The U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment’s Perception of Poland (1980-1981)
With the declassification of secret material after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, scholars are able to determine how accurate were the perceptions of foreign policy-makers to the reality which they were analyzing. This chapter will explore the accuracy of the perceptions of the American foreign policy establishment – the White House, the State Department, and the intelligent services – specifically the events in Poland from the birth of Solidarity to the declaration of martial law (1980-1981). It also will explore the role that the U.S. played after the imposition of martial law in Polish domestic politics (1986-1989). What we will discover is that in two of the three cases analyzed here, the American foreign policy establishment’s perceptions comported with the reality of events in Poland as well as those of its counterparts in the Warsaw Pact.
The two cases where the American foreign policy establishment accurately understood events in Poland was the first and second planned Warsaw Pact invasion of Poland (December 1980 and March 1981). In both of these cases, the United States recognized its need to balance its support for Solidarity against the cost of antagonizing the Soviet Union. What we find are neutral statements that the Polish crisis must be resolved internally while economic incentives and punishments are offered to the Warsaw Pact not to invade Poland.
The case where the American foreign policy establishment misjudged events in Poland was the declaration of martial law by the Polish communist government. Although this alternative was analyzed earlier, this option became less and less credible in the minds of American policy-makers as the threat of foreign intervention appeared to continue unabated. It also did not help that there were other distractions in the American foreign policy establishment at this time, such as the new administration in power.
The lessons, both right and wrong, were put into practice in the years 1986-1989 when the Polish communist government began to collapse. What we find is that the United States was able to use its diplomatic powers to achieve the domestic results it wants in a foreign country. Whether we can draw any general conclusions from this particular case is explored in the concluding section of this chapter.
The First Planned Warsaw Pact Invasion (December 1980)
By 1980 the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union was destroyed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Widely blamed for mishandling relations with the Soviet Union, the Carter Administration was specifically criticized for its failure to induce the Soviets to accept a deep armament cuts and treat Soviet citizens in accordance with human rights. With its diplomats held hostage in Iran, the Carter administration was humiliated by foreign events and powers and therefore perceived by the world as incompetent. By contrast, the Soviet Union appeared to be ascendant, with its invasion in Afghanistan in defiance of widespread international public opinion and its successful reorganization of the Warsaw Pact where the armed forces of its allied states were integrated and subordinate to Soviet command.
However, all was not well in the Warsaw Pact, with the emergence of Solidarity in August 1980 as the first independent labor union in this alliance. Although there were labor strikes throughout the 1970s, Solidarity was the first successful one, with the Polish government eventually agreeing to the workers’ demands known as the Gdańsk Agreement. The emergence of this mass movement was a challenge to Soviet’s interest in Eastern Europe. The fact of a workers’ rebellion trying to hold the avowedly working-class government to its promises of socialism, such as self-rule, was an embarrassment not only to the Polish communist government but to all the communist governments of the Warsaw Pact. The popularity of the Solidarity revealed the bankruptcy of the regime, which leaders acknowledged as much when it allowed Solidarity to register as a legitimate political organization and thereby challenged the principle of the communist party’s monopoly on power.
The initial Soviet reaction to the Solidarity movement was a call for reservists, increased combat readiness of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces, and sending warships to Polish ports. Later a special commission was established which was headed by senior party ideologist Mikhail A. Suslov and included KGB Chief Yurii V. Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, and Defense Minister Dmitrii F. Ustinov.[1] The commission agreed that “we cannot afford to lose Poland,” but remained uncertain about how to accomplish this task.[2] The Soviet allies of East Germany and Czechoslovakia advocated for administrative rather than political means to resolve the unrest in Poland, even if this were to lead to bloodshed.[3] The Polish communist party also agreed with its allies, having created a secret committee, led by Defense Minister General Jaruzelski, on August 24 to prepare for martial law.[4]
Brezhnev pressed his Polish counterpart, Stanislaw Kania, to take administrative action against Solidarity. Knowing that resistance to Soviet military intervention would be ruinous for both himself and his country, Kania attempted to persuade Brezhnev to postpone the annual Warsaw Pact’s Soyuz maneuvers until next year but was unsuccessful. The Soyuz maneuvers were set on December 8 with its completion on December 21. However, Brezhnev did accept a proposal that the communist party chiefs of the Warsaw Pact meet on December 5 to discuss the Polish situation.[5] At the same time, plans for an invasion of Poland by the Warsaw Pact military were drawn up.
