. foreign policy-makers realized the importance of an independent Ukraine to the European and world community.

Cold War History

The three events that have most affected the Ukraine in the twentieth century are 1) the fall of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Turkish Empires, as a result of World War I; 2) the dissolution of the Nazi Germany and its allies at the end of World War II and the re-division of post-war Europe in Yalta; and 3) the collapse of the Soviet Union Empire at the end of the Cold War.15 During World War I, the major battles on the eastern front took place on the territory of western Ukraine. The revolution of 1917-18 proclaimed Ukrainian independence with its only to be followed by occupation by Germans, Austrians, French, Polish, Czarist Russians, and Communists. This occupation led to a five-year civil war that culminated in a Communist victory and reintegration of Ukraine back into the Soviet fold.

During World War II, Ukraine again became the center of battle between Germany and the Soviet Union, with the Ukraine losing approximately nine million citizens and half of its industrial potential. Most Ukrainians resisted the Nazi invasion and occupation, although some nationalists greeted the Germans as liberators until the Nazis crushed their movement. Unlike World War I, the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union prevented any further bloodshed on Ukrainian soil.

It was also during this period that the Soviet Constitution was changed on February 1, 1944 to include an amendment to Article 18A which stated every Soviet Republic “has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representation with them.”16 This amendment permitted Ukraine to exist as a semi-state within the Soviet framework, and allowed it to establish a Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1944. On August 22, 1945, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine ratified the United Nations Charter that was signed in San Francisco by the Ukrainian delegation on July 27, 1945. Although the Soviet Union allowed the Ukraine to exist as a separate subject in international law as a way to balance against the number of pro-western nations in the United Nations’ (U.N.) General Assembly, Ukraine nevertheless was recognized as a separate state and elected a member of the U.N.’s Security Council in 1948-49 and 1984-85.17

Over the next decades Ukraine recovered to pre-war levels of industry and production and became the center of Soviet military research and modernized Soviet military bases aimed at Europe. Not surprising, Ukraine twice became the bridgehead for Soviet aggression against Hungary in 1956 and against Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, coal and ore mining, metallurgy, and chemical and energy industries continued to dominate the republic’s economy. Because the economy was directed for military production and not civilian goods, the availability of consumer goods in the Ukraine was sparse when compared to other Eastern bloc countries.18

Because of its geopolitical and military importance, many members of the Soviet leadership came from Ukraine, such as Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. It is also worth noting that the Crimea was transferred from the Russian Republic to the Ukrainian one in 1954, a decision that would have repercussions in the post-Cold War era. Finally, the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 occurred in Pripyat, Ukraine where the fallout contaminated large areas of northern Ukraine and parts of Belarus. This spurred a local independent movement known as Rukh that assisted in the break-up of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.19

With Gorbachev ushering in a period of perestroika and glasnost to reform the Soviet Union, Ukrainian politicians started to visit U.S. government officials, such as Volodymyr Yavorivskyi in October 1989, Mykhailo Horyn in September 1990, and Vitold Fokin in December 1990.20 At a hearing of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE and later called the OSCE) on February 6, 1991, Brzezinski urged the U.S. to establish ties with non-Russian republics.21 After the U.S. and USSR sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START-I) on July 31, 1991, President George H. W Bush visited Kyiv on August 1, 1991 and delivered a speech which often is cited as the starting point of relations between the U.S. and Ukraine.

Known in the West as the “Chicken Kiev” speech, Bush said that “Freedom is not the same thing as independence in order to trade a distant tyranny for local despotism. Americans will not help those who stand for suicidal nationalism and ethnic hatred.”22 Ignoring Gorbachev’s plead not to visit Ukraine because it may stir up nationalist sentiment, Bush did show the text of his speech to Gorbachev and included language to encourage Ukraine to remain in the Soviet Union.23 Although this pleased the Soviet leadership, Bush’s speech created domestic backlash, with Senator Dennis Deconcini (D-AZ) criticizing it, along with many Ukrainian-Americans.

Following the failed August coup d’йtat in the USSR, Ukraine declared independence on August 24. Following ratification, Leonid Kravchuk visited Washington on September 25, 1991 where Bush offered certain concessions, like a separate U.S. Peace Corps program for Ukraine, in lieu of support of Ukrainian independence. Later, during October and November, bills were passed in both the U.S. House and the Senate urging Bush to extend diplomatic recognition to an independent Ukraine. This prompted Bush to meet with fifteen Ukrainian-American leaders in the White House and informed them that the Bush Administration considers Ukraine entitled to independence.24

The Ukrainian parliament declared the desire of its nation for eventual non-nuclear status on October 24, 1991.25 On December 1, 1991, a nationwide referendum in Ukraine on independence was conducted and was passed with the election of Leonid Kuchma as president.26 Later, on December 8, leaders from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The U.S. did not extend diplomatic recognition but did announce that it would continue to work with the CIS on the question of nuclear stability in the region. James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, met with Leonid Kravchuk on December 18, when Baker announced that the U.S. considered Ukraine “in the forefront of former Soviet republics seeking U.S. diplomatic recognition,” although such recognition was dependent on U.S. concerns about nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil.27 Recognition was ultimately announced on December 25 when Bush extended formal diplomatic recognition to an independent Ukraine, after Gorbachev resigned and the Soviet Union had ceased to exist as a legal and political entity. Official diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Ukraine was established on January 23, 1992.28

During the period of August 24 to December 1, when the Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, the U.S. underwent a difficult and painful process of reassigning and changing its foreign policy directions. The traditional Russian-centric tendency, expressed by the U.S. State Department, remained intact. American foreign policy makers advocated preservation of the Soviet Union, somewhat liberalized by perestroika and glasnost, because they seemed to believe that the emergence of new states with nuclear weapons could create a complicated and confusing situation that would run counter to US interests in the region. However, the belief in the ability of Gorbachev to consolidate the Soviet Union bespoke a fatal misunderstanding on part of the U.S. of the profound processes under way in Ukraine and other republics, in addition to underestimating the strength of nation-liberation movement and the general disillusionment with Gorbachev himself.

Denuclearization

The rapid pace of the dissolution of the Soviet Union took many in the U.S. foreign policy establishment by surprise. As a result, many U.S. decision-makers did not do much thinking about how to deal with post-Soviet states before the actual collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the Bush Administration recognized Ukraine as an independent state, based on the fact that a majority of Ukrainians voted in favor of independence, it was more concerned about the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil. In fairness, the Bush Administration did not link recognition of Ukraine’s independence to denuclearization, but it did expect the Ukraine to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) once it had achieved independence.

Given its overwhelming focus on the Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union, the U.S. sought to stabilize the situation by moving all nuclear weapons to Russia. Consequently Russia played a significant factor in U.S. policy towards the region and was often seen as the primary party willing and capable of dealing with problems of post-Soviet space. The Russian-centric nature of U.S. foreign policy was at the expense of independent states like the Ukraine, although it not clear whether there was any realistic alternative to this policy. The relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine in 1992-1993 therefore was carried out in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion. The appearance of a new independent state with the world’s third largest stock of strategic nuclear weapons aimed at the West was conceptually difficult to grasp for U.S. decision-makers, as the mechanism of U.S. foreign policy still continued to be Russian-centric.

In a 1994 article in the journal, Politychna dumka/Political Thought, the prominent American analyst Sherman Garnett remarked: “The West is still unaccustomed to dealing with the territory of the former USSR as a region of international diplomacy. At least a partial reason for this reluctance lies with the West’s reliance in a time of change on strategic continuities that would guide its policies, even as they delayed engagement with new realities. The two most important continuities are its continued support for reforms in Moscow and its focus on nuclear weapons, particularly the problem of a nuclear Ukraine.”29

Some U.S. politicians refused to accept Ukraine’s independent status and continued to consider it as an integral part of Russia. An example of this type of thinking was Jerry F. Hough in The New York Times: “The Soviet superpower may be gone, but Russia and Ukraine still have nuclear weapons. It would be a disaster if Russian and Ukrainian politics evolve as politics did in Serbia and Croatia. It would be easy for Mr. Yeltsin to adopt a policy of annexing Russian-populated lands in adjoining republics in an attempt to bolster his faltering domestic support. Russian and Ukrainian economic integration, including a common currency and a subsidy policy coordinated with the other republics, is necessary for reform in both countries. The U.S. goal should be the loose union we support in Western Europe. In trying to achieve our goals, we must strive for the achievable, not the utopian, as is often the case. We should not oppose integration [of Russia and Ukraine] and insist on the full economic and military independence of Ukraine. If there were a crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations and we, siding with Ukraine, imposed economic and technological sanctions on Russia, the Russian Army would support Serbia-style annexation. But the Russian Army and leaders of defense industry mangers are our natural allies.”30