Unlike Czechoslovakia, when the invaders had attempted to discredit the Prague government, the Soviets made no demands on Kania prior to the planned invasion. From their perspective, the Soviets would rather have a loyal and weak leader rather than a subversive and unpredictable one; consequently, the Soviets tried to strengthen Kania’s hand. The plan for the invasion of Poland was revealed to Polish Deputy Chief of Staff General Tadeusz Hupalowski when he visited Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov in Moscow on December 1. Under the pretext of the Soyuz maneuvers, fifteen Soviet divisions with one East German division and one Czechoslovakian division would be deployed in the cities and industrial centers to create the political solution to the Solidarity problem.[6]
The Polish leadership was in a state of shock at this news, with Jarzuelski locking himself in his office and remaining completely inaccessible even to his closest entourage.[7] Later Jarzuelski tried to negotiate the removal of East German troops but was unsuccessful. However, he was able to convince Moscow that two Polish divisions would cooperate by actively supporting the German and Czechoslovakian units in order to prevent resistance to the invading forces. After military preparations had been completed, the Warsaw Pact Supreme Commander Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov asked Jaruzelski on December 3 to permit the allied forces to move into Poland at zero hour on December 8.[8] Although Jaruzelski later claims in his memoirs that he denied permission requested by Kulikov, it more likely, given the absence of credible evidence, that he had asked postponement and received no answer. Kania himself tried to arrange a meeting with Brezhenv before the December 5 meeting, but the Soviet leader was not available.[9]
In his presentation at the December 5 meeting, Kania assured his colleagues that the Polish Communist Party would recover and route the opposition by political means. Although the East German and Bulgarian party leaders were not impressed, the Soviet representatives were: Brezhnev omitted any reference to an armed intervention in the summit’s concluding statements.[10] After the summit, Kania was able to persuade Brezhnev that “if there were an intervention there would be a national uprising. Even if angels entered Poland, they would be treated as bloodthirsty vampires and the socialist ideas would be swimming in blood.”[11] Brezhnev replied, “OK, we will not go in although if complications occur, we would. But without you, we won’t go in.”[12]
During this time the U.S. government had been informed about what was transpiring from its satellite surveillance and from other intelligent sources and sought to support a resolution that did not involve a foreign intervention of Poland. For example, the U.S. State Department’s first public statements described the 1980 Gdańsk strike as one between “the Polish people and the Polish authorities” to be worked out by themselves. It was considered that U.S. statements on behalf of “rebel workers” in the past had been counterproductive; and the United States should refrain from showing a “red flag – or a trigger – to the Soviets.”[13] These statements were accompanied by a strong protest against the Soviet jamming of Western broadcasts as a violation of the Helsinki Accord.
Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski also had interpreted events as a planned invasion and sought to deter it by public disclosure of the military build-up around Poland to deny the invaders the advantage of surprise. He also sent dispatches to Moscow that cautioned about the costs of such an invasion.[14] This message, composed by Brzeinski, was sent to Brezhnev via. the White House hot line on December 3, to which president only added “best wishes” with his signature.[15]
Finally, Brzezinski “urged the President to underline American interests in these [Polish] developments through Presidential Letters” to Western European leaders in order for “a common Western policy would emerge.” It would also indirectly express the United States’ concern about a possible Soviet invasion.[16] Carter wrote to the French, German, and British leaders that “events in Poland are of such importance that I should very much like to have your personal assessment of them, and also to share mine with you.” The outcome “could precipitate far-reaching consequences for East-West relations and even for the future of the Soviet bloc itself.” He was sympathetic to the Solidarity, but the West should avoid any interference which “could be seized upon by the Soviets as a pretext for intervention.”[17]
The result was a December 12 statement by NATO foreign ministers which proclaimed the desirability of avoiding both Soviet and Western interference in Polish affairs. Unfortunately, this statement was preceded by a commentary by Admiral Robert H. Falls, the chairman of the alliance’s military committee, that seem to discredit this statement. Giving higher priority to Western than to Soviet restraint, Falls told reporters that NATO “is a defensive alliance which does not include Poland. And so it is terribly important that whatever the alliance does it does not exacerbate the situation and adversely impact on the intentions of the Soviet Union.”[18]
From the CIA perspective, the “militant workers” of Solidarity were perceived as the fundamental problem. Tough talk would be needed “to bring the militant strike leader around to the view that the dangers inherent in the situation have come to outweigh the gains they seek . . . The most effective means of pressure would almost certainly by saber-rattling from Moscow.”[19] However, the CIA also recognized that Moscow had never been enthusiastic about the option of military intervention, for the Soviet “military preparation was undertaken in anticipation of a political decision which would determine whether military forces would be moved into Poland.”[20] The CIA speculated that either the Soviet Union would approve compromises short of independent trade unions in the hope of removing them once the crisis was past, or the Soviet Union would allow the Polish government to use force itself and then intervene if the Polish government were unable to achieve success. Such a cost would be acceptable if this prevented the Polish regime from collapsing.[21]
President Reagan’s Secretary of State-designated, General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., made public statements that balanced the costs of a Soviet invasion on U.S.-Soviet relations with the rewards of restraint. Once in power, the Republican administration continued the Carter’s administration’s policy of helping reschedule Poland’s debt to western creditors on the premise that a political rather than military solution would be found to resolve the Polish crisis.[22] Such a proposal was congenial to Moscow, for the Soviet government, which also sent economic assistance to Poland, wanted Poland to resolve its own political crisis rather than resort to military intervention. Thus, both the United States and the Soviet Union believed that Poland would adapt its political behavior to economic incentives.
In spite of these attempts, the White House’s warnings and actions had no discernable effects on Moscow, whose leaders had written off the Carter Administration as a lame-duck president and did not seem to care whether the invasion would strain relations with Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan. If anything seemed to have an effect on Moscow’s decision to invade, it appears Kania’s presentation at the December 5 summit had an influence on the course of developments rather than anything the United States did or could do. Thus, the invasion that was to start on December 8 did not take place: the Soyuz maneuvers, which were conducted outside of Polish territory, were extended past the December 21 deadline with no objections from either the Polish government or military.
However, invasion was not called off: it was only postponed. Unlike Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, Poland was a case where military power did not translated into a political advantage. Having begun their own preparations for an administrative solution, the Polish military became indispensable for obtaining Soviet objectives.
The Second Planned Warsaw Pact Invasion (March 1981)
At a closed meeting among the Warsaw Pact’s supreme command and defense ministers on January 13, 1981, an internal solution to the Solidarity problem seemed more probable and was entrusted to Jaruzelski. In mid-February Soviet reconnaissance groups began arriving in Poland to assess the situation of the willingness of the Polish military to cooperate, which an internal solution depended.[23]
The Soviet estimate of the Polish communist party’s to resolve the Solidarity problem was skeptical. Gromyko suspected that “our Polish friends, regardless of our recommendations, do not want to adopt emergency measures”; and Ustinov had the impression that “there has not yet been any real turnaround in the Polish situation.” Therefore, he insisted:
. . . we need to constantly keep pressure on the Polish leadership and constantly
keep checking on them. We intend to hold maneuvers in Poland in March. It seems
to me that we should somehow bolster these exercises to make it clear that we have
forces ready to act.[24]
Jaruzelski was better than Kania at persuading Moscow that he was willing to impose emergency measures on the pretext of the looming threat of a military invasion. He received Moscow’s backing for assuming the premiership on February 10, 1981. Jaruzelski called for a 90-day truce with Solidarity, although he did not do anything to promote communication with them but rather used the state propaganda services to assert that “only Poland as a socialist state, joined the alliance with the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact, can remain an independent and free country, a country within secure borders.”[25]
Jaruzelski soon took steps to accelerate the plans for martial law.[26] It is not clear whether Jaruzelski had been encouraged by the commentary on the change of government in Warsaw by State Department spokesman William Dyess, who suggested that an intervention by Polish forces to “establish order” in their own country would be regarded by the United States as a “Polish matter.” Washington’s subsequent clarification that such an intervention would be “a matter of very great concern to us” did not discourage Jaruzelski from moving ahead with plans of martial law.[27] On February 20 the finished plans were submitted for approval to Jaruzelski, who two weeks later informed Soviet premier Nikolai Tikhonov.[28]
The Soviet leaders showed no signs of concern about the possible consequences for their relations with the new Reagan administration. In spite of Reagan’s anti-communist rhetoric, Soviet leaders believed Reagan would be another Republican who would conduct foreign affairs according to realpolitik rather than the ideological beliefs of democracy and human rights.[29] The combined military maneuvers of Soyuz and Druzhba were scheduled on March 16 and to be completed by March 25.