For its part, Ukraine’s primary foreign policy objective was to receive meaningful recognition of Ukraine as an equal partner in the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. As a nation that occupied an important geopolitical position in Europe and with interests that could differ from its neighboring states, Ukraine had to demonstrate to both the U.S. and its neighbors that it could conduct and effective and independent foreign policy. Ukraine accomplished this feat in 1992 by integrating itself into several multinational and international organizations and treaties as an independent state: it became a member of CSCE, NATO’s Cooperation Council, signed the Helsinki Accords, and entered into negotiations with the NPT and START-I Treaty.31 Finally, Ukraine sent Oleh Bilorus as the Ukrainian Ambassador to Washington D.C.; and in May 5-11, President Kravchuk visited the U.S. for the time as president of an independent Ukraine. During his visit, Ukraine was granted “most favored nation” status by the Oversees Private Development program, a separate Peace Corps program, and signed a U.S.-Ukraine agreement on environment collaboration.32

However, the biggest issue that caused confrontation between the two countries was Ukraine acquiring non-nuclear status. Driven by strategic interest that were not necessarily identical, the U.S. and Russia applied additional pressure to Ukraine to make it relinquish its nuclear arsenal. For example, the U.S. refused to start a dialogue on the basis of equality or develop economic cooperation until Ukraine would ratify START-I and join the NPT. Once Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol to START-I and entered the NPT on May 23, 1992, it began to receive U.S. financial and technical assistance in the dismantling of its nuclear arsenal.33 In short, the Ukraine had to withstand U.S. and Russian pressure to receive the best political advantage possible from denuclearization. It did so with guarantees from both the U.S. and Russia for its national security and U.S. economic compensation for acquiring non-nuclear status.

In January to March 1993, bilateral talks commenced between Ukraine and the U.S. to define the parameters for mutual cooperation. These parameters were brought to the forefront when Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Antaoliy Zlenko, visited the U.S. on March 23-24 and pointed out a number of obstacles to disarming rapidly Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal: 1) concerns about Russia’s future; 2) insufficient security guarantees from the U.S.; 3) insufficient financial assistance for dismantling its nuclear arsenal from the U.S.; and 4) the absence of an agreement with Russia to share funds obtain from the U.S. in the sale of highly-enriched uranium contained in Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal.34

The U.S. State Department responded with a declaration of the urgent need for jointly overcoming this “crisis of faith” and sent U.S. Ambassador-at-Large, Strobe Talbott, to meet with Kravchuk in Ukraine. To help move the START-I ratification process forward, Talbott affirmed U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s international security, but he also stressed that the nuclear issue should not dominate U.S.-Ukrainian relations: “The fact that we came to Kyiv first could be explained by the utmost important that the American Administration attaches to US-Ukrainian relations… By making Kyiv our first stop we stress the significance of our relations with Ukraine . . . I would like to confirm that not only the White House but the whole Administration has drastically overhauled our policy and relations with Ukraine. The leading U.S. government agencies participated in this work… The word “pressure” will not be used by the American delegation during these talks . . . The United States is not going to make Ukraine do anything that would run counter to its interests. On the contrary, the United States wants to conduct a dialogue with Ukraine… We will try to talk about the nuclear weapons that remain on Ukrainian soil in a much broader context – a context that would take into account the absolutely legitimate Ukrainian demands as to its security… Besides, we shall be talking about different parameters of the notion of “security,” since it is not a strictly military term. Security, as well as independence and sovereignty have an economic dimension to it. That is why we wish to talk about matters that constitute Ukrainian economic security and discuss the Ukrainian desire to be part of European and world community.35

Ukraine’s concerns were addressed by U.S. policy-makers, when Ukrainian Defense Minister, Kostiantyn Morozov, visited the U.S. on July 25-30, 1993 to sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation and communication between the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Defense Department. Ukraine also would receive financial assistance in the dismantling of its nuclear arsenal from the Nunn-Lugar Act. Several other scientific, industrial, and agricultural trade and cooperation agreements between the two countries were signed in the months afterwards.