The U.S. government again made it public that Soviet-led forces were about to enter Poland, and U.S. officials anticipated they would move there during the weekend of March 28.[30] The U.S. also had been alerted by an unnamed source that Jaruzelski was to declare a state of emergency with “very discreet . . . external support” and crush Solidarity by using the Polish army and police.[31] Thus, the CIA had correctly assessed the situation as follows:
Moscow will seek to enlist the backing of the Polish leadership and to co-opt the Polish General Staff. They would probably hope that the Polish security forces would take the lead in domestic repression, leaving the Soviet forces to concentrate on maintaining order and crushing armed resistance. They would also try to maximize the ambiguities of their move into Poland by utilizing such pretexts as “exercises” in order to minimize the possibility of full-scale military resistance by the Poles and in an attempt to lessen the international costs. We do not believe that the Polish military would present armed opposition organized under central authority.[32]
A U.S. Alert Memorandum concluded: “The Soviets are now capable of intervention with a force of 12 to 20 divisions with little further warning. Whether the Soviets believe such a force is adequate is known only to them.”[33] President Reagan sent a message to Brezhnev to warn him against the extension of Soyuz maneuvers.[34] But Reagan also offered Poland an economic package if force were not used: 1) $200 million, in addition to the $670 million, loan guarantees for the fiscal year; 2) sale of dairy products at concessionary prices, plus $70 million in surplus butter and dried milk; 3) an emergency donation of wheat under “food for peace” legislation; and 4) rescheduling some $80 million in debt repayments due by June 30.[35]
Solidarity responded to Warsaw Pact exercises by organizing a four-hour warning strike which brought the country to a standstill and threatened to follow it four days later with a general strike of indefinite duration. Although the Soviet leaders wanted martial law declared, the Polish Minister of Defense refused.[36] Warsaw Pact party leaders met on March 29-30 to authorize an agreement with Solidarity to avert a strike, because nobody was certain whether the Polish military would assist in the Warsaw Pact or organize a rebellion against them.[37] Kania and Jaruzelski in fact pleaded this very case against foreign intervention. The Warsaw Pact thus had no choice other than rely on the Polish Communist Party and military to resolve the Solidarity problem without foreign intervention.
Martial Law and Communist Collapse
Once Moscow had abandoned the military option, the Polish leaders were given choices whether they would use force to resolve the Solidarity situation. Jaruzelski assumed the top party position on October 18, 1981. The October maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact were conducted in Poland and made no mention of an outside intervention.
When martial law was declared on December 13, 1981, the U.S. government, unlike previous times, had misjudged the situation. Blinded by the possibility of a Warsaw Pact invasion, the U.S. government no longer considered the alternative of martial law declared locally. Nor did it help that is National Security Adviser, Richard Allen, was distracted with accusations of graft. The result was that the United States was caught flat-footed when martial law was declared.
Likewise, Moscow was taken by surprise. “No one knows what will really happen in the next few days,” Soviet ambassador to Warsaw Boris I. Aristov was quoted as having reported at the 10 December Politburo meeting. “There was a conversation about ‘Operation X.’ First there was talk that it would happen the night of the 11th to 12th, then the night of the 12th to the 13th. And now they are already saying it will only be about the 20th.”[38]
When martial law was declared, there was anger in the White House. Richard Pipes recalled: “the six or seven weeks following the crackdown were extremely tense and busy in the White House. In my two years in Washington they were the most intense and harrowing.” Reagan “did not conceal his outrage at what was happening in Poland.” Convinced that appeasement in the 1930s had led to the Second World War, he was determined to respond to Soviet aggression before it was too late.”[39]
Writing a personal letter to Jaruzelski to protest the declaration of martial law, Reagan announced American sanctions on December 23, 1981 that ended food and consumer purchases, cancelled export credit insurance, and terminated civil aviation landing rights in the United States and fishing permissions in U.S. waters. However, humanitarian aid would continue. Reagan then extended sanctions to the Soviet Union, which was seen as the principal agent of martial law. These included cancellation of export license for gas pipeline equipment, embargoes on certain technologies, and the postponement of a new long-term grain agreement.[40]
It was not until mid-1986 when the United States began to lift sanctions in direct proportion to the domestic political liberalization in Poland. Specifically the United States demanded 1) an end to martial law, with a later extension to respecting human rights; 2) the release of political prisoners; and 3) the resumption of a dialogue with Solidarity.[41] In return, in the words of one diplomat, “The U.S. government would respond to a genuine amnesty [for political prisoners] by signing an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation. If the amnesty was a full one, and went so far as including Bujak for example, the U.S. would lift its embargo on credit for Poland. In the final phase, Poland could regain the most-favored-nation trading status.”[42]