On October 24-25 Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Ukraine and argued for the unilateral disarmament of its nuclear arsenal and commitment to the START-I Treaty.36 He also offered American financial assistance for the dismantling of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal. On November 18 the Ukrainian parliament ratified START-I and Lisbon Protocols but with thirteen conditions attached, which included a firmer U.S. commitment to Ukrainian security and assistance in dismantling its nuclear arsenal.37 Although at the time President Clinton expressed disappointment about these conditions in a telephone call to Kravchuk, Ukraine would eventually drop these conditions in February 1994 and achieve non-nuclear status by June 1996.38

It is also worth noting that U.S.-Ukrainian relations began to change in 1993 after U.S. disappointment with Russia’s political and economic performance. After a strategic review of U.S. foreign policy, U.S. policy-makers concluded that a Russian-centric foreign policy in the region had served U.S. interests poorly and therefore called for more cooperation with Russia’s post-Soviet nations, with a special position reserved for Ukraine. With this shift, the dialogue between the U.S. and Ukraine on denuclearization continued in a more productive fashion which would lead to the Trilateral Agreement which was signed by Clinton, Kravchuk, and Yeltsin on January 14, 1994.39 This Agreement would return and destroy Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal in exchange for U.S. financial and technical assistance and Russia’s forgiveness of Ukrainian debt.

What is clear is that the U.S. was able to achieve its foreign policy objective – the denuclearization of Ukraine – when it was able to treat the Ukraine as an independent state and equal partner on the world stage. Furthermore, when denuclearization became one of many issues for the U.S. and the Ukraine about which to negotiate, Ukraine was more ready to ratify the START-I Treaty. For its part, Ukraine was able to achieve its objective of a recognized independent state through an effective foreign policy which integrated it into multi-national and international organizations and treaties and received assurances from the U.S. about its national security. Both countries were able to achieve their objectives – a denuclearized Ukraine and recognition as an independent state – after a period of adjustment in the foreign policy apparatus of both states.

The Year of the Ukraine

In the U.S. foreign policy establishment, 1994 was called the “Year of the Ukraine.”40 Zbignew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger played an influential role in this new focus on Ukraine: both agreed to join the Ukrainian-American Advisory Committee, a non-governmental consultative body compromise of prominent politicians from U.S. and Ukraine. In 1993, Brzezinski gave a clear formula for the significance of Ukrainian independence: “Independent Ukraine changes the whole geopolitical map of Europe. Its appearance is one of the three main major geopolitical events of the twentieth century. The first is the 1918 breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The second – the 1945 division of Europe into two blocs. The emergence of independent Ukraine could be considered the third event because it marks the end of Imperial Russia. And it is a lot more than the end of the Communist USSR, this is the end of the last European Empire. By breaking Imperial Russia independent Ukraine created the possibility for Russia itself – as a state and a nation – to finally become a democratic European country. So for Russia Ukrainian dependence is a beneficial factor. And it is not anti-Russian. On the contrary, it is definitely pro-Russian. Because to preserve the Russian Empire its people have to live in a poor, dictatorial state.

The birth of an independent Ukraine is, in other words, not only an important geopolitical but also a political and philosophical event. There were times when some of us thought that America had to make a choice between Russia and Ukraine, but now it looks as if everyone understands that good relations with both countries will only strengthen European stability.41 Henry Kissinger, pursuing the same geopolitical line, warned in 1994 that “. . . it is a vital American interest to see to it that Eurasia not be controlled by a single power center. In essence, we have fought two wars over this issue.”42

If the shift from its Russian-centric perspective in U.S. foreign policy was complete, the U.S. hoped that Ukraine would implement political and economic reforms, especially after the election of Ukraine’s new president, Leonid Kuchma. Greeted enthusiastically in the U.S., Kuchma was seen as someone who could change Ukraine for the better. This hope was expressed by Republican political activist of Ukraine descent, Ms. Paula Dobriansky, who wrote in The Washington Times: “Fortunately, the situation in Ukraine is critical, but not hopeless. Leonid Kuchma, as the new president of Ukraine, has a unique opportunity to discard Mr. Kravchuk’s flawed policies and to adopt a strategic vision capable of inspiring the nation. That vision must be of a Ukraine that is a key Central European nation and an important stakeholder in Western economic and security systems and at the same time enjoys a constructive relationship with Russia.