After Minister of the Interior Czyrek declared that he was willing to negotiate with Solidarity on August 26, 1988, the Round Table Talks were established with 35% of the seats for contest in the Sejm, all the seats contested in the Senate, and with the understanding that Jaruzelski would be elected president. The U.S. Embassy was following these developments closely and had contacts both within the Polish government and Solidarity. When elections were called, U.S. Ambassador John R. Davis Jr. had no doubt about the outcome, as he had reported to Washington: “The elections in June are, for the regime, an unpredictable danger and, for the opposition, an enormous opportunity. The authorities, having staked a great deal, are hoping for some modest success. But they are more likely to meet total defeat and great embarrassment.” The notion that the Polish Communist would succeed because of its superior organizational abilities would have little impact, since Solidarity had changed the nature of the regime. As far as Solidarity’s inexperience and disorganization, these obstacles, in Davis’ opinion, were being overcome.[43]
After the election, with Solidarity’s overwhelming success, there was a question about the presidency which was to be given to Jaruzelski. During this period, Czyrek called the American Deputy Head of Mission to express concern about “rumors” that the United States was supporting maneuvers to block a Jaruzelski’s presidency. Although Czyrek was unable to name the source of these rumors, he stated that if Jaruzelski would not be president, then “the process underway could lead either to chaos or rigid dictatorship . . . Poland’s fate is at stake.” He asked the United States “to exert influence on Solidarity to provide enough votes to ensure [Jaruzelski’s] election.[44] It was known that both the Polish military and militia would “feel personally threatened if Jaruzelski were not President and would move to overturn the Round Table and election results.”[45] In short, the United States was asked to intervene in order to prevent a coup in Polish politics.
The United States played an active role in advising Solidarity of how to elect Jaruzelski to the presidency. Perhaps the turning point was President Bush’s visit to Poland in July 1990 when he met with the main political actors, including Jaruzelski.[46] In fact, Bush pushed Jaruzelski to run for the presidency for the stability of Poland.[47] Perceived by some as an endorsement, Jaruzelski did run for the presidency and won by one ballot. However, Jaruzelski resigned after he had appointed Mazowiecki as Poland’s first non-communist prime minister since 1948.
Conclusion
What lessons, if any, can we conclude from this case? It is clear that the American foreign policy establishment accurately understood the concerns and factors that played into the planned Warsaw Pact invasion of Poland in both December 1980 and March 1981. What it failed to do was to consider seriously the alternative of martial law declared locally. Nevertheless, the lessons of Poland served the United States well in supporting Poland’s transition towards liberal democracy and a free-market economy.
The singular factor that seemed to play a critical role in the United States for misjudging the declaration of martial law was an unwillingness to consider all options with equal gravity. It is this factor that led to the U.S. misjudging Jaruzelski’s intentions about martial law. In fairness, the Soviets also were surprised. Nonetheless, this does not excuse the misjudgment. If the American foreign policy establishment wants to continue to perceive events accurately, they need to remedy this deficiency.
Overall the American foreign policy establishment’s perceptions of Poland comported with the reality of events. These perceptions helped shaped America’s role in Polish domestic affairs during its transition from communism to liberal democracy. As more secret material becomes declassified, the more we will be able to discern whether our policy-makers are correct in their judgments; and if not, how we can help in improving their evaluations of events.
Notes
[1] “Dokumenty ‘Komissii Suslova’: Sobytiya v Polshe v 1981 g.” Novaya I noveishaya istoriya, 1994, 1, August 25, 1980, pp. 84-105. Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Jachranka.
[2] Soviet Politburo session, October 29, 1980, copy National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington DC.
[3] Kubina, Michael and Mafred Wilke, eds., ‘Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen!’: Die SED contra Polen 1980/81, Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückkung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin Akademie, 1994), pp. 101-114, 122.
[4] Ryszard J. Kuklinski, ‘Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka’ Kulutra (Paris), 475, April 4, 1987, pp. 3-57.
[5] Initially they were to meet December 1, but Brezhnev postponed it to December 5. Anatolii I. Gribkov and Stanislaw Kania, November 9, 1997, Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Jachranka.
[6] Jaruzelski, Wojciech. Mein Leben für Polen: Erinnerugen (Munich: Piper, 1993), 234-35.
[7] Kuklinski “Wojna” p.23.
[8] Jaruzelski, Mein Leben, 236.
[9] Witalij Swietlow, “Bez wzgledu na cene,” Gazeta Wyborcza, December 11, 1992.