To realize this vision, the Ukrainian leadership must devise a comprehensive economic reform package and attract foreign investment; undertake legal and electoral change that will break the near monopoly of power at the local and regional levels of the old nomeklatura, while enhancing the legitimacy of Ukrainian democrats; and pursue firm but sensitive Ukrainization policies that foster national identity without promoting ethnic and religious schisms. With the right set of policies, informed by sound vision, Ukraine can not only survive but flourish. An intelligent U.S. policy could bolster these prospects. The United States must continue to make it clear, publicly and privately, the importance we attach to Ukraine being not only a prosperous democracy but a sovereign and independent state with inviolable borders.”43

On August 2, Vice-President Gore visited Kyiv to affirm continued U.S. support for Ukraine and the new president, Kuchma. Gore also stressed that “there is no alternative to radical economic reform in Ukraine.”44 After the Ukrainian parliament acceded to the NPT on November 18, Kuchma visited the U.S. on November 19-23 where both he and Clinton signed the “Charter for Ukrainian-American Partnership, Friendship, and Cooperation.” The U.S. announced aid to the Ukraine of $350 million and an additional fourteen bilateral agreements were signed.45 Both countries stated that “the existence of a free, independent and sovereign Ukrainian state, its security and prosperity is very important for the United States of America.” Both countries expressed within the Charter their understanding of the fact that “…Ukraine’s strategic location in the center of Europe enables it to make a special contribution to the peace, security and stability of the region. Convinced that Ukraine cannot be secure until Europe as a whole is secure, the United States of America supports Ukrainian efforts to resolve differences with its neighbors in a peaceful and cooperative spirit, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state.”46

The U.S. also positively greeted Ukraine’s decision to participate in NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” program and expressed its desire to develop mutually advantageous military cooperation and have regular consultation on issues of international security. Of particular importance in the Partnership for Peace program is the clause which: “If in the future, an external threat to the territorial integrity, political independence or security of Ukraine should arise, the United States of America and Ukraine intend to consult and to undertake steps as appropriate to achieve a peaceful resolution consistent with international laws and principles of the CSCE.47

By the end of 1994 at the Budapest Summit of the OSCE, Ukraine, in exchange for its ratification of START-1 and joining the NPT, received guarantees of its national security in the form of a Memorandum, signed by the U.S., Great Britain, and Russia. Ukraine also received unilateral guarantees of its security from France and China.48 Ukraine also received substantial financial aid from the U.S. and other international organizations: the U.S. announced $700 million of aid to Ukraine and granted it its Generalized System of Preference status on March 3-7; $100 million in aid for denuclearization on March 21-23; $4.2 billion in aid from the Group of Seven industrialized nations (G-7), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank on July 8-10; and an additional $1.2 billion from the G-7 in October. In exchange for this assistance, Ukraine promised to implement market-oriented reforms in the shortest time possible.

Thus, the year of the Ukraine was the beginning of the high-point of U.S.-Ukrainian relations as both countries’ interests aligned in creating a stable, democratic, and free-market economy in the Ukraine.49 By the second half of the 1990s, U.S.-Ukrainian relations were elevated to a strategic partnership, with the 1996 Kuchma-Gore Commission realizing the significance both sides saw in this bilateral relationship. Ukraine also signed important treatises with the U.S., Russia and other countries and multi-national organizations, including the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO and the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). However, the Ukrainian economy continued to deteriorate under Kuchma in spite of his free market reforms. There also were concerns of corruption, crackdown on civil liberties, particularly with regards to the media, and Ukraine’s growing relationship with Russia.

 Postscript

Since 9/11 the U.S. shifted its foreign policy where the war on terror received priority and anything else not related to it was downgraded, which included Ukraine. Not seen as a country capable of assisting the U.S. in its war on terror, Ukraine sought to demonstrate its relevance by sending troops to Kuwait at the beginning of the Iraq War. However, this was gesture was overshadowed by the Kuchma government’s ongoing undemocratic behavior as well as its selling of Kolchuga radar stations to Iraq. As a result, bilateral relations between the two states deteriorated with the U.S. freezing financial aid to Ukraine.50

The Orange Revolution of 2004 changed the dynamics of U.S.-Ukrainian relations. The Bush Administration’s support of the pro-democracy forces was instrumental in improving relations. In 2006 the U.S. granted Ukraine market economy status in February, permanent normal trade relations status in March, and signed a new Trade and Investment Cooperation Act in April. In December 2006, the U.S. signed the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership which highlights the importance of the bilateral relationship and outlines cooperation in areas of defense, security, economics, trade, and democracy.51

Unfortunately, Ukrainian leaders have failed to deliver the anticipated social, economic, and political changes to their country. As a result, pro-Russian forces, such as Yanukovch, came into power and has steered Ukraine’s foreign policy towards the east rather than to the west. Although Ukraine has received more than $4.1 billion in U.S. assistance since it has declared independence, it is not clear whether Ukraine will become a stable democratic state with a free-market economy.52

What we can conclude from this study of U.S.-Ukrainian relations immediately after the Cold War is that for a successful U.S.-Ukrainian relationship to exist, several factors are required: 1) the U.S. must approach the Ukraine as an independent state rather than one affiliated with Russia; 2) the U.S. must understand the geopolitical importance of Ukraine; 3) the U.S. must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities confronting Ukraine, such as its post-communist legacy, multi-ethnic population, historical ties with Russia, and insecurity about its territorial integrity; 4) the U.S. must not permit one single issue, such as denuclearization, dominate the bilateral relationship; 5) the U.S. should continue to encourage pro-democratic forces in Ukraine; and 6) the U.S. should recognize that countries not fitting the war on terror paradigm still are important and vital to U.S. long-term national security interest.

For the Ukraine to have a successful U.S.-Ukrainian relationship, it must 1) continue to demonstrate an effective and independent foreign policy, including further integration into multi-national and international organizations; 2) implement democratic political and market-oriented economic reforms at home; and 3) recognize and remind the U.S. that its importance to the U.S. is its geopolitical position in Europe rather than adopting a role it is ill-suited for, i.e., the war on terror.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was able to achieve its independence in a radically-changed map of Europe. By conducting an effective and independent foreign policy, Ukraine was also able to consolidate its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. For the U.S., once it abandoned its Russian-centric policy in its bilateral relations with Ukraine, a productive relationship commenced with the eventual denuclearization of the country. In the immediate post-Cold War era, both the U.S. and Ukraine required new strategic paradigms in their thinking in order for this bilateral relationship to work and create a more stable and prosperous Europe.

 

References

1. Aslund, Anders and Michael McFaul. Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996)

2. Asmus, Ronald D. and Bruce P. Jackson, “The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom,” Policy Review (June 2004). Available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6451.

3. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Ukraпns’ke slovo, January 20, 1993.

4. Brzezinski, Zbigniew “The Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 72: 2 (March-April 1994): 67-82.

5. Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Paige Sullivan. Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, Analysis (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997).

6. Bush, George H.W. “Address to Supreme Soviet of Ukraine,” August 1, 1991. Available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Chicken_Kiev_speech.

7. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The USSR in Crisis: State of the Union. Hearings before the Commission on Security, February 6, 1991 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 1-77.

8. Dobriansky, Paula. The Washington Times, August 28, 1994: B4.

9. Fink, Susan. “From Chicken Kiev to Ukrainian Recognition,” Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993.

10. Garnett, Sherman. “The Ukrainian Question and the Future of Russia,” Politychna dumka/Political Thought 94: 4 (1994): 169-70.

11. Grabowicz, George G. “Ukrainian Studies: Framing the Contexts” Slavic Review 54: 3 (Autumn, 1995): 674-90.

12. Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Re-making of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

13. Jackson, Bruce P. “The European Union Goes East,” Policy Review 166 (April 2011). Available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/EUR/State/113366.pdf.

14. Jerry F. Hough “Russia Aims its Oil Weapons,” The New York Times, June 17, 1993: A25.

15. Karatnycky, Adrian. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Foreign Affairs (March-April 2005). Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60620/adrian-karatnycky/ukraines-orange-revolution;

16. Kissinger, Henry. “At Sea in the World,” New Perspectives Quarterly 2:3 (Summer, 1994): 43.

17. Kolosov, Vladmir A. “Perspektivy rossisko-ukrainskikh otnoshenii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, February 13, 1997.

18. Kuromiya, Hiroaki. “Political Leadership and Ukrainian Nationalism, 1938-1989: The Burden of History.” Problems of Post-Communism 52: 1 (January-February 2005): 39-48.

19. Kuzio, Taras. Russia-Crimea-Ukraine: the triangle of conflict (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994).

20. Kuzio, Taras. “Ukraine: Coming to Terms with the Soviet Legacy,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transitional Politics 14:4 (1998): 1-27.

21. Kuzio, Taras. “Ukraine’s Relationship with the West: Disinterest, Partnership, Disillusionment,” European Security 12: 2 (Summer 2003): 21-44. Available at http://www.taraskuzio.net/International%20Relations_files/ukraine_west_relations.pdf

22. Lawton, Lancelot. “Ukraine: Europe’s Greatest Problem,” East Europe and Contemporary Russia 3:1 (Spring 1939): 3-4.

23. Levandovs’kyi, Vadym. “Ukraine in Geopolitical Concepts of the First Third of the 20th Century,” Politychna dumka/Political Thought 1994 (3): 62-63.