[10] Minutes of Warsaw Pact Summit Meeting, December 5, 1980, in Kubina and Wilke, 140-195; Minutes of Soviet Politburo session, December 11, 1980, copy NSA.
[11] Jane Perlez, “Poland ’80-’81: Players Do a Surprising Postmoderm,” International Herald Tribune, November 12, 1997.
[12] Kania, Stanislaw. Zatrzymac konfrontacje (Warsaw, BGW, 1991), 91.
[13] Cynkin, Thomas. Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis (Bassingstroke: St. Martin’s Press 1988), 42.
[14] Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1985), 463-469.
[15] Carter to Brezhnev, December 3, 1980, in Orbis, Winter 1988, pp. 32-48.
[16] Brzezinski, Power and Principal, 464.
[17] State Department Telegram, “Presidential Letter (August 27, 1980)” and “(September 1, 1980).”
[18] Communiqué by the North Atlantic Council, December 12, 1980, Texts of Final Communiqués Issued by Ministerial Sessions of the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group, 1975-1980 (Brussels, NATO Information Service, no. date), pp.153-157; quoted in Washington Post, December 10, 1980, A35.
[19] NIB Special Analysis, (August 28, 1980).
[20] “Poland’s Prospects over the Next Six Months,” National Intelligence Estimate, 12:6-81, January 27, 1981.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Cynkin, Soviet and American Signaling, 84.
[23] Kuklinski, “Wojna,” p.31
[24] Minutes of the Soviet Politburo session, January 22, 1981, copy, NSA.
[25] Michta, Andrew A. Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988 (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institute, 2009), 101.
[26] Kuklinski, “Wojna,” p.28-29.
[27] Cynkin, Soviet and American Signaling, 90; New York Times, February 11, 1981.
[28] Kuklinski, “Wojna,” pp.29-30.
[29] Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington DC: Brooking Institution, 1994), 57-74.
[30] The New York Times, March 27, 1981; Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 230.
[31] US Defense Intelligence Agency, “Weekend 28-29 March Ominous for Poland,” March 27, 1981.
[32] “Poland’s Prospects over the Next Six Months,” pp.13-14.
[33] CIACO NID Alert Memorandum, April 3, 1981.
[34] Cynkin, Soviet and American Signalling, 111.
[35] Ibid., 106-07.
[36] Kuklinski, “Wojna,” pp. 33-34.
[37] Minutes of Soviet Politburo session, April 2, 1981 and April 9,1981, NSA.
[38] Minutes of Soviet Politburo session, December 10, 1981.
[39] Richard Pipes, “American-Soviet Relations and the Polish Question.” In Sisyphus and Poland. Reflection on Martial Law, J. Black and J. Strong, eds. (Winnipeg, 1986), 127.
[40] P. Marantz, “Economic Sanctions in the Polish Crisis.” In Sisyphus and Poland. Reflection on Martial Law, J. Black and J. Strong, eds. (Winnipeg, 1986), 114-15.
[41] John R. Davis, Jr. in Packowski, A. ed. Polska 1986-1989 (Warsaw: 1997), 43-45.
[42] AAN 237/XIA/1442: reports on July 10 and 29, 1986 (L. Pastusiak and B. Sujka).
[43] NSA, “Election ’89: The Year of Solidarity” (April 19, 1989), 1-2.
[44] NSA, “Politburo member warns that US has been ‘dragged into the war’ over election of Jaruzelski as President” (June 16, 1989), 1-3.
[45] Ibid., 5-9
[46] Beschloss, Michael and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels (Boston, 1993), 85-89.
[47] Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 117.
Also available are “Enemy Images, Evidence, and Cognitive Dissonance: The Cold War As Recalled by Michiganders“; “The American Perspective of the Cold War: The Southern Approach (North Carolina)“; “Soviet Perspective on the Cold War and American Foreign Policy“; “The Polish Perspective of American Foreign Policy: Selected Moments from The Cold War Era“; “The Netherlands During the Cold War: An Ambivalent Friendship and a Firm Enmity“; “The Special Relationship: United States-Russia“; “After the Cold War: U.S.-Ukrainian Relations (1991-2000)“; Soviet Attitudes Towards Poland’s Solidarity Movement” and “The Paradox of Solidarity from a Thirty Years Perspective.“
This article was originally published with the same title in The Solidarity Movement and Perspectives on the Last Decade of the Cold War, Lee Trepanier, Spasimir Domaradzki, and Jaclyn Stanke, ed. (Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University Press, 2010).
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