24. Nahaievs’kyi, Isydor. Istoriia ukraпns’koп derzhavy dvadtsiatoho stolittia (Kyiv: Ukraпns’kyi pys’mennyk, 1993).

25. Naydan, Michael M. “’Slavic and Eastern European Journal’ and Fifty Years of Ukrainian Studies,” Slavic and East European Journal 50: 1 (Spring 2006): 150-58.

26. Posen, Barry. “Kontseptsiia oborony dllia Ukrainy.” In Ukraina: problem bezopastnosti (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 1996).

27. Samuilov, Sergei M. “O nekotorykh amerikanskikh stereotipakh v otnoshenii Ukrainy,” SSha-ИPI, 3-4 (1997): 87.

28. Segal, Jack D. “Building a Partnership with Ukraine,” Western Slavic Affairs, Department of State, March 21, 1997.

29. Shcherbak, Yuri. The Strategic Role of Ukraine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

30. Simonsen, Sven Gunnar. “You take your oath only once”: Crimea, The Black Sea Fleet, and national identity among Russian officers,” Nationalities Papers 28: 2 (June 2000): 289-316.

31. Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

32. Talbott, Strobe. Holos Ukraпny, May 11, 1993.

33. Talbott, Strobe. “US Interests and Russian Reform,” State Department Dispatch 6 (10) 1995.

34. “Ukraine wants Russia, EU to invest in its gas transportation system,” RIA Novosti, April 26, 2010. Available at http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100426/158743259.html.

35. U.S. State Department Dispatch 5 (49) 1994.

36. U.S. Department of State, “United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership,” Washington D.C.: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, December 19, 2008. Available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/EUR/State/113366.pdf.

37. Way, Lucan A. “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine,” World Politics 57: 2 (January 2005): 231-61.

38. Zhilin, P.A. Kak fashistskaia Germaniia gotovila napadenie na Sovetskii Soiuz (Moscow: Mysl’, 1966).

39. Zhukov, G. A. Vospominaniia i razmyshleniia (Moscow: APN, 1970).

 

Notes

1. For past studies of Ukraine’s role and importance to the geopolitical stability of Europe before 1991, refer to Lancelot Lawton, “Ukraine: Europe’s Greatest Problem,” East Europe and Contemporary Russia 3:1 (Spring 1939): 3-4; Vadym Levandovs’kyi, “Ukraine in Geopolitical Concepts of the First Third of the 20th Century,” Politychna dumka/Political Thought 1994 (3): 62-63. For the place of Ukrainian studies in the West, refer to George G. Grabowicz, “Ukrainian Studies: Framing the Contexts” Slavic Review 54: 3 (Autumn, 1995): 674-90; Michael Naydan, “’Slavic and Eastern European Journal’ and Fifty Years of Ukrainian Studies,” Slavic and East European Journal 50: 1 (Spring 2006): 150-58.

2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 72: 2 (March-April 1994): 80.

3. Strobe Talbott, “US Interests and Russian Reform,” State Department Dispatch 6 (10) 1995.

4. Jack D. Segal, “Building a Partnership with Ukraine,” Western Slavic Affairs, Department of State, March 21, 1997.

5. Nahaievs’kyi, Isydor. Istoriia ukraпns’koп derzhavy dvadtsiatoho stolittia (Kyiv: Ukraпns’kyi pys’mennyk, 1993), 53-54.

6. Ibid., 56.

7. Zhilin, P.A. Kak fashistskaia Germaniia gotovila napadenie na Sovetskii Soiuz (Moscow: Mysl’, 1966), 200.

8. Zhukov, G. A. Vospominaniia i razmyshleniia (Moscow: APN, 1970), 220.

9. Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 178-200.

10. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union turned the Black Sea Fleet into an operational and strategic force of 100,000 men and 700 warships and support vessels, some with tactical nuclear weapons. It was seen as the main neutralizing force against the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which was based in the Mediterranean. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence of Ukraine, there was a lengthy conflict between Russia and Ukraine concerning the division and basing of the Black Sea Fleet. The 2010-Ukranian-Russisan Naval Base for

Natural Gas Treaty allows Russia to lease naval facilities in Crimea until 2017 in exchange for a multi-year discounted contract to provide Ukraine with Russian natural gas. “Ukraine wants Russia, EU to invest in its gas transportation system,” RIA Novosti, April 26, 2010. Available at http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100426/158743259.html. For more about the importance of the Black Sea, refer to Kuzio, Taras. Russia-Crimea-Ukraine: the triangle of conflict (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994); Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “You take your oath only once”: Crimea, The Black Sea Fleet, and national identity among Russian officers,” Nationalities Papers 28: 2 (June 2000): 289-316; Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, “The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom,” Policy Review (June 2004). Available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6451.

11. Barry Posen, “Kontseptsiia oborony dllia Ukrainy.” In Ukraina: problem bezopastnosti (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 1996), 88-89.

12. Subtelny, 538-73; also refer to Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine: Coming to Terms with the Soviet Legacy,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transitional Politics 14:4 (1998): 1-27.

13. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Re-making of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

14. Sergei M. Samuilov, “O nekotorykh amerikanskikh stereotipakh v otnoshenii Ukrainy,” SSha-ИPI, 3-4 (1997): 87; Vladmir A. Kolosov, “Perspektivy rossisko-ukrainskikh otnoshenii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, February 13, 1997.

15. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ukraпns’ke slovo, January 20, 1993.

16. Subtelny, 435-95.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 481-537; also refer to Hiroaki Kuromiya, “Political Leadership and Ukrainian Nationalism, 1938-1989: The Burden of History.” Problems of Post-Communism 52: 1 (January-February 2005): 39-48.

20. Shcherbak, Yuri. The Strategic Role of Ukraine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 123.

21. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The USSR in Crisis: State of the Union. Hearings before the Commission on Security, February 6, 1991 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 1-77.

22. George H.W. Bush, “Address to Supreme Soviet of Ukraine,” August 1, 1991. Available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Chicken_Kiev_speech.

23. Susan Fink, “From Chicken Kiev to Ukrainian Recognition,” Master Thesis, Naval  Postgraduate School, 1993.

24. Scherbak, 124.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Sherman Garnett, “The Ukrainian Question and the Future of Russia,” Politychna dumka/Political Thought 94: 4 (1994): 169-70.

30. “Russia Aims its Oil Weapons,” The New York Times, June 17, 1993: A25.

31. Scherbak, 124-25.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Strobe Talbott, Holos Ukraпny, May 11, 1993.

36. Scherbak, 125-27.

37. Ibid., 127.

38. Ibid., 129-33.

39. Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Paige Sullivan. Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, Analysis (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 141.

40. Ibid., 26.

41. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ukraпns’ke slovo, January 20, 1993.

42. Henry Kissinger, “At Sea in the World,” New Perspectives Quarterly 2:3 (Summer, 1994): 43.

43. Paula Dobriansky, The Washington Times, August 28, 1994: B4.

44. Scherbak, 128.

45. Ibid., 129.

46. U.S. State Department Dispatch 5 (49) 1994.

47. Brzezinski, Sullivan, 466, 486.

48. Scherbak, 129.

49. Ibid., 124-29.

50. Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Relationship with the West: Disinterest, Partnership, Disillusionment,” European Security 12: 2 (Summer 2003): 21-44; also refer to Bruce P. Jackson, “The European Union Goes East,” Policy Review 166 (April 2011). Available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/EUR/State/113366.pdf.

51. Aslund, Anders and Michael McFaul. Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996); Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Foreign Affairs (March-April 2005). Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60620/adriankaratnycky/ukraines-orange-revolution; U.S. Department of State, “United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership,” Washington D.C.: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, December 19, 2008. Available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/EUR/State/113366.pdf.

52. For concerns about Ukraine abandoning its democratic principles, refer to Lucan A. Way, “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine,” World Politics 57: 2 (January 2005): 231-61.

 

Also available are “Enemy Images, Evidence, and Cognitive Dissonance: The Cold War As Recalled by Michiganders“; “The American Perspective of the Cold War: The Southern Approach (North Carolina)“; “Soviet Perspective on the Cold War and American Foreign Policy“; “The Polish Perspective of American Foreign Policy: Selected Moments from The Cold War Era“; “The Netherlands During the Cold War: An Ambivalent Friendship and a Firm Enmity“; “The Special Relationship: United States-Russia“; The U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment’s Perception of Poland (1980-1981)“; “Soviet Attitudes Towards Poland’s Solidarity Movement“; and The Paradox of Solidarity from a Thirty Years Perspective.”

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Lee Trepanier is Chair and Professor of the Political Science Department at Samford University in Birmingham, Alabama and former editor-in-chief of VoegelinView (2016-21). He is author and editor of several books and editor of Lexington Books series Politics, Literature, and Film (2013-present).

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